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Abstract
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate civic activism among rural communities in Indonesia and
how they can obtain their policy of interest – two main features that build rural political agency.
It emphasizes on rural participation in Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs), popular
community-based farmer organizations, which have proliferated over the last decade. Two
research questions guide this project: (1) What are the conditions that explain rural participation
in RPOs in Indonesia? and (2) What are the effects of this participation on the political agency
of rural communities?. Using a mixed-method approach that consists of original survey analysis,
interviews, and quantitative analysis, this dissertation found that exposure to trade openness
provides the primary motivation for rural communities to join an RPO, as they desire to stay
competitive in the globalized market. The dissertation further explores how membership in RPOs
promotes not only economic well-being of its members but also rural communities’ involvement
in political activities, mainly by participating in policymaking discussions. The empirical
findings suggest that rural participation in RPOs correlates with higher government support,
although it is still constrained by certain political environment at the local level. The findings in
this dissertation will help us better understand democracy in developing countries such as
Indonesia, as nearly three-quarters of its population lives in rural areas and engaging in
agricultural activities.

Keywords: rural civic participation, rural producer organization, RPO, political agency, rural
development
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Research Questions
Scholars of democracy have emphasized the importance of civic participation in
promoting economic prosperity, particularly for the most disadvantaged populations (Putnam,
2000; Sen, 2000; Gaventa, 2006). With nearly three-quarters of the poor population in
developing countries living in rural areas and engaging in agricultural activities, understanding
civic participation in rural agrarian communities should be an integral part of understanding
democracy in developing countries.
Small agricultural producers1 in developing countries, however, are often considered
marginalized, both in economic and political terms. They are seen as weak, unable to mobilize,
and underrepresented in politics (Omamo, 1998; Key et al., 2000; Minot, 2007; Barret, 2008).
Following Olson (1968), the conventional wisdom is that concentrated interests dominate public
policy because of their ability to coordinate and solve collective action problems. This is
contrary to large and diffused groups, such as small agricultural producers, who face many
market failures such as information asymmetry and limited access to resources. This, coupled
with their inability to lobby the government, results in agricultural producers being
underrepresented in politics (Omamo, 1998; Key et al., 2000; Minot, 2007; Barret, 2008).
Moreover, growing economic liberalization has also further suppressed their role in politics
because governments opt for efficiency instead of welfare. Developing countries usually exhibit

1

The term “agricultural producers” is used interchangeably with “farmers” and “rural producers” in this dissertation.

1

“urban bias” as they heavily tax and lower the prices of the agricultural sector to support urban
industrialized constituents that demand cheap products (Lipton 1977, Bates 1981, Bezemer and
Headey, 2008). This causes high rates of poverty and income inequality in many developing
countries despite their continued trade and economic growth (Woodward, 1996; Rudra, 2002;
Williamson, 2011).
Yet, studies on the existence and role of Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs), popular
community-based farmers’ organizations, in enhancing the livelihood of small agricultural
producers have proliferated over the last decade, such as agricultural cooperatives and producer
associations. These studies show many successful collective action stories of small agricultural
producers (Berdegue et.al., 2001; Jones 2004; Hellin et al., 2007; Valentinov 2007; Markelova et
al, 2009; Bernard et al., 2008; Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Shiferaw et al, 2009; Francesconi
and Heerink 2011; Fischer and Qaim 2011). Because RPOs pool resources and coordinate
economic activities, they can reduce transaction and production costs of its members. This
results in increased economies of scale, improved market access, and secured livelihoods for
members in a growing competitive market.
Although RPOs focus mainly on economic activities, studies have shown that they are
also involved in political activities, mainly through their participation in policymaking
discussions (Ndambo, 2005; Hellin et. al., 2009; Gouët et. al., 2009; Pimbert et. al., 2010). Other
political activities of RPOs include affiliating with certain political parties and having their
representatives hold elected office (Swanson, 2006). Scholars and policymakers have therefore
argued that it is essential for small agricultural producers to work collectively to stay competitive
in the growing modern market and have a place in politics.

2

Over the past decade, small agricultural producers have consistently increased their
membership in RPOs in most parts of the world, particularly in developing countries (IFPRI,
2012). According to the UN's Global Census on Cooperatives (2013), there are about 1.2 million
agricultural cooperatives, accounting half of the overall cooperatives across the globe. Excluding
members in farmers’ associations, there are 122 million people in agricultural cooperatives
around the world. Global comprehensive data on agricultural cooperatives are limited, but some
information is available about agricultural cooperatives in a few different countries. FAO (2013)
provides data on the number of agricultural cooperatives and their membership size across
different countries. For instance, 40 percent of Brazil’s agricultural GDP comes from
cooperatives; 4 million farmers in Egypt are members of agricultural cooperatives; 924 thousand
Kenyan coffee farmers are members of cooperatives; 900 thousand Ethiopian coffee farmers are
members of cooperatives; 12 million Indian dairy farmers are members of cooperatives; and 500
thousand Columbian coffee farmers are members of cooperatives.
The significance of RPOs is also evident in Indonesia – the focus of this study – as the
number of RPOs and its membership total (both agricultural cooperatives and farmer’s
associations) grew by almost 20 percent between the years 2010 and 2015 (Graph 1.1). In 2015,
there were about 48 million members of RPOs, which accounted for 25 percent of Indonesia’s
total population.

3

Graph 1.1. RPOs in Indonesia
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of Indonesia.

Despite these overall positive trends, participation rates in RPOs vary considerably across
locations as shown in Graph 1.2 below. The graph shows that, in general, rural producers’
participation in agricultural cooperatives is higher in developed countries. For example, Japan
and Korea have a high membership rate of 70 to 90 percent, while countries in Latin America –
such as Colombia and Paraguay – have lower membership rates of 18 and 11 percent
respectively (International Cooperative Agriculture Organization Statistics, 2017). A more
interesting observation is that RPO membership also varies considerably across different regions
within a country, as evident in Indonesia in Figure 1.3.
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Graph 1.2. Agriculture Cooperative Membership across Countries
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Graph 1.3. Indonesia’s RPO Membership across Provinces, 2010 and 2015
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This dissertation seeks to demonstrate how civic activism among rural communities in
Indonesia shapes the political agency of rural population. By political agency, I refer to rural
communities’ capacity to participate in matters that concern their well-being and ability to access
decision-making processes. Because the vast majority of Indonesia’s population live in rural
areas and are engaged in the agricultural sector, we cannot get the full picture of how
democratization has changed Indonesian society unless we understand civic participation in rural
communities. This dissertation is novel in its emphasis on rural producers’ participation in RPOs
and the ways in which RPOs promote economic welfare and democratic values within rural
communities. Moreover, this dissertation is motivated by the considerable variation of rural
producers’ participation in RPOs that exist across sub-national regions of Indonesia. Thus, the
two research questions that guide this project are: (1) What are the conditions that explain rural
participation in RPOs in Indonesia? and (2) What are the effects of this participation on the
political agency of rural communities?
Using a mixed-method approach that consists of survey analysis, interviews, and
quantitative analysis, I demonstrate the conditional factors that can affect the level of rural
producers’ participation in RPOs in a region and how participating in RPO shape the political
agency of rural communities in Indonesia.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews existing
literature on the concept of rural political agency, the development and role of RPOs, and
explanations on the level of RPO participation. Section 1.3 describes the research design, and
Section 1.4 explains the structure of the dissertation.

6

1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Concept of Rural Political Agency

In this dissertation, rural political agency is defined as both the capacity of rural agrarian
societies to participate in matters that concern their well-being and access to governance or
decision-making processes. A succinct justification is given below.

In sociological terms, the most basic definition of human agency is the capacity of
humans to take actions towards achieving their aspirations in a particular social structure such as
within a state, group, or culture (Bennett, 2002) 2. Different temporal processes shape this ability.
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) note: “…. human agency is a temporally embedded process of
social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the
future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to
contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).” While
different structural environments temporally construct human agency, Emirbayer and Mische
argue that human agency also constructs these structural environments.
Political agency – human agency in the political realm – consists of different political
actors’ engagement and their ability to effect change within the political system (Maiguashca and
Marchetti, 2015; Biekart and Fowler 2008). Particularly, it emphasizes how these actors
influence policy outcomes within formal state institutions. Maiguashca and Marchetti (2015)
describes the different theoretical views of political agency, although all entail a similar notion of
politics – power and the interaction between different political actors. According to the radical
2

Although the concept of agency in sociological terms is mainly rooted for individual agent, it also applied to
collective agency known as ‘civic agency’ (Biekart and Fowler, 2009).
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tradition, “political agency is the capacity to take part in the struggle to define the modalities of
life in common, stressing the conflictual dimension of politics.” Citing Koremoenos et al. (2004),
Maiguashca and Marchetti claims that a liberal or rational choice approach sees “political agency
as being the strategic capacity to coordinate with others in order to have one’s own
predetermined preferences adopted by the political system.” And citing Wendt (1987) and
Dessler (1989), Maiguashca and Marchetti argues that the constructivist approach sees “political
agency as the capacity to take part in socio-linguistic interaction in order to co-determine social
structures and one’s own identity.”

From the definitions above, one can see that the civic participation of different political
actors is a key aspect of political agency. Civic participation is also an important pillar in
democracy and has been widely discussed in the democracy literature, particularly concerning
developing countries with relatively new democracies (e.g., Putnam, 1993; Dreze and Sen, 1996;
Moore and Putzel, 1999; Harriss, 2000; Luckham et al., 2000). In the literature, civic
participation is used interchangeably with civic engagement or citizen participation, but the
words convey the same meaning – citizens being able to engage in public processes (Malik and
Waglé, 2002). Having democratic institutions is not a guarantee for having democratic practices.
The latter is dependent on whether citizens can hold the government accountable (Moore and
Putzel, 1999). Through civic participation, citizens can select, monitor, and sanction leaders.
This hinders corrupt and unjust policies that benefit elites, leading to an improvement in public
goods provision and good governance. Consequently, civic participation can reduce economic
instability and improve economic performance since it encourages citizens to cooperate and
compromise (Rodrik, 2000).

8

While civic participation in the political system can be primarily understood as
participating in elections and voting, the scope of participation goes beyond that. Civic
participation does not necessarily have to be electoral; it can include other forms of engagement
that affect the political landscape. This includes membership in community groups or
associations, participating in public meetings, providing feedback to government officials, taking
part in public decision-making processes, monitoring government agencies, and volunteering
(Putnam, 2000; Messner et al., 2006). In fact, these non-electoral forms of participation are
increasing as indicated by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). When measuring
citizen participation in established democracies in 2004 and 2014, ISSP found that while there
was a decline in voter turnout, other forms of civic participation – such as direct contact with
political leaders and members of civic associations – were rising.

Discussing political agency begs the question: who are the political actors? Traditionally,
political agency only encompasses the capacity of political parties and governmental actors to
influence political systems. However, changes in societal relations – due to globalization,
modernization, and/or the complexity of the political system – have shifted political agency to a
wider range of society such as non-governmental organizations, stateless group, and firms
(Higgott et al. 2000; Arts, 2000; Maiguashca and Marchetti, 2015). Political actors also include
rural communities, where collective action among rural agricultural producers is flourishing and
talks with government officials, particularly local government officials, are becoming common.
These non-states actors are now more involved in the policy process by means of lobbying and
monitoring the implementation of public programs, thus demonstrating a bottom-up approach to
policymaking. Political agency can bring about substantial transformative changes, as individuals
can have the ability to change a structure or system (O’brien, 2015).
9

The notion of political agency also encompasses effective participation, in which the
concerns of rural producers are being heard and taken into consideration in the policymaking
process. However, as theories of policymaking have indicated, participation does not always
mean that policy outcomes will match participants’ interests (Shadlen, 2004). Policy outcomes
tend to favor small groups of elites and organized interest groups, particularly those that have
economic leverage. This is known as the Biased Pluralism view of policymaking (Gilens and
Page, 2014). Mass-based interest groups, such as rural agricultural groups and citizens, tend to
have little to no influence. However, not everyone supports this view of policymaking. Neopluralist scholars argue that policy outcomes are influenced by many contextual variables.
Therefore, even the elites are not guaranteed their desired policy outcome because they too are
constrained by other factors such as public opinion, budget, counter opposition, and political
culture (Gray and Lowery, 1996). This is aligned with Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) view in
which political agency is influenced by time and place.

But even when citizens participate, this does not mean that their interests will be taken up
by their representatives, because they may not always be responsive to their demand. These
representatives may not deliver what their constituents want because their political interests,
ideas, etc. can be at odds with those of their constituents (Bradley and Chen, 2014; Htun, 2015).
In other cases, participation can be used as a mechanism of control from the government. For
example, the Moroccan government established a participatory institution known as the
Moroccan Community Abroad, but it was essentially a tool for the old regime to maintain control
(Dalmasso, 2017). When the desired policy outcome of certain groups is not obtained despite
their participation, their political agency can be considered weak. Their ability to participate in
policymaking was constrained by the power of other groups or elites. Similarly, when
10

representation exists without participation, political agency cannot be achieved since there is no
mechanism to hold representatives accountable (Htun, 2015). Political agency should therefore
consist not only of civic participation but the ability to have representation and influence policy
outcomes.

Thus, rural political agency consists of both the capacity of rural agrarian community to
participate in matters that concerns their well-being and access to governance or decisionmaking processes.

1.2.2 Building Rural Political Agency through Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs)

Three-quarters of the poor in developing countries live in rural areas and have minimum
access to policymaking processes. Thus there is a growing consensus among development
practitioners that civic participation of the rural poor is particularly important in improving
development (World Development Report, 2002; UNDP Annual Report, 2002; UN Human
Development Report, 2014). Improvement in rural participation will benefit national economic
performance and democratic development since agriculture remains the primary sector in
developing countries. It will also improve other important issues – such as urban poverty,
migration, global food security, and climate change – since they are all linked to rural
agricultural development (FAO Report, 2002). However, while electoral participation is an
important form of participation, non-electoral political participation may be more relevant for
small agricultural producers since access to electoral activities are economically and
geographically limited for rural communities (Fox, 2007).
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One major form of rural participation widely discussed in agricultural development
literature is participation in community-based farmers’ organizations or Rural Producer
Organizations (RPOs). RPOs are the most widespread form of agricultural organizations in
developing countries. They aim to enhance farmers’ market access, increase their earnings, and
achieve goals they may not be able to achieve by themselves (Bienabe and Sautier, 2005). With
the growing liberalization and privatization of the global agricultural sector, small agricultural
producers face many challenges, such as limited access to market and financial tools as well as
their lack of resources to compete. These challenges make RPOs an important element for
farmers to secure their livelihoods, because RPOs are basically economic organizations built
upon the principle of voluntary collective action, where farmers build their economies of scale
and improve service quality. RPOs can assume one or several functions, such as marketing,
processing, collection, and quality control, thus there are different forms of RPOs.
Cooperatives are the most well-known farmers’ organizations. A cooperative is “an
independent association of people united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise”
(ICA, 2010). Cooperatives are formal organizations, which are registered with the government
and are guided by state law. Agricultural cooperatives are cooperatives built by farmers and
specialize in one or more of the following activities: marketing, processing farm products,
purchasing farm inputs, and increasing members’ production and income. Since cooperative
activities are democratic, members have control over the organization (Barton, 1989). Another
principle of cooperatives is user ownership since members pay dues or some monetary
contribution (van Dijk et.al., 2005; Soboh et al., 2012; Verhees et.al., 2015).
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Other forms of farmers’ organizations are associations, registered producer groups, credit
groups, women’s groups, and landless laborers’ groups. These are formal organizations of
individuals around a shared interest, activity, or purpose. The structure and rules of the
organizations tend to be flexible. Besides these formal organizations, there are also informal
farmers’ organizations. These organizations are not formally registered with the government.
They include ethnic networks and traditional community organizations. Typically, these
organizations consist of people that share the same norms, values, and ethnic backgrounds,
acting collectively to achieve a common goal. They are more flexible than formal organizations
yet can be very exclusive and constrained by their customs and culture (FAO Report, 2007).
However, despite their variety, farmers’ organizations all share the same characteristics: they are
member-based organizations (owned and controlled by rural producers), rooted in rural areas,
and mainly engage in collective marketing activities (Bijman, 2007; Wennink et al., 2007;
Penrose-Buckley, 2007).

RPOs—particularly cooperatives—have been popular in development programs both in
developed and developing countries. It is considered the first step in many developmental
interventions to improve the performance of the smallholder farming sector and achieve rural
poverty reduction (World Bank, 2013). In the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries widely
sponsored the establishment of cooperatives mainly as a coordination tool for the central
government to conduct agricultural programs (Syahyuti, 2014). Indonesia started supporting
cooperatives under the Massive Guidance (BIMAS) Program in the 1970s as a tool to distribute
government support, facilitate coordination between the central government and local farmers,
and coordinate among small producers. The global support for cooperatives grew after the UN
designated the International Year of Cooperatives in 2012. As a result of their popularity, RPOs
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have increased over the last decade, demonstrating the success of collective action (Roy and
Thorat, 2008; Narrod et al., 2009; Bernard and Spielman, 2009; Shiferaw et al, 2009; Markelova
and Mwangi, 2010; Francesconi and Heerink 2011; Fischer and Qaim 2011). For example, more
than 70 percent of India’s milk is produced by small farmers in dairy cooperatives who own one
or two animals (FAO, 2004). Similarly, many coffee producers in South America can participate
in the market value chain due to their membership in cooperatives and farmer groups (Hellin and
Higman, 2003).
Previous discussions on rural producers’ agency, however, have centered around their
economic agency with the focus on how collective action among small agricultural producers
can improve their economic fortune. Through collective action, small agricultural producers have
the ability ‒ hence agency ‒ set up their own selling prices, build production infrastructure, and
select their own marketing strategy. Meanwhile, rural producers’ political agency has been
understudied. Why does membership in RPOs constitute rural political agency? I argue there are
three reasons for this.
First, the main feature of farmers’ organizations is that it is owned and controlled by its
members. Self-rule is the basic element needed to build rural political agency. It provides a very
simple form of democratic voting and practices that promote political participation (World Bank,
2016). Farmers’ organizations are also voluntary, which means that farmers who do join are
practicing a form of civic engagement. There are many barriers that prevent rural producers from
joining RPOs. Some reasons are: rational calculations of the expected benefits and transaction
costs (Stockbridge et al. 2003); weak management and entrepreneurial skills needed to manage
an organization (Pingali et al. 2005); collective action problems such as free-riding members and
high transactional cost (Olson, 1965); weak interactions with formal authorities (Pur and Moore,
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2007); and the inability to act independent of the government (Mohmand, 2016). When rural
producers voluntarily decide to join an RPO despite these challenges, they build up their political
agency as they gain the ability to participate independently and have control over their wellbeing.

Second, although their activities center around increasing the economies of scale and
market inclusion of its members, many farmers’ organizations have now moved beyond those
functions into policymaking. For example, Vorley et al. (2012) discuss how coffee cooperatives
in Ethiopia have successfully lobbied the government for international market access. In Peru,
the national federation of coffee cooperatives have successfully challenged tax laws that
disproportionately benefit private businesses (Vorley et al., 2012). In Tanzania, social networks
in rural villages are involved in many local policies such as government primary education
programs (Snyder, 2008). Farmers’ organizations are also involved in policymaking in
Indonesia. For example, farmers in Banyuwangi were able to demand settlements over land
disputes in 2013 (Tempo, 2013). Additionally, one of the well-known farmers’ organization,
Network of Farmer Groups, successfully lobbied the local government in Kulon Progo to
allocate microcredit loans in its budget to farmers (Vorley et al., 2012). In another example, one
of Indonesia’s farmers’ groups, Kontak Tani Nelayan Andalan (KTNA), successfully demanded
the government provide more biotechnology to boost agricultural productivity (Metro, 2015).
Involvement in policymaking even results in political positions in some countries, notably India
and Japan. In these cases, farmers were able to occupy positions in various political parties, the
government, and parliament and represent the interests of farmers (Swanson, 2006). As Swanson
(2006) argued, “… farmers’ organizations will become the basic building blocks of democratic
institutions and will enable farmers to participate more fully in the political process.”
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Lastly, RPOs are more accessible for farmers compared to other types of rural
organizations. Other types of organizations include religious, women’s or youth-based
organizations; mass-based development organizations; and rural political parties. Because rural
communities tend to work in agriculture, their livelihoods intersect with the economic mission of
RPOs. This creates a sense of ownership over the RPOs and an urgency to be part of the
organizations. RPOs are also geographically more accessible to join than other organizations
because they typically organize around specific landed area and commodities. They thus
concentrate in one area as opposed to other types of organizations that are more dispersed. RPOs,
particularly cooperatives and associations, are also economically accessible since member fees
are democratically agreed upon among members.3 Since cooperatives and associations are the
largest forms of RPOs and the most effective in delivering economic and political outcomes
(FAO, 2014), this dissertation will focus on the relationship between these two RPO forms and
rural participation.

1.2.3 Explaining Rural Participation in RPOs: The Importance of Contextual Factors
There are two large strands in the literature on RPOs: understanding RPOs’ performance
and understanding why rural communities become members of RPOs. Both strands, I argue, can
help us understand rural participation in the aggregate. First, rural participation depends on
whether RPOs exist in a given area and whether they benefit their members. Second,
understanding why individual farmers participate in RPOs can help us scale up and explain
aggregate level of rural participation.

3

Chapter 3 will discuss and test these assumptions.
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In understanding the performance of RPOs, scholars have focused on the features of
successful RPOs in practice, typically measured by how the organizations achieve their goals or
how they benefit their members. Despite growing rural participation, most rural producer
organizations are still weak (Bourgeois et al., 2003). Many RPOs are not effective in delivering
the promised outcome, and many simply fail to maintain their organizations (Markelova et al.
2009 and Poulton et al. 2010).
Scholars of agricultural development have studied factors that strengthen RPOs. Ragasa
and Golan (2012) claim that there are five main factors that make RPOs successful. They are: (1)
governance and management of the organization; (2) composition and heterogeneity in the
organization; (3) membership commitment; (4) community and agro-ecological factors; and (5)
external support. Governance and management of the organization refers to the organizational
capacity of its members. This is the most widely discussed factor in explaining the success of
RPOs. It takes into account the formal governing rules and management bodies of the
organization (whether it is strong or not), free-rider problems, the size of the organization, and
the leader’s accountability (Coulter et al, 1999; Shiferaw et al, 2009, Bernard et al, 2009; Fischer
and Qaim, 2012; Ragasa and Golan, 2012).
The composition and heterogeneity of membership are also widely discussed in the
literature. Homogeneity among members with respect to educational level, poverty level, age,
ethnic and religious background, and shared values positively affects organizational performance
(Coulter et al, 1999). The proportion of female participants, particularly in leadership positions,
is also important for RPOs to be successful (Barham and Chitemi, 2009). Thus, what’s important
is not just the homogeneity or heterogeneity of an organization. It’s important to consider the
member characteristics that would be beneficial for the organization. Another factor that explains
17

organizational success is membership commitment – the level of engagement of members. For
example, Shiferaw et al. (2009) argue that financial contributions or resources of members
increase the success of an organization.
Agro-geological and community factors are another factor studied in the literature. For
example, distance to markets (Bernard et al., 2009; Barham and Chitemi, 2009; Ragasa and
Golan, 2012) and rainfall availability (Bernard et al. 2009; Ragasa and Golan, 2012) are argued
to affect the success of RPOs. Some scholars looked at the characteristics of the product or sector
where successful collective action was seen. Organization occurred around high-value crops and
not food grains (Barrett, 2008; Berdegue et.al., 2001), showing that whether marketing and
distribution channels are long and complicated matters (Markelova and Mwangi 2010).
Additionally, existing social capital is beneficial for organizations because members who share
the same norms and values have an easier time coordinating among themselves (Heemskerk and
Wennink, 2004).
The three factors above are considered internal factors that affect successful organization;
however as Ragasa and Golan (2012) have noted, external factors have been understudied in the
literature. Internal factors refer to the characteristics and operation of the organization, while
external factors refer to the environment the organization is embedded in. Different studies on
the factors that explain successful RPOs show variation across place, supporting the need to
include contextual or external variables in the analysis. Some external variables that have been
explored by scholars include incidence of conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Ragasa
and Golan, 2012) and external support from NGOs, research institutes, and government agencies
(Bernard et al, 2008; Barham and Chitemi, 2008; Ragasa and Golan, 2012). Pojasek (2013)
argues that external factors also include many different economic and political contexts such as
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legislations, regulatory bodies, economic trends, consumer attitudes, and international trade. This
has not been studied for RPOs.
The other large strand in the literature seeks to understand why farmers participate in
RPOs. Studies on farmer participation in RPOs mainly focus on individual characteristics of
farmers, such as their education, age, gender, income, occupation, and time. For example, Karli
et al. (2006) studied what factors led farmers to join agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia. These
factors were education, communication skills, income, farm size, and technology. In Northern
Ethiopia, farmers decided to join cooperatives based on the following factors: information
access, special skills, frequency of attending a public meeting/workshop, education-level of the
head of the household, credit access, training access, number of family members in school,
distance to main market, availability of infrastructures, farmland ownership, and farmland sizes.
A farmer’s capital, such as land ownership and equipment, is also important (Shiferaw et al.,
2009; Fischer and Qaim, 2011). All these factors contribute to farmer’s utility maximization
calculation in which farmers join RPOs when costs are lower compared to non-membership
(Leathers, 2006).
Existing studies, however, do not explain the overall pattern of rural participation in
RPOs across different places. Why do some places have more rural participation than others?
Why do more farmers join RPOs in one place than in others? Most studies have established the
role of individual resources and attitudes on rural participation but are mostly context specific,
resulting in fragmented results. This reflects the need to account for the conditions in which the
organizations operate (Ragasa and Golan, 2012). Just as studies explaining the performance of an
organization lack contextual explanations, studies on why farmers participate in RPOs neglect
the role of contextual environments. Contextual factors, such as institutions and social structures,
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shape an individual’s motives, opportunities, and capacity for political participation. Therefore,
these are important elements to consider when understanding rural participation in RPOs.
Although very limited studies have looked at the contextual factors that shape rural
participation in RPOs, the literature on civic engagement provides useful information regarding
this matter. This literature outlines the following contextual factors that affect civic participation:
economic and political institutions, social structure, and cultural settings.

Democratic institutions are fundamental for rural participation because they provide rural
populations political rights to organize and vote rights that are limited under authoritarian
regimes. However, democracy per se does not guarantee that citizens will actively participate
(e.g., Barber 1984, Lijphart 1997, Skocpol 1999, Putnam, 2000). Moreover, although democratic
institutions even the playing field for farmers in the political arena (Bates and Block, 2013), they
still contain power inequalities that hinder rural participation (Van de Walle, 2003). In new
democracies particularly, rural communities must fight for access to social power which have
been traditionally reserved for political parties, government agencies, and unions (Ferrara and
Bates, 2001; Marchetti, 2014). Their participation is thus hindered by bureaucratic systems of
control and social exclusion, which fuels a more centralized and elite-based participation (Victor
and Heller, 2007).

Another structural disadvantage rural producers face is the ability to act collectively. The
conventional wisdom (Olson, 1965) is that collective action is difficult to achieve in a large
diffused group such as rural producers. Additionally, market failures; information asymmetry;
limited access to education, information, technology, and resources; and the isolated
geographical condition of farmers result in them becoming underrepresented in politics (Omamo,
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1998; Key et al., 2000; Minot, 2007; Barret, 2008). Public policies become dominated by small
concentrated interest groups because they can better overcome collective action problems. Thus,
rural participation and political agency face many challenges due to an unequal social structure,
leading to policies that marginalize small agricultural producers and continue poverty and
development problems of developing countries (Conray et.al, 1996).

Thus, the specific institutional features of democracy that promote broad civic
participation are important. Kriesi (2004) argue that the openness of the political system creates
formal access and more possible channels to influence politics, therefore increasing civic
political participation. This study uses the characteristics of the state to measure the openness of
the political system. It argues that states that are facilitative, cooperative, and rely on integrative
strategies lead to a higher overall level of mobilization. Under an open system, states rely on
cooperation with non-state actors and are open to public engagement. This contrasts with states
that employ exclusive strategies that limit public engagement.

The deepening process of democratic institutions, particularly through decentralization,
has been widely discussed to benefit rural populations and increase their engagement.
Decentralization is considered to improve public service provision and better governance
through the empowerment of citizens. Decentralization makes it is easier for citizens – especially
marginalized groups – to take part in decision-making through local governments (Crook and
Manor, 1998; Blair, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). The most common practice within the
decentralized system is participatory budgeting, where rural communities negotiate and criticize
local budgeting. In India, for example, the village meetings, known as Gram Sabhas, and the
panchayats system helped a marginalized group have a voice in local bodies. The group was able
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to improve village health and sanitation (Joan Costa-Font and Divya Parmar, 2106).
Additionally, those in rural areas have become more aware of the importance of participating in
decision-making programs since public officials, particularly at the local level, have improved
their responsiveness (Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Blair, 2000; Crook and Sverrisson,
2001).

1.3 Research Design
This dissertation adopts a mix-method approach using both qualitative and quantitative
analyses in answering the research questions. An original survey and interviews were conducted
as part of the qualitative strategy, with the main goal of obtaining key information for developing
the theory and collecting original data that was not available elsewhere. Interviews have played
an important part in developing the theory, where it can reveal the underlying rational choice and
incentive of an action and help to differentiate among different potential causal mechanisms. To
generate a causal explanation from the case, semi-structured interviews were conducted during
my research field in the summer of 2017. The respondents consist of small farmers – both
members and non-members – of RPOs, board members of RPOs, and people from related
government agencies.
An original survey of 220 rural producers drawn from 30 villages across three districts of
Indonesia – Keeron, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and Semarang, Central Java –
was conducted to obtain information on their membership in RPOs as well as their individual
socio-economic and political information. The spread of the region can be seen in Figure 1.1 of
Indonesia’s states. The data collected from the survey were then used for quantitative empirical
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analysis to: (1) identify the conditional factors that motivate farmers in joining an RPO and (2)
see how membership in an RPO shape member political participation.

Figure 1.1. Map of Regions in Indonesia

Secondary data at the subnational level of Indonesia were also collected to see the
correlation between the identified contextual factors with the level of rural participation. This
helps us understand how the level of rural participation in RPOs varies considerably across
regions of Indonesia. Panel data of Indonesian states during the period of 2010-2015 were
collected, which consists of RPO membership, socio-economic and political context of the
regions, and different governmental agricultural and welfare programs. Cross-country data on
RPO activities appear to be non-existent. But even if the data did exist, comparison across cases
might not be feasible since the nature and characteristics of rural organizations might differ
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across countries. Since subnational data is more accessible and comparable, the subnational
variation can provide similar insights in understanding rural civic participation in general.
However, a case should not be selected because it is interesting or has data available
(George and Bennett, 2005). Its selection should be relevant to the research objective and be able
to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem. Indonesia is a good
case to understand rural civic participation for a number of reasons. Indonesia is a large and
growing country and ran as the world’s 10th largest economy. Its population is 252 million, with
28.6 million still living below the poverty line (World Bank, 2014). Indonesia is open to the
world market, with a value of over 350 billion US dollars. It is engaged in numerous trade
agreements, including the ASEAN Free Trade Agreements (AFTA) and World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements.
Most importantly, Indonesia is the third largest democracy according to the Freedom
House Index, which emphasizes public participation. Indonesia is dominated by small scale
producers where 99.79 percent of Indonesian producers are small scale, and only 0.01% of
producers are large scale (Indonesia's State Ministry for Cooperatives Small and Medium
Enterprises). Since 2004, Indonesia has decentralized its economy giving administrative and
fiscal power to districts. Local governments are also responsible for many tasks, including
management of natural resource sectors and the provision of social services, such as health and
education. The local government is selected through local elections, known as the pilkada, that
are separated from the national elections. Thus, given Indonesia’s regime-type (democracy) and
its economic relevance, studying rural civic participation in Indonesia can provide a better
understanding of rural civic participation in general.
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1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction,
literature review, and an overview of the project. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide a historical
background of rural participation in Indonesia during two different political systems. Chapter 2
focuses on rural participation under the “New Order” authoritarian regime, while Chapter 3
focuses on rural participation under the democratic regime. The next three chapters will provide
empirical analyses on rural civic participation in Indonesia.
Chapter 4 focuses on the following question: does membership in an RPO increase rural
political participation? This chapter looks at the role of RPO membership on individual political
participation by using quantitative analysis based on the survey data I collected on 220 farmers
drawn from 30 villages across three districts of Indonesia. In this chapter, I discuss how RPOs
can also function as a tool for its member to participate in political activities not just economic
activities. The study focuses on two forms of political participation – elections and public
policymaking. Past studies on the role of RPOs have mostly focused on how RPOs increase
economic production and sales. Meanwhile, studies on RPOs’ role in politics are scarce at best.
Chapter 5 focuses on the following question: what are the contextual factors explaining
rural participation in RPOs? This chapter identifies the key contextual variables that explain rural
participation in RPOs. Through interviews and the survey, I gathered information on the external
factors that motivate respondents to join RPOs. Using panel data of Indonesian states from 2010
to 2015, I then conducted a quantitative analysis that tests the correlation between different
contextual variables and the level of rural participation in RPOs. Studies explaining rural
participation across the developing world have focused on when or how small rural agricultural
producers organize. While most explanations reference internal aspects of an organization – the
25

characteristics of members and organizational features – the literature lacks explanations on the
context in which the organization is placed. In other words, existing explanations do not answer
why rural organizations are more prevalent in certain areas than others.
Chapter 6 focuses on the following question: does rural participation result in farmers
obtaining their desired policy outcome? This chapter analyzes the effect of rural participation in
RPOs in obtaining government support, both in the form of agricultural productivity programs
and general social welfare programs. Quantitative analysis was conducted using the panel data of
Indonesian state from 2010 to 2015 to test this. Additionally, given that these government
programs were only provided to a specific group – farmers – this chapter tests whether political
contextual variables influence this relationship between rural participation and government
agricultural support.
And lastly, Chapter 7 provides a summary of the findings, a conclusion, avenues for
future research, and the policy implications of this study.
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CHAPTER 2
RURAL CIVIC PARTICIPATION UNDER INDONESIA'S “NEW
ORDER” AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides historical and institutional background on rural civic participation
during the 32 years of Indonesia’s authoritarian regime known as the “New Order” regime.
Although rural civic participation in Indonesia has existed since the Dutch colonial era, it was
formally institutionalized under the “New Order” regime which set the legal bases for many rural
organizations in Indonesia today. Under the rule of President Suharto, agriculture became the
leading sector in the economy. Substantial agricultural development programs were
implemented, including programs that promoted rural civic participation and rural organizations.
The regime achieved remarkable agricultural growth and economic outcomes. However, rural
communities did not actively contribute to these economic outcomes since agricultural
development occurred through oppressive top-down governance.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the early years of Indonesia’s
agricultural institutional development from the post-independence “Old Order” era to the “New
Order” authoritarian regime. Section 2.3 discusses the extensive agricultural development
programs adopted by President Suharto during the “New Order” regime. Section 2.4 focuses on
how rural participation was developed and shaped by institutional and political forces. Section
2.5 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 Institutional Shift from Post-Independence “Old Order” Regime to “New Order”
Regime
The “New Order” regime (Orde Baru) refers to the administration of President Suharto
that was established in 1966 to replace the post-independence “Old Order” regime (Orde Lama)
administration under President Sukarno. The “Old Order” regime lasted from the beginning of
Indonesia’s independence in 1945 until the overthrow of President Sukarno in 1966 after a series
of political and economic instability. Within the first year of independence, the Sukarno
government established “Pancasila,” the five basic principles of Indonesia (monotheism,
nationalism, humanism, social justice, and democracy), and the national constitution known as
the “UUD 1945” (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945). However, ideological conflict over the nation’s
political system, institutional infrastructure, and international relations emerged in the 1950s
(Salim, 2001). Part of the reason for the conflict was Indonesia’s multi-cultural society and
dispersed population, as well as the deep ideological tension mainly occurred between four major
groups in the country: (1) the military; (2) Communist Party; (3) Nationalist Party; and (4)
Islamist organizations.
The military (Indonesian Army) held a significant role during Indonesia’s independence
and continue to be an important group in Indonesia’s post-independence political activities.
Indonesia’s 1945 constitution, however, does not provide any political role for the military but
instead provides important roles to civilians and the President (Said, 2001). But Indonesia’s
strong military force continued after the revolution, and the early years of Indonesia's
independence were marked by a “dualism” of leadership between President Sukarno and the
military. Many of Sukarno’s instructions were disobeyed by the military, creating a hostile
environment between them (Said, 1991). The tension escalated quickly, mainly due to the
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development of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) during the
post-independence period. The Communist Party received support from President Sukarno, but
part of the military were against the Party (Horowitz, 2013).
Communism in Indonesia, developed during the Dutch colonial era in 1924, grew rapidly
during the “Old Order.” Poverty increased during the post-independence period and concerns
over the spread of capitalism were growing. The Communist Party’s main goals were to fight for
equality for disadvantaged people, such as peasants and rural labors, and promote the
establishment of rural-based organizations, such as Indonesian Peasant’s Front (Barisan Tani
Indonesia or BTI) and workers unions (Aspinall, 2005). The Communist Party’s members grew
from less than 8,000 to fourteen million, making it one of Indonesia’s most popular parties
(Pauker, 1969). The Party developed close ties with the Indonesian National Party (Partai
Nasional Indonesia or PNI), a revolutionary party established and led by Sukarno. The two
parties aligned to counter the increasing strength of the military. This later developed into a
conflict between two ideologies, capitalism – supported by a significant part of the military – and
communism. All this was happening in the context of the Cold War. Thus, this international
ideological conflict seeped into Indonesia and escalated the country’s domestic conflict
(Aspinall, 2005).
Meanwhile, a growing number of Islamist groups and parties were interested in making
Islamic ideology the state’s principle. However, these groups did not gain significant power over
the state. They were rebuffed by the significant number of non-Muslim citizens in Indonesia and
the country’s desire to prevent a separatist movement (Said, 2001). Moreover, due to Indonesia’s
multicultural society and Sukarno’s active nationalism campaign, Islamic political parties found
few ideological supporters among the citizens (Yulianti, 2015).
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Due to these ideological conflicts, the “Old Order” era experienced a series of economic
and political instability. The country’s multiparty electoral system created coalitions of groups
that found it difficult to reach a common ground. The distribution of power was relatively equal
among the political parties,4 which created instability in Indonesia’s early political life. Between
the years 1950-1959, Indonesia experienced seven cabinet changes (Cribb, 1999). Indonesia’s
political system changed from a presidential system to a parliamentary sytem to a liberal
democracy and, lastly, to a “guided democracy.”
Indonesia’s liberal democracy, implemented from 1949-1957, was the closest to a
western democracy. However, it failed due to a lack of sufficient institutional support, low
education rates and support for a democratic culture, and a lack of economic support (Hadiz and
Robinon, 2013). To replace the liberal democracy and provide a fresh start to a polarized
economy, President Sukarno adopted the “guided democracy.” The administration, 1959-1965,
was also known as a “systematic and planned democracy” or a “democracy with leadership.”
(Hadiz and Robinon, 2013). Although the goal was to achieve better national planning, the
“guided democracy” was essentially an authoritarian regime. Most of the national decisionmaking processes were controlled by the presidency with limited political constraints. Under this
system, Sukarno implemented populist economic policies and emphasized the importance of
building a national culture to unify the different local cultures and reduce the influence of
Western imperialist culture. His most popular policies were the nationalization of Dutch
commercial companies and the adoption of a closed economy in which Indonesia cut all ties with
the West, including the United Nations, IMF, and the World Bank (Glassburner, 1962).
4

The first Indonesian election in 1955 was participated by 172 parties with four main parties and the results as
follows: (1) Masyumi Party (Islamist) receive 20.9 percent of votes; (2) Indonesian National Party (PNI) received
20.3 percent; (3) Nahdatul Ulama (Islamist) received 18.4 percent; and (4) Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
received 16.4 percent (Tomsa, 2008).
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However, this created an economic catastrophe. Indonesia no longer received any foreign aid
money, and most of the plans to nationalize dutch companies failed due to unqualified
bureaucratic officials (Said, 2001). Moreover, Sukarno spent much of his focus on political
issues, both domestic and international, rather than on national economic problems. By 1966,
Indonesia’s budget deficit reached 300 percent of government revenue, and hyperinflation
reached 600 percent (Kingsbury, 2002).
In addition to this economic crisis, the 1960s was characterized by a growing tension
between the Communist Party and the military. Sukarno supported redistribution of rural
agricultural lands, which increased the strength of the Communist Party. Invigorated by the
popularity of the Party, many rural communities participated in protests and demonstrations
against western values. These values, they argued, affected their stability and security.
Concerned by the radical demonstrations and riots across different parts of Indonesia, some
military forces – those who were proponents of capitalism – raised concerns about the growth of
the Communist Party and demanded the government abolish it. In an effort to ease these
ideological tensions, Sukarno created a controversial policy aimed at combining three significant
ideological fractions – Nationalist, Islamic, and Communism. This policy was known as
Nasionalis, Agama, dan Komunis (NASAKOM). By combining these elements, Sukarno wanted
Indonesia to honor each of the elements (Said, 2001). The implementation of Nasakom,
however, led to a stronger polarization between the Communist Party and the military. The
military itself was divided between those who supported Sukarno’s administration and those who
were against it.
The polarization between the Indonesian Army and the Communist Party reached its peak
in the mid-1960s. There were a series of massacres against communist members and a coup
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against Sukarno in 1967 (Tomsa, 2008). Suharto, commander in chief of the Indonesian Land
Army, used propaganda and subversive tactics against communists to overthrow President
Sukarno and gain power. On February 22, 1967, Suharto became president and established the
“New Order” regime to replace the “Old Order” regime. This represented a significant
ideological shift in Indonesia.
The “New Order” regime restructured Indonesia’s political and economic systems. Three
development principles (trilogi pembangunan) were adopted. They emphasized: (1) equal
development for all citizens to secure national stability, (2) increased economic growth, and (3)
economic stability. A series of comprehensive economic stabilization and rehabilitation
programs were developed to reverse many of the policies implemented during the “Old Order”
regime. Two important policies were restoring Indonesia’s ties with the West and enhancing
developmental programs. In restoring ties with the West, Indonesia implemented an economic
package to gain foreign aid and investment inflow returned to the country. The package focused
on four policy approaches: (1) open up to foreign investment, (2) practice fiscal discipline and
balance the budget, (3) practice monetary control through increased interest rates and stabilize
the budget through exports and imports, and (4) decrease and control foreign debt.
Indonesia reintegrated into the international market and joined the IMF, UN, and World
Bank as well as other international organizations such as the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), Asia Pacific Economic Partnership (APEC), and Consultative
Group on Indonesia (CGI). This provided the Indonesian economy financial assistance and
signaled to foreign investors that Indonesia had a conducive investment climate. Access to
Indonesia’s market improved significantly. Tariffs on imports declined from 59 percent in 1987
to 16 percent in 1995, and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) dropped from 77 percent to 17 percent
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(Bird et al., 2008). Indonesia established a foreign investment law in 1967 and repealed a
domestic investment law in 1968 to simplify economic activity and encourage foreign investors
to provide new private capital investments.
Another hallmark of the “New Order” regime was its emphasis on developmental
programs, particularly those that targeted rural areas. This emphasis on rural development, along
with other economic strategies, was part of the Indonesian Broad Guidelines of State Policy
(Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara or GBHN). This policy laid out Indonesia’s key policy
approaches. The vast majority of Indonesia’s population live in rural areas. Therefore, their
incorporation into the economy is vital to increasing the country’s overall economic development
and accelerating its modernization efforts. Due to this realization, the government implemented
both short- and long-term development planning goals, known as the Five-Year Development
Plan (Pembangunan Lima Tahun or PELITA). This plan emphasized the provision of basic
needs, such as education, income, health, employment, entrepreneurial opportunities, and justice,
for rural communities. To achieve these goals, the state deemed it necessary to be actively
involved in the economy and to maintain strong links between its state bureaucrats and the
business community.
Suharto’s emphasis on improving the economic conditions of rural areas was not just an
economic decision. It also served to maintain his political stability. The possibility of a
communist resurgence was a main concern in the early years of the “New Order” regime since
rural communities were in deep poverty. To hinder such resurgence, Suharto emphasized
improving the agricultural sector, particularly rice production – Indonesia’s main food staple.
The target was to achieve rice self-sufficiency and lessen Indonesia’s dependence on imports.
Because the “New Order” regime had re-established ties to the West, it was able to finance these
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programs from the foreign capital flowing into the country. As a result, the Indonesian economy
grew at an average annual rate of over 6 percent. Because of the remarkable economic successes
during the “New Order regime,” Indonesia was referred to as one of the “Asian Tiger”
economies. Additionally, Suharto was famously named the Father of Indonesian Development.
While Indonesia experienced economic liberalization during the “New Order” era,
political liberalization, however, was limited. In order to strengthen Suharto’s political power,
the regime was highly centralized, patrimonial, and predatory (Slater, 2004; Aspinall, 2010). The
state controlled state resources and extracted profits from these resources. The state also
distributed patronage through rent-seeking practices. It used quotas, licenses, and monopolies to
serve the interest of Suharto and his family, friends, and political allies (Malley 1999). Rosser et.
al. (2005) highlight four main groups that benefited from the regime but served Suharto’s
interests: (1) the politico-bureaucrats, which included military officers and high level
bureaucrats; (2) domestic conglomerates; (3) controllers of mobile capital, such as portfolio
investors, international banks, and manufacturing investors; and (4) western governments.
The regime used different strategies to maintain their political power. One effective way
was to limit the political parties allowed to contest elections. Although this strategy can be seen
as a way to create a more stable political environment, it was essentially a tool for the
government to consolidate power by having fewer people mobilized for elections (Hadiz and
Robison, 2013). During the first Indonesian election in 1973, the government only allowed a few
parties to participate and urged parties to collaborate. As a result, there were only three main
parties during the election: (1) the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
or PPP), which consists mostly of Islamist parties such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the Muslim
Party of Indonesia (Parmusi), the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), and the Islamic
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Educational Movement (Perti); (2) Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
or PDI), which includes nationalist parties such as the Indonesian National Party (PNI), the
League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), Murba Party (Partai Murba), the
Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), and the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik); and (3)
Functional Group Party (Golongan Karya or Golkar). Meanwhile, the Communist Party was
completely banned from the system. The government essentially tried to depoliticize Indonesia.
The regime also created a hegemonic party system, where Golkar became the regime’s
leading political party. Golkar was Suharto’s parliamentary and electoral vehicle to garner
support for the government, thus the regime made efforts to ensure that Golkar kept winning
elections (Gaffar, 1992). This was done by obligating civil servants to vote for Golkar through
the establishment of the Indonesian Civil Servants Corps (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia or
KORPI) (Emmerson, 1978). Other organizations such as labor unions, peasant groups, and
business associations were also required to become members of Golkar and vote for the party.
This limited overall civic mobilization since many civic organizations were affiliated with
Golkar. This support, however, was not without its costs. In exchange for support, the regime
had to maintain a close relationship with voters, for example, by funding their activities (Hadiz
and Robison, 2013). As a result, Golkar won in all the elections during the “New Order,” earning
over 70 percent of votes each time. Golkar’s supremacy allowed the government to control the
parliament and easily approve government programs, including those that allowed the
government to extract profits. Moreover, since the parliament appointed the President, Suharto
was easily able to serve as President for six terms.
To have more control over the political system, the government formed an alliance with
the military. They not only served as a security force but also functioned as political actors. In
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doing so, the military typically had a seat in parliament and were involved in policymaking
processes. This was known as the “double-function,” or dwifungsi, of the military. At the same
time, the regime had implemented regulations to limit civic mobilization. The regime limited the
ability of civilians to conduct demonstrations or protests as well as having control the media.
Thus, despite implementing strong developmental programs, Indonesia’s “New Order” regime
cannot be considered a developmental state (Maclntyre, 1994).
The next two sections provide the contradictory effect of “New Order” institutions for
rural communities. On the one hand, the “New Order” regime provided government support for
rural development. On the other hand, the regime’s predatory nature limited the political
development of rural communities.

2.3 Agriculture Development Programs under the “New Order” Regime
The agricultural sector has been the main driver of Indonesia’s economy since its
independence until today. It was also the central focus of the “New Order” regime for two
reasons. First, the agricultural sector accounts for around three-quarters of total employment in
Indonesia, making it a significant piece of the nation’s overall economic performance (Timmer,
1998). Not only does the agricultural sector provide a source of livelihood for many Indonesians,
it also reduces food shortages and the poverty rate. Moreover, an increase in food production
also provides cheap products for consumers in urban societies (Fahmid, 2004). Second, a healthy
agricultural sector was crucial in maintaining the political legitimacy of the regime. A poor
performance in the agricultural sector can result in a high rate of poverty, increasing the risk of
communist infiltration, political crises, and social conflicts.
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The regime implemented four comprehensive policies to increase overall agricultural
production and productivity: (1) agriculture intensification, which used techniques from the
“Green Revolution;” (2) agriculture extensification, which extended agricultural production to
other regions outside Java island – where most agricultural activities take place; (3) agriculture
diversification, which increased agricultural production from a few commodities; and (4)
agriculture rehabilitation, which increased agricultural production by rehabilitating land and
commodities that were in crisis. Suharto, however, put his main priority in developing food
crops, especially rice – the primary food staple for Indonesians. By having access to foreign aid,
the regime had the resources to spend on agricultural and rural development programs, with
agriculture receiving an average of 30 percent of the national budget (Booth, 1998).
Rice, in particular, received special attention, where 65 percent of the total population
depends on rice (Timmer, 2005). Due to its significance, rice has become a political commodity.
Several events in history have shown that when there is instability in either price or stocks of
rice, civil unrest will increase. Moreover, because many farmers supported the Communist Party,
government need to make sure to keep communism at bay and maintain political stability.
Therefore, one of Suharto’s prominent programs was to achieve rice self-sufficiency and lesson
Indonesia’s dependence on rice imports.
As part of the effort in achieving food self-sufficiency, Suharto implemented several
strategies that intervened in food production and distribution. Suharto applied the “Green
Revolution” strategy, where the agricultural production process adopted some agriculture
technologies – chemical fertilizers, improvements in the irrigation system, new seeds, pesticides,
and modernized farming techniques. The government managed access to fertilizers, seeds, and
other production inputs and provided large subsidies for farmers to access these technologies.
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National fertilizer factories such as Petro Kimia Gresik, Pupuk Sriwijaya, and Asian Aceh
Fertilizer were established to ensure that agricultural inputs were within the national price range.
The “Green Revolution” strategy also emphasized research and developmental programs and
getting farmers access to capital.
The government also heavily invested in rural infrastructure, such as roads, irrigation
systems, bridges, water supplies, and dams, as well as supported infrastructure such as schools,
markets, and health centers. Within the national five-year development plan (Rencana
Pembangunan Lima Tahun or Repelita), irrigation development had its own chapter. By 1978,
rural infrastructure accounted for 12% of the national development budget. Moreover, research
and development programs, as well as better financial access for farmers, have been an integral
part of the green revolution.
The regime set up a number of institutions to support its agricultural programs. This
included the agriculture extension body, village cooperatives, the National Logistic Body (Badan
Urusan Logistik or BULOG), and research institutes such as the Agriculture Technology
Development Body (Badan Pengkajian Teknologi Pertanian or BPTP). The agriculture
extension body was established to assist farmers in implementing new technologies under the
“Green Revolution.” It was established by President Instruction No. 4 Year 1973 and assigned to
the Ministry of Agriculture. The body instructs that agriculture extension officers be placed at
the village level to work closely with farmers’ organizations. It is part of the general “mass
guidance” program, or Bimbingan Masyarakat (Bimas), in which farmers are trained and
educated to use agricultural technology – seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. Bimas was carried out
in cooperation with foreign organizations, such as the International Rice Research Institute that
promotes the use of high-yielding rice varieties (Bowen, 1986). At the same time, the
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government established a mechanism for farmers to dialogue with other farmers, extension
officers, government officials, and the President. This was known as “the group of listener,
reader, and audience” (Kelompok Pendengar Pembaca dan Pemirsa or Kelompencapir). Other
participatory programs included the farmers management system (Panca Usaha Tani), mass
intensification (Intensifikasi Massal or Inmas), and Special Operation. These bottom-up
institutional programs helped the “New Order” era successfully implement the “Green
Revolution” since they provided support for farmers to participate in many different government
programs (Suyatno, 2007).
As part of the effort to increase rural participation in government programs, the
government established village cooperatives (Koperasi Unit Desa or KUD). Different forms of
cooperatives − such as agricultural cooperatives, village cooperatives, and commodity
cooperatives − have existed since the colonial era. However, Suharto incorporated them into the
KUDs through President Instruction No. 4 Year 1973, which emphasized agricultural activities.
The focus of KUDs was then shifted to rural village cooperatives through President Instruction
No. 2 Year 1978. And through President Instruction No. 4 Year 1984, Suharto established more
concrete programs to develop these village cooperatives.
The purpose of village cooperatives is to organize agricultural activities among farmers
and serve as a mechanism for the government to distribute agricultural inputs, facilitate
production, and market its agricultural development programs. Through village cooperatives,
farmers not only have access to production inputs but also bank credit and the government’s
farmer credit (Kredit Usaha Tani or KUT). However, village cooperatives are also a way for the
government to control and monitor the agricultural production process and push for further
production when the production targets are not met. While farmers’ organizations existed in
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colonial Indonesia, they were first institutionalized as agricultural cooperatives under the “New
Order” era.
In 1988, the Minister of Cooperatives proclaimed Instruction No. 04/Ins/M/VI/1988,
guidelines on how to develop village cooperatives. The program centered on how to increase the
role of village cooperatives in the national economy. It also focused on increasing the welfare of
KUD members by improving their economic and organizational skills, increasing their access to
financial support, and supporting research and development. A Special Instruction (Instruksi
Khusus or Insus) was also made available to farmers’ organizations. It assigned a special group
that developed a work plan, spread information, monitored organizational activity, coordinated
cooperation among different farmers’ organizations, and held communication with the
government and related stakeholders. Several benchmarks were used to define successful village
cooperatives. For example, village cooperatives were successful if they had at least 25% of
eligible farmers as members. Success was also measured by a minimum level of funding.
As a result, the number of village cooperatives and its members increased during the
“New Order” era, with KUDs experiencing an average growth of 6.28% and KUD membership
experiencing a growth of about 13% (Graph 2.1).

40

Graph 2.1. Number of Village Cooperatives (KUD)
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Another important development during the “New Order” era was the establishment of the
National Logistics Agency (Badan Logistik Nasional or Bulog), which was a marketing board
that functioned to control overall national production and food supply as well as the distribution
of agricultural products to stabilize prices. Through Presidential Decree No. 272 Year 1967,
Bulog was formed as the “single purchasing agency” for agricultural commodities. It is a nonministerial body that reports directly to the President. The Presidential Decree established this
monopolistic body to secure the nation’s food supply, maintain price stability, and regulate the
import and export of most agricultural commodities such as rice, sugar, soy, eggs, meat, and
cooking oil – the primary staples in Indonesia (Saifullah, 2001). Bulog was given several
instruments that allowed it to determine government buying price, ensure commodity
procurement, and maintain market operation. It also worked closely with KUDs and set the base
price of commodities so that farmers’ incomes were protected. Bulog maintained a well41

coordinated warehouse network and transportation system to ensure distribution stability. It
established multiple storages that were spread across 1,500 locations in Indonesia with a capacity
of 3.5 million tons (Saifullah, 2001).
Additionally, to support these agricultural programs, the government invested in a
research institute, the Agriculture Technology Development Body (Badan Pengkajian Teknologi
Pertanian or BPTP), that provided innovation in agricultural production techniques and seed
efficiency.
As a result of these programs, the agricultural sector in Indonesia developed rapidly.
Food staple production increased from 12.2 million tons in 1969 to 25.8 million tons in 1984. By
1984, Indonesia had also become a rice self-sufficient country, shifting its position from the
world’s third largest importing economy to an exporting country the following years. The shift in
the agricultural sector also impacted macro level economic growth due to an increase in farmers’
incomes and other development outcomes. During the “New Order” era, poverty was reduced by
half from 23 percent of Indonesia’s total population to only 11 percent. Also, economic growth
increased from 2.25 percent in 1963 to 12 percent in 1969, with an average annual rate of growth
of over 6 percent (Graph 2.2). Inflation decreased drastically from 650 percent to 12 percent in
three years during the “New Order” era (Table 2.1). Indonesia received recognition from the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the United Nations as one of the “Asian Tigers”
due to its remarkable economic success. This was especially notable as Indonesia did not follow
the “urban bias” pattern of industrialization. This means that instead of putting significant
support in urban communities, the government gave the agricultural sector significant support
(Timmer, 1998; Anderson et.al., 1986).
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Graph 2.2 GDP per Capita (in US$) under the “New Order” regime
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Table 2.1. Economic Indicators of Indonesia under the “New Order”
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

Inflation
135.1
594.3
635.3
112.2
85.1
12
8.9
2.5

Economic Growth
3.5
1.1
2.8
1.4
10.9
12
7.5
7

Source: Boediono (2016), p.82

2.4 Rural Civic Participation During the “New Order” Era
The “New Order” regime supported rural civic participation mainly through the village
cooperatives or the KUDs. However, government support of these KUDs was mainly political –
development programs were provided in exchange for political support (Bhakti, 2004). The
government monopolized almost all aspects of agriculture production, distribution, and
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marketing using a top-down, supply-driven, and centralized command and control approach.
Meanwhile, local governments only functioned as surveillance bodies and forms of social control
when local farmers did not follow the federal government’s instructions. The power held by
Suharto and his small circle of elites allowed them to control state profits and secure rents in
strategic sectors, such as agriculture, through quotas, license distribution, and monopolized
institutional practices.
Clientelism and rent-seeking practices were also prevalent in Indonesia’s “New Order”
regime. New institutions, such as Bulog, were intentionally set up by the regime to maintain
Suharto’s power. The regime established a clientelistic relation between it and these institutions
to extract profits. Bulog, for example, was allowed to monopolize many aspects of the
agricultural sector, such as price setting, marketing, and regulating the import and export of the
most important agricultural products – rice, sugar, coffee, palm oil, and cloves. This also
includes the direct appointment of milling services and taking full decisions for most of the
government procurement process. The agency was led by people who were close allies with
Suharto and accountable to him only, thus it had limited legitimacy from the public. One of the
major ways rent-seeking occurred was through exclusive licenses, where distribution
opportunities and trade contracts were given to privileged groups that had a close relationship
with Suharto or his allies.
Additionally, subsidies and government allocation grants were mainly given to private or
state-owned plantations that could be controlled by the government (Barlow and Tomich, 1991).
For example, the Clove Marketing and Buffer Stock Agency (BPPC) – controlled by Tommy
Suharto, Suharto’s youngest son – received exclusive rights over the clove trade (Borsuk 1999).
Similarly, State Plantation Companies (P.T. Perkebunan Negara or PTPN) –which oversaw
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estate crops – and PT Rajawali Nusantara Indonesia – which oversaw sugar distribution – were
both state-owned trading companies. Often, the appointed person or agency in charge did not
meet the standards and requirements to perform the tasks. They thus re-sold their contracts to
legitimate companies that met the government’s facilitiy, quality control, and legal requirements.
Similarly, the village cooperatives or the KUDs provided a source of extractive and
rent-seeking opportunities for a small group of elites, typically through key village leaders or
more prosperous farmers (Mackie and MacIntyre, 1994; Rock, 2003). They were closely linked
to the government and had the power to organize farmers and supervise all their agricultural
activities (Mackie and MacIntyre, 1994). The regime wanted to make certain that rural
communities had a high appreciation for the government programs to ensure their continued
political support. The role of rural elites was important to make sure that such government
support was secured. A patron-client relationship was therefore established between the
government and elites in rural organizations. These rural elites acted as monitoring agencies in
the countryside by identifying loyal followers and ensuring support to the central government
(Antlov 1995; Hellman, 2003). One way the government tried to gain support was by holding
inauguration ceremonies every time the government provided agricultural development
programs. The government needed this political support because it was really important for the
“New Order” regime to be portrayed as a corrective force of the “Old Order regime.” By gaining
a lot of support from rural societies, the regime could claim some legitimacy.
Several approaches were implemented by the regime to establish a clientelistic
relationship with rural communities. For example, a uniform village administrative structure was
implemented across the country to control all village-level programs, with KUDs functioning as
a coordinating body to implement government programs. Since government support was also
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given to ensure that Golkar continued to be re-elected, the role of KUDs and local leaders was to
monitor citizens and suppress political dissent. Thus, rather than functioning as a collective body
and representative of farmers, the KUDs were intended to be a tool to implement orders from the
central government (Bourgeois et.al., 2003). The promotion of rural participation did not
empower farmers because they had very little recourse to challenge the state and were unable to
mobilize freely.
Farmers’ organizations were also banned during this era, with village cooperatives or
KUDs being the only farmers’ organizations allowed. The government’s establishment of the
KUDs was therefore more of a mechanism to supply governmental programs rather than a tool
that responded to farmers’ actual needs (Hermanto and Swastika, 2011). Even the largest
farmers’ organization, National Indonesian Farmers’ Union (Himpunan Kelompok Tani
Indonesia or HKTI), was a quasi-state corporatist union. It was affiliated with the ruling party
Golkar, and leaders of the organization were always from Suharto’s circle. Thus, farmers during
this era were very passive, lacked technical and managerial skills, and had limited opportunities
for political mobilization (Booth, 1992; Tabor, 1992; Tjondronegoro, 2017). Nevertheless,
because of active government control and government incentives, there was still see a high
participation rate of farmers in KUDs (Hermanto and Swastika, 2011).
Furthermore, farmers faced other barriers that hindered their political agency during the
“New Order” era. First, rural elites used farmers’ organizations for their rent-seeking activities.
Small farmers, therefore, had less control over farmers’ organizations and policy outcomes. This
created a wealth disparity among farmers. As a result, farmers’ political agency became limited,
as collective action among farmers was difficult to achieve (Tabor, 1992). Second, the situation
was made more complicated with the open economy. Foreign investment into the country was
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increasing, and more land was needed to build infrastructure, factories, and buildings. Thus, the
“New Order” era was characterized by land conflicts, as land was coercively taken from
smallholder farmers with little to no compensation. Land grabbing became common since the
government relied more and more on large investments for their rents. As a result, the lot size of
farmers declined from 0.93 acres per family to 0.83 acres, and the number of landless farmers
increased drastically (Booth, 2000). This affected the credit score of farmers, leaving them with
no assets for mortgages. This entrapped farmers in a circle of poverty.
Lastly, farmers had less control over their income, as they became dependent on products
and technology that were costly and cut into their profits. Although KUDs provided farmers with
access to agricultural inputs, they set high prices for fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides. This
suppressed the real income of farmers. Moreover, industrialization in the agricultural sector was
unequal across farmers. The system disproportionately benefited wealthy farmers who were able
to use the new technologies provided by the central government. Additionally, small farmers
faced barriers to industrialization. Their traditional values were being replaced by modern
technological values and adjustment towards a profit-oriented worldview from a communal one
was costly for them.

2.5 Conclusion
This chapter described how the “New Order” regime implemented many agricultural and
developmental programs that, on the surface, supported rural civic participation. One of these
government programs was specifically aimed at establishing rural organizations known as village
cooperatives or KUDs. In practice, however, such organizations lacked the ability to enhance
rural political agency because they were constrained by clientelist and predatory practices that
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benefited the small circle of elites surrounding the regime. Thus, despite the proliferation of
KUDs and its large membership, small agricultural producers rs were passive, not mobilized, and
could not escape poverty. The farmers’ organizations that existed were more of an instrument of
control and rent-seeking than a means for rural representation.
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CHAPTER 3
RURAL CIVIC PARTICIPATIOIN UNDER INDONESIA’S
DEMOCRATIC ERA

3.1 Introduction
This chapter continues the discussion on the historical and institutional background of
rural civic participation in Indonesia’s democratic era. Indonesia democratized in 1998 after the
fall of the New Order authoritarian regime, following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.
The new democratic government removed many restrictive policies from the past regime,
including monopolies, rent-seeking, and unfair economic and political practices. The chapter is
structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the major institutional shifts during the democratic
era. Section 3.3 discusses the ways in which these institutional shifts affected rural civic
participation. Particularly, the removal of rural participation constraints has provided
opportunities for farmers to participate and organize independently. Section 3.4 discusses the
challenges faced by independent rural organizations, including under the current decentralized
system. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.

3.2 Institutional Shift from New Order Authoritarian Regime to Democratic Government
The democratic government in Indonesia started in 1998 after the fall of Soeharto’s
authoritarian regime. Following the Asian Financial Crises that occurred between 1997 to 1998,
the Indonesian economy experienced an economic turmoil marked by currency depreciation of
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Indonesian Rupiahs by 229% in relation to the US dollar. This led to inflation, capital flight, and
macroeconomic instability. The economic situation was worsened by the weak regulatory body
and legal framework under Soeharto’s regime. Consequently, mass unemployment spread across
Indonesia, and the poverty rate increased by a significant amount. By 1998, more than half of the
Indonesian population lived below the poverty line, with an income of only $0.55 per day.
The Soeharto regime agreed to a bailout program by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) in 1997 to tackle the economic situation. However, these bailout programs came with
strict conditionalities in the form of structural adjustment policies. The IMF imposed a series of
macroeconomic stabilization and financial restructuring policies on the Indonesian economy,
mainly on the banking sector. One policy sought to transform private debts into public debts
through the issuance of state bonds. This, however, burdened the state’s finances which resulted
in a high national debt, amounting to over 90% of national GDP in 2000 (Sufian and Habibullah,
2010). A large portion of the state’s budget today is still being allocated to repay this debt. In
addition, the IMF also called for the elimination of subsidies on basic commodities, such as
petroleum and electricity. This increased the price of many basic commodities by 70% (Hara,
2001). With no improvement in real wages, this economic situation precipitated huge national
protests, which peaked in May 1998. The protestors demanded Soeharto’s resignation and the
country undergo a “reformation” process for a democratic transition. This was supported by
Indonesian civil society, which at the time had become more educated due to the development
that occurred under the New Order regime.
Led by the newly appointed President, B.J. Habibie, a number of significant institutional
changes were adopted during this transition. The government deregulated many aspects of the
economy. Most importantly, the state’s power was decentralized, and monopolized state
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practices were eliminated against rent-seeking practices (Wie, 2002). Additionally, an anticompetition law was implemented to regulate monopolistic, monopsonist, and collusive practices
that were prominent in the authoritarian regime. In the agricultural sector, the law made it clear
that the government no longer had authority over agricultural sales and prices. Soeharto’s
privileges in many agricultural products, including clove, were removed. As a result, Indonesians
were able to enjoy freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of information, checks and
balances between the executive and legislative branches of the government, free and fair
elections, and a depoliticized military. These rights were not available to them in the previous
regime.
In addition to the aforementioned internal institutional shifts, the government continued
to pursue a more outward market approach through the removal of many import and export
restrictions – both tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) – and promoted international trade and
investment cooperation in general. The efforts were also part of the IMF structural adjustment
program attached to the previous bailout program during the New Order era. The Indonesian
government committed to reducing tariffs to around 5% by 2010. In 2002, Indonesia, along with
other Southeast Asian countries, signed the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which
implemented liberal tariffs of 0-5%. To further support market liberalization, Indonesia also
adopted more transparent trade practices and open administrative trade procedures.
After the democratization process, Indonesia underwent decentralization in 1999. Power
was diffused to a larger number of government units at the local level. Power was not only given
to Indonesia’s 30 provinces but also to more than 300 district governments, both regencies and
municipalities. The goal was to strengthen regional autonomy and increase social welfare evenly
across the country. Through Decentralization Law No.22 year 1999, separation of power
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between the central and local governments was established along with the division of authorities
for several national issues. While the central government has authority over foreign policy,
defense and security, monetary policy, the legal system, and religious affairs, local governments
were given more power in other areas such as agriculture development and social welfare
programs.
After democratization and decentralization that followed in the agricultural sector, local
governments were given more authority to provide agricultural services that were based on local
needs, while the central government was responsible for designing and managing strategies of
national policy (Chordhury et.al., 2009). Under the revised Law of Decentralization (Law No. 32
Year 2004 regarding Local Governance), local governments were given a larger share of fiscal
revenue than the central government. The increased role of local governments in managing the
agricultural sector is further codified through Government Regulation No. 38 Year 2007
regarding Separation of Local Government Authorities. According to this regulation, the
agricultural sector is one of the 32 sectors whose budgets can be managed by both central and
local authorities (Sumarto et.al., 2004). However, local governments are not required to take on
this task, as not all regions have a strong agricultural sector. This differs from the education and
health sectors, where all local governments are responsible for managing these budgets. Figure
3.1 below shows the way the state’s budget is managed between the central and local
governments.
Because of this arrangement, most of the government’s agricultural fund is allocated to
the local governments. Over 80% of the agriculture national budget has been given to local
governments over the past years, and most government programs are operated by local
governments (Sumarto et.al., 2004). The budget is used to fund different types of agricultural
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development programs, such as agricultural fields, irrigation systems, infrastructure
development, rehabilitation programs, subsidized fertilizers, warehouses, and technical
assistance programs.

Figure 3.1 Division of Tasks between Central and Local Governments under Indonesia’s
Decentralization Law
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Democratization and decentralization in Indonesia created an open political system that
allowed civic participation to flourish. With basic freedoms of expression and association being
upheld, the number of civil society organizations increased significantly. These organizations
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include non-governmental organizations, community associations, trade unions, religious groups,
ethnic-based organizations, peasant organizations, and politically affiliated organizations. From
2004-2014, the number of civil society organizations throughout Indonesia grew dramatically.
During the early period of democracy, there were around 40 national labor organizations, 300
local labor unions, hundreds of peasant organizations, and more than 10,000 labor associations.
These figures continue to grow. Popular participation in associational life is the most common
form of civic participation in Indonesia, with 80 percent of the population belonging to such an
organization (Lussier and Fish, 2012).
Under the New Order regime, these organizations were not allowed to flourish, during
which there was only one labor organization and one farmer union in the country. Civil society,
once previously discouraged by the New Order regime, is now active participants of Indonesia’s
political life. Civil society has also participated in establishing government accountability rules
and mechanisms by monitoring the democratic process and participating in the decision-making
process itself. Lussier and Fish (2012) found that in recent years, there has been both an overall
increase and change in the type of civil society organizations’ engagement in Indonesia. The
types of activities observed include demonstrating, publicizing a policy analysis in mass media,
developing a written advocacy strategy, carrying out a customer satisfaction survey, organizing a
media campaign, submitting a petition to the government, and lobbying the government. They
found that almost all types of activities show a dramatic increase, with the notable exception of
demonstrations. Further, they found that civil society engagement in government planning and
decision-making processes, specifically, have become more common in recent years. Civil
society organizations involved in public consultations and planning meetings (Musrenbang) grew
from only around 35 percent in 2005 to more than 80 percent by 2009 (Graph 3.1).
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Graph 3.1 Civil Society Participation in Indonesia

Source: Antlov and Wetterberg, 2011 , p.63

With governments being more accessible at the local level, decentralization has created
new opportunities for civil society to further engage in public affairs. Under the decentralized
system, many government programs were developed using a bottom-up approach, allowing
people to participate in national planning and budgeting in public forums such as Musrembang.
These bottom-up approaches were supported by donor-initiated programs such as the World
Bank’s Community Driven Development (CDD) program. The program focuses on poverty
reduction, which results in community participation in planning, budget development, and the
allocation of funds (Bebbington et al., 2004). This high level civic participation at the local level
has improved the quality of Indonesia’s democracy and has been a significant part of the
democratic consolidation process in Indonesia until this day. The presence of strong civic
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associations at the local level promotes trust and develops the capacity to engage politically,
therefore building strong democratic institutions from the bottom-up (Putnam, 1993).

3.3. The rise of Independent Rural Producer Organizations (RPOs)
Democratization has also enabled civic participation in the agricultural sector by creating
the opportunity for farmers to organize and advance their collective interests. The agricultural
sector shifted from a tightly controlled and clientelist system to a competitive market-based one
(Khudori, 2005). The government made reforms within the agricultural sector that loosened its
control over the market. A notable improvement was the elimination of Bulog’s monopoly over
agricultural activities. This transformed the production, distribution, and marketing processes, as
they became competitive for the public. Only certain strategic commodities such as rice and
sugar remained under Bulog’s control, as outlined by Law No 23 Year 1999. Another reform,
enacted through President Instruction No 18 Year 1998, focused on Village Cooperatives known
as Koperasi Unit Desa (KUDs). Many privileges from the government, such as fertilizer
subsidies and other government support, were retracted. KUDs were no longer able to set the
base price and selling price of commodities and such functions were transferred to the new
reformed Bulog. This reform was outlined in two regulations, President Instruction No 32 Year
1998 and President instruction No 8 Year 2000. These new regulations resulted in the dismissal
of many KUDs during the early years of democratization.
At the same time, the government also removed restrictions on establishing farmers’
organizations. Exploitative agriculture farming through a top-down, monopolistic, and coercive
approach was no longer allowed. It was replaced by a bottom-up grassroot process (Suarta and
Swastika, 2004). Participation in a farmers’ organization was no longer mandatory. Instead,
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farmers could freely choose whether to participate in an organization or not. If they did, they
could organize independently, choose any variety of commodities to plant, and decide how to
sell and distribute the commodity and by how much. This allowed farmers to handle their
activities and build market-based relationships with different stakeholders (Montgomery et al.
2002). Thus immediately after the democratic reform, there was a boom in sector-based farmers”
associations and cooperatives, known as the RPOs (Suarta and Swastika, 2004). As shown
previously in Graph 1.1 in Chapter 1, farmers’ associations and cooperatives increased
significantly, particularly the number of RPOs (both agricultural cooperatives and farmers’
associations) and members (shown again in Graph 3.2).
Decentralization further allows farmers’ organizations to flourish at the local level since
they are closer to local authorities (Sumarto et.al., 2004). In addition, local governments tend to
coordinate with RPOs in distributing government support and provide technical support through
their extension officers (Saragih, 2002).
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Graph 3.2. RPOs in Indonesia
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Agriculture has become one of the primary sectors that the government has focused on
during the reformation era. The government views farmers’ organizations mainly as a medium to
communicate with geographically diverse farmers, which makes coordination less costly.
Programs such as National Community Development Program (Program Nasional
Pemberdayaan Masyarakat or PNPM) and Rural Agribusiness Development Program (Program
Usaha Agribisniss Pedesaan or PUAP) are examples of national development programs in which
the government works closely with farmers’ organizations (Hansen, 2019). RPOs in Indonesia
are also supported by several government regulations. The Minister of Agriculture Regulation
No. 82 Year 2013 defines RPOs as groups of farmers that are built on similar interests, socio-
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economic conditions, or common commodities to increase the welfare of all members. They
function as cooperative platforms to increase production and create economies of scale that are
more efficient and effective. They also serve as places where members can exchange information
and develop new skills in agricultural farming, productivity, and production. Such organizations
are not limited to cooperatives but also include other types of rural organizations that do not
necessarily require regulation like the older KUDs (Syahyuti, 2007). This includes Farmers’
organizations (Kelompok Tani or POKTAN) and Collaborative Farmers’ organizations
(Gabungan Kelompok Tani or GAPOKTAN).
While Farmers’ Organizations (Poktan) are smaller in scale, Collaborative Farmers’
Organizations (Gapoktan) involve several farmers’ organizations working together. Like
farmers’ organizations, collaborative farmers’ organizations can provide benefits to their
members by increasing their access to financial support, facilitating collaborative production and
marketing, utilizing their economies of scale, and increasing earnings and livelihood among
others. Collaborative farmers’ organizations, however, mostly emphasize their leadership,
entrepreneurial, and managerial skills. The role of Gapoktan is to provide production facilities
and farming units, which helps farmers increase their production on a larger scale (Nuryanti and
Swastika, 2016). In practice, both forms of RPOs have worked closely with one another as well
as with the government and partnered with different external actors such as business partners and
NGOs. The dynamics of RPO activities in Indonesia are seen in Figure 3.2. Meanwhile,
Stockbridge (2007) list several services the organizations provide, including marketing services
(input supply, output marketing and processing, market information), facilitation of collective
production activities, financial services (savings, loans, and other forms of credit), technological
services (education, extension, research), educational services (business skills, health, general),
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welfare services (health, safety nets), policy advocacy, and the managing common property
resources (water, pasture, fisheries, forests).

Figure 3.2 The Relationship between Farmers’ Organizations (Poktan) and Collaborative
Farmers’ Organizations (Gapoktan) in Indonesia
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The government established laws and regulations to protect farmers and promote their
development, among others through the enactment of (1) Law No. 16 Year 2006 on Counseling
System; (2) Law No. 1 Year 2013 on Microfinance institutions; and (3) Minister of Agriculture
Regulation No. 82 Year 2013 on Developing Farmers Organization and Farmers Network
Organization (Syahyuti, 2014). Law No 16 Year 2006 focuses on agriculture, fisheries, and
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forestry. The Minister of Agriculture Regulation No 67 Year 2016 provides clear guidance and
support for farmers, including how farmers’ organizations can better cooperate and develop. The
government’s agricultural extension programs, in particular, support the development of RPOs
(Hansen, 2019). They provide technical assistance to help farmers develop their production and
marketing skills as well as their organizational skills. The latter occurs through activities such as
training, monitoring, information sharing, and evaluation. Training centers for extension officers
are also built into all levels of government, including at the village level. They provide funding
to support extension activities as well (Hansen, 2019).
Democratization has, therefore, increased the important role of RPOs in Indonesia’s
agricultural sector, as their political influence. New RPOs represent farmers’ interests in the
economy, as well as in the policymaking. The Sugarcane Farmers Association (Asosiasi Petani
Tebu Rakyat or APTR), for example, is one of Indonesia’s active farmers’ associations and has
successfully advocated for the end of sugar smuggling and a reduction of imports (Zulkarnaen,
2015). A ban on sugar imports was even imposed in response to their demands. Similarly, the
Association of Indonesian Coffee Farmers (Asosiasi Petani Kopi Indonesia or APEKI), in
collaboration with other RPOs such as the Gayo Organic Coffee Farmers Association (Persatuan
Petani Kopi Gayo Organik or PPKGO), is actively involved in developing coffee certifications
with the government (Mariyudi et.al., 2018). In some cases, strong organizations such as the
Indonesian Cocoa Commission (Komisi Kakao Indonesia or KKI) have taken the lead in
formulating national cocoa policy (Narulita et.al., 2014). Such influence is not only seen at the
national level but also the local level. The relatively close access to local governments, due to
decentralization, has made farmers interact more with local governments. Because local
governments are now responsible for the income and welfare of farmers, promoting agricultural
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development requires partnership with farmers. Thus, many farmers are invited to policy
discussions and consultations on planning, implementation, control, and evaluation of different
agricultural development programs (Jaya and Sarwopasodjo, 2017; Jalieli and Sadono, 2013). In
many cases, national level organizations and local level organizations are affiliated with one
another, with each focusing on different responsibilities and strategies. For example, the
Indonesian Coffee Farmers Associations (APEKI) has its regional level organization, Gayo
Coffee Farmers, in Aceh. National level organizations are more active in lobbying government
officials and typically coordinate with different other organizations within the same subsector.
With more elections held at the local level, farmers’ participation in politics has
increased. Jaya and Sarwopasodjo (2017) argues that participation in farmers’ organizations
increases farmers’ abilities to develop organizational and civic skills. Through activities such as
group discussion, planning, adoption, monitoring, and evaluation, farmers increase their ability
to make decisions on production inputs and techniques, exercise dialogue, and problem-solve.
Such civic skills promote rural participation in political activities (Jaya and Sarwopasodjo, 2017;
Jalieli and Sadono, 2013). Participation in politics particularly increases during election times, as
political contracts between farmers’ organizations and candidates commonly form during this
time. To gain rural votes, legislative personnel at the local level pledge their support for
agricultural programs through the media and face-to-face campaigns and discussions. RPOs also
engage in politics by encouraging members to enter into the political system. This is done by
helping members occupy political positions starting at the lowest administrative structure, such
as the head of villages or a seat in the local parliament (Raya, 2016). In Garut district, for
example, the Pasundan Federation of Farmers (SPP) holds 13 of the 45 parliament seats
(Indonesian Observer, 2000). Thus, RPOs under Indonesia’s democratic government have risen
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significantly in number and prominence. Not only do they engage in economic activities, RPOs
also engage in political activities as well.

3.4 Challenges of Rural Civic Participation under Democratic Era
Democratization has made a positive impact on rural civic participation in Indonesia.
However, rural civic participation still faces many challenges that come from both within and
outside of RPOs. Indeed, despite progressive institutional reforms and strong national
commitments, many RPOs are still unable to develop. Additionally, most small producers in
Indonesia are not members of an RPO (Syahyuti, 2014). Based on Indonesia’s Ministry of
Agriculture data, there are around 318 thousand farmers’ organizations and 10 million members.
Meanwhile, there are about 21 million other farmers that are not members of an RPO. Moreover,
successful RPOs are unevenly distributed across Indonesia, as shown in Graph 1.3 of Chapter 1
(shown again in Graph 3.2).
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Graph 3.2. Indonesia’s RPO Membership across Provinces, 2010 and 2015
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Establishing viable organizations poses challenges and mainly depends on member
commitment – their expected benefits and costs. As Olson (1968) argued, rational and selfinterested individuals will have the incentive to free-ride if the conditions make it possible to do
so. In this case, an individual will choose their personal interests rather than the group’s interests
based on their expected benefits and costs. Such collective action problems exist in all
organizations including RPOs. The problem is more pervasive in larger groups, as individuals in
these groups have greater incentives to shirk commitments. In larger groups, member
contributions are more likely to be unequal (Booth, 2012). One way to avoid such collective
action problems is monitor and enforce members’ compliance with the agreed rules and develop
a mechanism of punishment to prevent free-riding. This mechanism can include informal social
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mechanisms such as norms, shared values, and conventions. However, RPOs typically are
underdeveloped and do not have punishment mechanisms, making collective action problems
difficult (Syahyuti, 2014). Although some RPOs have informal norms that can overcome such
problems, the existence of such norms depends on the type of agricultural products managed. We
can expect such norms to be upheld in RPOs that focus on rice commodities, for example,
because rice farming requires cooperation among different farmers. On the other hand, products
such as coffee require less cooperation and, therefore, coffee RPOs may not be able to uphold the
informal norms needed to avoid collective action problems.
In many cases, RPOs are formed to obtain financial services and governmental support
such as capital funding and subsidized fertilizer. This is because certain governmental programs
are only distributed to verified RPOs. As soon such programs end, many RPO members leave
these organizations, and the organizations become inactive (Syahyuti, 2007). This contributes to
the rational calculation made by farmers on whether they are better off joining and establishing
an RPO or not (Stockbridge et al., 2003). Thus, collective action can only be established if
expected benefits are higher than transaction costs and capacity enhancement outweighs the costs
of complying with collective rules and norms.
Furthermore, successful associations also require strong management and entrepreneurial
skills, which most farmers with little education lack (Pingali et al., 2005). In fact, farmers do not
have many characteristics for successful cooperation, such as education and financial capacity.
This can result into weak organizations. Thus, many RPOs in Indonesia still do not have wellfunctioning organizational structures, and they have high member turnover. Some of these
problems can be traced to practices to Indonesia’s previous authoritarian regime, which resulted
in passive members and weak and failing organizations that continue to this day (Bourgeois et
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al., 2003; Syahyuti, 2014). Even large national institutions, such as Bulog, have struggled in the
transition between the two regimes.

Contextual Factors
Despite Indonesia’s significant progress and becoming the third-largest democracy
worldwide, democratization is a work in progress and yet to be consolidated. The development
of RPOs is no exception. Transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democracy because of a
deep crisis, rather than modern development, has created challenges in Indonesia’s democratic
identity and implementation (Hara, 2001). Indonesia lacks a strong political culture and ethics,
that are needed for consolidating democracy. Moreover, many Indonesians today still face
economic hardships. Despite the substantial reduction in poverty since the transition to
democracy, the wealth gap in Indonesia is growing. Many Indonesians care less democracy than
economic well-being and good governance. This has resulted in an electoral system that is
marked by many vote-buying practices (Lussier and Fish, 2012).
Furthermore, Indonesia also faces problems of law enforcement and freedom of
expression. In many cases, movement remains restricted by Indonesian authorities (Lussier and
Fish, 2012). Journalists and publishers can face extra-judicial threats and violence from elites
and even religious organizations. Many political and economic elites are linked to corrupt
behavior, and to some extent, have the power to influence media and law enforcement. Many of
these elites, including those with ties to the Indonesian military that benefited from the New
Order era, succeed in maintaining their power after the reformation. They continue to influence
political campaigns, party candidates, and elections (Hara, 2001).
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Economic corruption is also a major problem in Indonesia and has made daily headlines.
The pattern of corruption changed dramatically after regional decentralization was implemented.
Due to proximity to local citizens, decentralization is said to promote active citizenship. This
distribution of power improves community participation in the decision-making process (Ito,
2011; Beard, 2005; Greem, 2005). Local government is made more accountable and expected to
provide public services that are more accessible, appropriate, and efficient to the public (Blair,
2000; Crook and Manor, 1998; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Manor, 1999). In contrast, such
accountability is lacking in the central government, making it relatively unchecked and prone to
rent-seeking behavior (Ostrom et.al., 1993). The political transitions and governance initiatives
at the provincial and local level, however, have not resulted in the hoped for progress. Most of
the corruption cases are found at the local level (Akhmadi, 2017). Because local governments
started to produce regulations, more officials from multiple levels of government and other
agencies were able to engage in corruption. Corrupt practices at the local level have resulted in a
lack of political commitment to rural development (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001). Many
agricultural programs are being used for political ends and subject to manipulation by corrupt
leaders. This may result in the continuation of a top-down process of government programs that
lead to public services not suitable for rural producers. Green (2005) have noted that local
governments that are supportive of farmers are not too common in Indonesia.
Moreover, local authorities may have inadequate capacity to support farmers’
participation in RPOs, in terms of personnel, capability, or financial resources. They may also
have weak extension services, which suffer from limited funding, few human resources, a lack of
coordination, and a lack of managerial skills (Purnomo and Lee, 2010; Dendi and Shivakoti,
2003). Agricultural extension programs have decreased since decentralization was implemented
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since local governments have limited funding (Widodo, 2017). The lack of support of extension
programs, including training programs, has resulted in a low number of extension officers who
cannot keep up with the growth of farmers (Widodo, 2017). Extension programs in Indonesia are
also prone to coordination problems. There are many cases of conflict in implementation
between different government tiers or between executive and legislative branches (Dendi and
Shivakoti, 2003). The frequent change of rules and management procedures by the central
government has also made extension officers confused on how to operate the program (Akhmadi,
2017).
As the country democratized, Indonesia also underwent a series of economic
liberalizations which affected rural activities. After implementing the structural adjustment
programs suggested by the IMF, the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, and the World Bank in
1997, Indonesia continued to reduced import tariffs significantly. This resulted in challenges for
farmers. Foreign investment laws created greater competitive pressures for farmers and tightened
export margins. New laws that initially limited ownership of foreign investors were changed to
allow agricultural product exports from 100 foreign-owned companies rather than require foreign
investors to create joint ventures with domestic companies. Within years after the reformation,
large international traders and investors opened branches across Indonesia in different sectors.
Some of the well-known foreign companies include Cargill, Andira, Bero, and Olam. These
foreign companies have advantages in the production system, which created powerful
competition and allow them to nearly dominate the agriculture sector. For example, foreign
companies are estimated to control over 50 percent of the total volume of export in coffee
products (Akhmadi, 2017).
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Small agricultural producers, therefore, face a new set of challenges – increasing imports,
market competition, and international standards. They had to compete with large international
farms that were able to sell at a low price because these farms are heavily subsidized. At the
same time, their access to efficient production is limited as fertilizer subsidies were eliminated,
which increased the prices of agricultural production supplies. Additionally, the government
focused more on the industrial and manufacturing sectors rather than the agriculture sector. This
is reflected in the low share allocated to the agriculture budget (Breman and Wiradi, 2004;
Khudori, 2005). A lot of agricultural land was also transformed into housing and used for
industrial purposes. Within 30 years, land was mostly owned by large companies, housing,
farms, and mining firms (Simamarta, 2002). As a result, Indonesia became a net food importer in
many of Indonesia’s main commodities. Rice imports increased by 64%, sugar increased by
57%, and shallots increased by 50%. At the same time, exports decreased from US$210 million
to US$3 million, with profits from soybean exports decreasing from US$2.2 million to US$281
thousand (Khouduri, 2005).
Under this economic liberalization backdrop, the role of local governments became more
significant. They became more accountable since they controlled many trade-related policies.
Regional regulations, such as charges and taxes, proliferated in Indonesia. From 2001 to 2006,
13,520 regulations were enacted at the province and district levels (Bourgeois et.al., 2003). The
empowerment of local authorities can, therefore, influence trade activities and encourage the
public to become more involved in local governmental programs (Sumarto et.al, 2004). As the
country became more liberal, local governments gained attention from international trade and
development practitioners. This is because local governments gained a significant role in the
policy-making process after the decentralization reforms. They acquired autonomy in many
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trade-related issues. According to the Center for International Relations Studies (CIReS), local
governments have become central actors in developing human resources, product
competitiveness, infrastructure, and market information needed for trade activities and
cooperation. Other roles for local governments include providing technical assistance, promoting
local goods and services, maintaining quality control of products, stabilizing prices, facilitating
investors, creating easier business conduct and licensing processes, developing infrastructure,
and maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions. Local governments are expected to
understand local resources and capacities in order to develop their regions further. Indonesia has
repeatedly emphasized the role of local governments through its commitment with the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC).
The role of local governments in international affairs has also been mandated in
Indonesian Law No.32 Year 2004 clause 42 point 1. It states that local governments can facilitate
international cooperation on behalf of and regarding local jurisdictions as long as they are still
protecting the national interest. For example, the Batam, Bintan, and Karimun regions of
Indonesia have established special economic agreements with Singapore 2006. This cooperative
agreement covers a duty-free area and trade facilitation issues.
The increasing role of local governments in the global context has, therefore, raised the
importance of collaboration between local and central governments in Indonesia. However, this
is unlikely to happen. There is a lack of central-local coordination and a clash of interests in
Indonesia that has made many central regulations unable to be implemented at the local level
(Chowdury et.al, 2009). In many instances, local regulations also contradict central regulations,
which makes trade and investment programs difficult to conduct. One major problem that exists
in Indonesia is the lack of coordination regarding fees that may be applied at the local level. As
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stated in Law No.28 Year 2009, local governments can collect taxes to gain their own revenue.
However, this has led to over-taxation and high business costs, with Indonesia ranking the
highest among ASEAN countries (Tambunan, 2006).
Nevertheless, small agricultural producers have become part of a large production chain
both at the national and international levels. This allows them to work closely with international
actors such as international NGOs, donors, and organizations. These external actors, on many
occasion, have facilitated and assisted farmers in different aspects of their lives (i.e., improved
production, provided access to health care, transferred knowledge on sustainable resource
management). However, farmers gain the most by being exposed to new information and
technology that they did not have before. With foreign goods flowing rapidly into the market,
farmers who are empowered to voice their concerns by becoming more politically active. Thus,
despite the challenges of economic liberalization and democratization, several farmers’
organizations were empowered (Montgomery et.al., 2002). Indonesian Sugar Association and
Indonesian Cocoa Farmers (APKAI) are examples of the most powerful political groups in the
agricultural sector. Within two years of the country’s crisis-driven liberalization, these newly
empowered sugar farmers allied themselves with the country’s sugar mills to push for reregulation of the sugar sector, including the reintroduction of a sugar import ban.

3.5 Conclusion
Democratization in Indonesia has paved the way for rural civic participation and RPOs to
flourish. It provides a way for rural communities to participate in political activities since it
removes a significant barrier to farmers’ economic and political power – a ban on organizing.
However, RPOs under the democratic regime still face challenges – both internal and external to
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RPOs – that stymie their progress. RPOs are prone to collective action problems, which hinders
their viability. Meanwhile, external factors such as the rise in democratic practices in Indonesia
and economic liberalization, have further limited the progress of RPOs. Indeed, the data shows
that there is still limited rural producers’ participation in Indonesia, and it differs significantly
across the country. Even decentralization does not guarantee higher rural participation in RPOs.
Thus, democratization and decentralization can be considered necessary for rural civic
participation in Indonesia but not sufficient.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF RPO MEMBERSHIP ON INDIVIDUAL
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 1, studies on RPOs have mostly focused on how RPOs affect
small agricultural producers’ livelihoods. Studies on how they function as political instruments
that promote the political participation of members are scarce at best. Although the common
understanding is that being a member of an organization can increase individual political
participation, scholars who study collective action and organizations have suggested that not all
organizations have the same influence on political participation. Some scholars even argue that
an organization, depending on its characteristics or the contextual environment in which it is
embedded,5 can work in the opposite direction and hamper political participation (Hulme and
Edwards 1996; Luciak and Gonzalez, 2001). Although many studies have investigated the
different effects of organizations on political participation, there are no studies on rural
organizations, particularly RPOs. The goal of this chapter is, therefore, to look at how RPOs
shape member political participation.
Additionally, this chapter considers several conditional factors that might support or
obstruct farmers’ decisions to participate politically. These factors concern individual
characteristics of farmers. This chapter thus considers that an organization does not bring the

5

Hulme and Edwards (1996), for example, argues that organizations who are highly dependent on donors may
undermine the strength of the organization and limits the independence of its members.
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same effect to different individuals, as political participation may vary across individual
attributes – such as gender and age – within the same organization. Factors considered in this
chapter are an individual’s structural position in the organization, land ownership status,
educational level, gender, and age. These factors are based on the agricultural development
literature and information gathered during fieldwork for this study.
To test whether participation in RPOs increases rural political participation, I conduct an
original survey of 220 farmers that are drawn from 30 villages across three districts of Indonesia,
namely Keeron, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and Semarang, Central Java. I
gather information about whether a farmer is a member in an RPO as well as his/her socioeconomic and political information. This chapter focuses on two forms of political participation
– voting and participating in policy discussions. Through quantitative analysis of the survey data,
I found that members of an RPO are more likely to participate politically compared to nonmember farmers.
The chapter proceeds as follows: The second section discusses the concept of political
participation as the dependent variable of this analysis, the determinants of political participation,
and how organizations can promote political participation. The third section presents my
hypotheses. The fourth section, the empirical strategies section, explains the survey and
quantitative strategies in more detail. The fifth section provides the empirical findings and
analyses. The last section concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Literature Review
Conceptualizing and Measuring Political Participation
To understand how RPOs influence member political participation, the concept of
political participation must be clarified. Scholars have long discussed the importance of political
participation. It is commonly understood that democracies will not survive without the political
participation of their citizens (Almond and Verba 1963; Huntington and Nelson 1976; Verba et
al. 1978; Dahl 1989; Leighley, 1996; Lijphart 1997; Diamond 1999; Tocqueville, 2003).
According to past literature, four key components define political participation. They are: (1)
actions, (2) by the citizens, (3) to influence, (4) policy decisions and government appointment
(Bennett and Bennett, 1986; Dahl 1989; Verba et al. 1995; Brady, 1999). In this definition, the
focus is less about a small group of elites using their power to make policies and more about the
public’s ability to influence policies. Citizens are considered political actors that can press the
government to generate policies in their interests (Dahl 1989; Verba et al. 1995).
There are different views on what constitutes political participation (Norris, 2002).
Political participation includes a broad spectrum of activities that, either directly or indirectly,
influence the government. In general, political participation can be divided into electoral and
non-electoral forms of participation. Voting is the most direct form of electoral participation that
can affect the political landscape. Other forms of electoral participation include registering as a
candidate, being a member of a political party, and campaigning. Non-electoral participation can
influence the political landscape as well. This includes being a member of community groups or
associations, participating in public meetings, providing feedback to government officials, being
involved in a public decision-making process, monitoring government agencies, and
volunteering (Putnam, 2000; Messner et al., 2006). This form of participation also includes
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donating money and wearing symbols of support. Hooghe and Marien (2013) divide political
participation into institutional and non-institutional forms of participation. Institutional
participation is participation within the political system, such as voting and direct
communication with the government. In contrast, non-institutional participation involves indirect
participation outside formal institutional channels, such as demonstrating, signing petitions, or
donating money.
Because of the numerous forms of political participation, scholars have used different
ways to measure it. Some scholars have separated the different forms of political participation,
and others have combined them into an index. Pollock (1982), for example, uses an index that is
composed of three forms of political participation – voting, campaigning, and contacting
politicians or public officials. Meanwhile, Dinesen et al. (2016) analyze the different types of
political participation separately. Although previous analyses have mostly used voting as the
primary indicator of political participation, other forms of participation are also being measured
and analyzed. The selection and measurement of the variable depends on the purpose and focus
of the study. If the goal is to understand the overall pattern of political participation, then
building an index would be appropriate since it captures a wide range of activities. However, if
the focus is to acknowledge the multidimensionality of political participation and understand the
effects of different forms of political participation, then analyzing each form separately would be
more appropriate.
Since the goal of this dissertation is to understand how rural producers participate in
institutional forms of the political system, I focus on voting and participating in policy
discussions. The former is an electoral form of participation, and the latter is a non-electoral
form of participation. Although non-institutional political participation – such as protesting,
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social movements, and solving community problems – are also able to influence policy change
(Diamond 2008; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Holzner 2010), such participation is still
considered less effective when compared to institutional political participation (Hooghe and
Marien, 2014). Moreover, institutional political participation has been made more available
today through the deepening process of democracy and increasing economic liberalization.

Determinants of Political Participation
The determinants and processes that lead to political participation have been an extensive
topic in the democracy literature. Political participation as the dependent variable is studied at
both the micro- and macro-level. Micro-level analyses focus on the individual’s attitudes and
decisions that affect participation, while macro-level analyses focus on the aggregate level of
political participation in a region. A series of different explanatory variables have been explored
at both levels.
The socio-economic attributes of a person, particularly education, has been widely
acknowledged to influence the level of a person’s participatory behavior (see, e.g. Verba et al.,
1995; Mayer, 2011; Schlozman et.al., 2012). The role of education in political participation even
triumph the role of age (Turcotte, 2015). Education increases political participation because it
allows people to develop an interest in politics, increases awareness of their civic duties, and
helps them learn skills that are relevant to politics (Verba et al., 1995; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008).
Outside of education, resource model of political participation focuses on other variables besides
education such as time and income (Verba et.al., 1978; Nie et.al., 1996). Additionally,
psychological factors also influence an individual’s decision to participate politically. This
includes whether an individual has an interest in politics, how optimistic an individual is about
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politics, and how satisfied an individual is about their general civic life (Almond and Verba,
1963; Scheufele, & Moy, 1999). As for the latter point, people who have complaints about
society and feel like they are being deprived, will have higher rates of political participation than
those who are satisfied in life.
Meanwhile, macro-level analyses consider the relational and social contexts in which
individual choices are being made. This is because a person’s environment can influence their
decisions. Studies on individual attitudes are inadequate to explain the different patterns of
aggregate political participation across different contexts. They are also inadequate in explaining
why participation in some cases remain low despite the high level of resources available to
individuals. As we saw with the variation of farmer participation in RPOs, different patterns exist
across places, including across sub-national states within a country. Contextual factors, which
can include economic, social-structural, political, institutional, and cultural settings, can
influence which citizens and how citizens participate. Thus, these factors shape opportunities as
well as constraints for political participation.
The literature on political participation discusses several contextual variables. These
include social networks, social inequality, political institutions, and democratic transitions.
Social networks are referenced often in the literature, which claims that social networks often
include people who share similar cultures and values, which can generate norms of reciprocity
and trust amongst each other (Putnam, 2000; Krishna, 2008). Similar to the notion of social
capital, social network promotes social interactions, cooperative behavior, information sharing,
and community problem solving, which makes political participation possible (Mcclurg, 2003).
Another contextual factor is social inequality which is argued to increase political participation
because it provides certain groups with a sense of injustice and relative deprivation, motivating
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them to participate politically (Lijphart 1997; Coffe and Bolzendahl 2010). Lastly, institutional
contexts such as regimes, political institutions, and democratic institutions, are argued to shape
opportunities for political participation (Molyneux 2001).

Political Participation through Organization
The studies mentioned above look at how different variables directly affect an
individual’s political behavior. However, there is a strand within the literature that looks at the
role of organizations in fostering the political participation of members. Although an
organization can be non-political, its activities can translate into political participation through
activities such as voting, campaigning, and being involved in policy discussions with officials
and politicians.
Many studies have examined how and through what mechanisms an organization shapes
an individual’s political participation. First, an organization is argued to develop civic skills in its
members, which facilitate participatory activities (Verba et.al.,1978; Verba et al. 1995; Oxhorn
2006). For example, members of organizations can develop their communication, presentation,
and decision-making skills. Second, an organization fosters social capital since members interact
with one another and develop a sense of shared values, identities, and goals. This, in turn, can
create motivations to participate politically, particularly in achieving collective goods (Putnam,
1993). Third, an organization can influence members’ cognitive and emotional functions, which
can motivate the members to participate politically. Organizations can create a sense of identity,
self- worth, and, more importantly, political consciousness of civic duties and roles (Diamond
1999; Bayard de Volo 2006).
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However, studies have also shown that not every organization leads to more members’
political participation. Member political participation is conditional on the characteristics of the
organization. Political organizations, such as political parties, have the highest chances of
member political participation (Jennings, 1997). But, an organization does not necessarily have
to be political to enhance participation. Scholars have argued that civil society organizations,
despite not being political in nature, can also draw individuals into political life (Verba et al.,
1978). Some civic organizations that have been discussed in the literature are trade associations,
labor unions, occupational associations, and non-governmental organizations. Organizations,
however, do need certain characteristics to promote political participation.
Having a strong managerial and administrative capability is one crucial aspect of
promoting political participation. Although these are technical, they ensure that the organization
is meets its objective. Many cases have shown that organizations fail to enhance political
participation because they are weakly administrated. This is particularly acute in developing
countries where managerial and organizational skills are relatively weak in comparison to
developed countries (Boris et.al., 2002). Activities that deepen the nature and membership of the
organization are also important in fostering political participation (Brady, 1999). Brady et al.
(2012), for example, argue that activities that provide educational opportunities, such as
problem-solving discussions, are important. Group discussions among members can translate
into more awareness of societal and political issues (Mcclurg, 2003).
Since an organization consists of different individuals, relational networks among
members can also promote political participation. When tolerance between members is achieved,
crosscutting solidarity between different people in the organization is achieved. This leads to
cooperation and, therefore, provides an opportunity for members to develop their civic skills
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(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Mutz, 2002). However, this cooperation depends on the
democratic nature of the organization, as democratic organizations provide a better opportunity
for members to develop their civic skills (Verba et.al., 1995; Almond and Verba 1963).
Additionally, whether an organization is voluntary is particularly important in promoting the
political participation of members. Ayala (2000), for example, found that a person’s political
participation is higher in a more voluntary organization than in a less voluntary organization
because there are fewer constraints and decisions are made more freely. Employment
associations or labor unions, for example, are considered to be less voluntary because
membership is contingent on the survival of member jobs. This makes the members less free to
participate and develop civic skills needed for political participation outside the organization
(Verba et al., 1995).
In addition, the purpose of the organization also matters. Wilson (1973) has noted that the
level of political participation differs between three types of organizations: solidary
organizations; purposive incentives organizations (ideology, collective interests); and material
rewards organizations (tangible benefits, member services). Wilson argues that political
participation is highest in purposive incentives groups because political participation goes
beyond voting and involves more active participation, such as campaigning and contacting local
politicians.
Thus, while is it the conventional wisdom that being a member of an organization fosters
political participation, characteristics of the organization determine the outcome. Those that
promote democratic values and activities are argued to push their members to participate
politically outside the organization.
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4.3 Hypotheses

Based on the discussion above, organizational characteristics play a vital role in
delivering member political participation. Voluntariness and democratic values are two main
features needed in the organization. In chapter 1, I explain that RPOs ‒ particularly cooperatives
and producer associations ‒ meet both characteristics. The goal of RPOs is to increase the wellbeing of its members through activities that are independent and voluntary (Barton, 1989; van
Dijk and Klep, 2005). This means that members can join the organization based on their own
will and thus have a sense of ownership and control over the organization. Additionally, RPO
activities are based on cooperation among members, particularly in production and marketing
processes. This intensifies communication among members (Bijman, 2007; Wennink et al.,
2007; Penrose-Buckley, 2007). RPOs are also categorized as purposive incentives organizations,
which have the highest likelihood of increasing member participation (Wilson, 1973).

Due to these voluntary and democratic features, RPOs provide a function other than what
they were designed to do. This function is to foster member political participation. Based on the
fieldwork I conducted in Indonesia, there are three main channels in which RPOs successfully
enhance member political participation. First, RPOs provide education that enhances members’
civic skills. This results from members’ activities in the organization, such as problem-solving,
communicating, and cooperating. Second, RPOs provide a venue for information exchange,
leading to more awareness of members’ political role in society. Often, members share
information regarding social and political issues that might concern them. Their contacts with
external actors – such as extension officers, local governments, and traders – also make them
exposed to different types of information. Third, RPOs build trust among their members and
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strengthen social capital within their organizations through cooperating to achieve a collective
goal. Many of the RPOs I studied were founded because the members either shared the same
commodities or land. Through collective action, RPOs strengthen solidarity among members.
These effects, in turn, enhance members’ capacity and motivation to participate in the
political realm. The analytical framework of this argument can be seen in Figure 4.1 below.
Since the focus of this analysis is on institutional political participation, the framework tests two
forms of political participation, voting and participating in policy discussions. The hypotheses
are below:

H1: Smallholder producers, who are members of an RPO, are more likely to participate in
electoral voting than non-members.
H2: Smallholder producers, who are members of an RPO, are more likely to participate in
policy discussions than non-members.

Figure 4.1 Theoretical Framework on How RPOs Increases Members
Political Participation

Civic Skills
Rural
Producer
Organizations
(RPOs)

Democratic Processes

Information
Exchange

Voluntariness

Trust and
solidarity
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- Voter turnout
- Participating in
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I expect that members of an RPO are more likely to participate politically. However, the
literature has shown that the impact of an organization on member political participation may
depend on other factors. The literature on organizations has focused on how the characteristics of
the organization can play a role. Given that not all organizations are voluntary or promote
democratic values, we would expect variation in the relationship between being a member of an
organization and political participation. RPOs are not without exception; in fact, most of them
are still weak (Bourgeois et al., 2003). Many RPOs in developing countries face problems, such
as a lack of organizational skills (Markelova et al. 2009 and Poulton et al. 2010), dependency on
external actors, lack of resources, and internal conflicts. These problems can influence the
behavior of members. However, whether an organization is democratic is the most significant
factor affecting member political participation, with democratic organizations more likely to
increase member participation than non-democratic ones. When certain individual members have
more power over the organization, organizations may have different effects on different
members. This is supported by studies that show variations in political participation exist among
members within the same organization. Guo (2007), for example, found that the leaders of an
organization have a higher level of political participation than regular members. Fanny (2014)
found more educated members of a female organization in the South West region of Cameroon
were more likely to participate politically.
As with any social organization, RPOs have a political structure that distributes authority
and power within the organization which may not be done unequally across members. Despite
RPOs being member-based organizations at their core, not all members of RPOs contribute and
benefit equally, especially in large settings (FAO, 2015). I argue that certain individual attributes
can increase a person’s position in the organization compared to other members. This hinders
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certain members from acquiring the capacity and motivation to participate politically. Members
who have more power or leverage have a better opportunity to develop civic skills. Because of
this “structural inequality,” the opportunity to develop such civic skills may not be equal across
members and thus explain the different political participation patterns of RPO members.
In rural organizations, I argue that four factors can potentially provide such leverage for a
member. They are (1) structural position in an organization, (2) land ownership, (3) education,
and (4) age.
A person who holds a vital role in the organization, such as the leader, secretary, or
council member, is more involved in bargaining with actors inside and outside the organization.
Through this role, the member develops more knowledge about the organization and community
and gets the opportunity to practice their communication and bargaining skills as a representative
of the organization. Although a regular member could develop these same skills, those who hold
a structural position in the organization are more likely to be involved these organizational
activities (Guo, 2007).
A second factor is education. The role of education on political participation has been
thoroughly discussed. A person with more education is more likely to develop cognitive skills
that will allow them to be receptive towards new information (Nie et al., 1996). An educated
individual is more likely to have an interest in politics and, therefore, a higher commitment to
civic duties (Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). This can foster political participation. Education is also
said to bring higher social status, which can result in a person holding a central position in
society. This can also lead to political participation (Nie et al., 1996).
Third, land ownership also affects political participation. The agricultural development
literature has shown its importance for farmers. In developing countries, there are about 100
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million households who do not own any farmlands and are thus agricultural farm workers
(Barrett et.al., 2008). Most farmlands are either state-owned lands or large farms. One common
practice, however, is forming a communal land organization. In this practice, a community
shares land use among members of the organization, but each member can independently
cultivate their farm. In this case, even though farmers do not formally own land, they do have
authority over parts of the land. This is in contrast to agricultural farm workers who do not get to
cultivate for themselves. These landless farmers are dependent on their landowner and have no
access to credit or have the ability to cultivate and market farm products. Those who own or have
the authority over land, therefore, have leverage within an organization.
The last factor that can leverage one’s position in an organization is age. Young people
are argued to have difficulty accessing the services, opportunities, and benefits provided by
RPOs as well as participating in decision-making processes (FAO, 2015). Because RPOs are
rural-based organizations, traditional values – such as holding elders in high esteem – still apply
in the community.
Based on the arguments above, the following four hypotheses will also be tested in the
second part of the analysis:
H3: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in
elections/policy discussions if the person holds a structural position in the organization.
H4: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in
elections/policy discussions if the person has higher education.
H5: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in
elections/policy discussion if the person owns farmland.
H6: Being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood of a person participating in
elections/policy discussion if the person is older.
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Figure 4.2 Theoretical Framework on How RPOs Increases Members
Political Participation
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4.4 Data and Methodology
To test the abovementioned hypotheses, both quantitative and qualitative analyses are
conducted. The quantitative analysis uses survey data to test the correlation between membership
in RPOs and rural farmer political participation. Meanwhile, qualitative studies are conducted to
complement the survey by providing more extensive information on RPO membership and how
it can translate into political participation. The qualitative studies consist of a series of interviews
with key informants – such as the head of an RPO, extension officers, and randomly selected
farmers – to gain information on how RPOs function. The purpose is to understand RPO
activities and how they shape member political participation. Insights from these interviews can
be used to generate variables for quantitative analyses, i.e. examining how structural position
might matter. Additionally, these interviews can also help understand the possible causal
relationship between RPO membership and political participation.
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Survey Strategies
To gain the necessary data on rural farmer political participation, I conducted a survey
from July-September of 2016 of 220 rural producers from 30 randomly selected villages in three
districts of Indonesia: Keerom, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and Semarang,
Central Java. Each region is located in three provinces – Central Java, South Sumatera, and
Papua – spanning western and eastern Indonesia (Figure 4.3). They represent a variety of
geographical conditions, cultures, proximity to the central government, agricultural commodities,
and level of RPO participation. Each region has different agricultural characteristics. Thus,
obtaining a sample that consists of this variety can expand the external validity of the
relationship by confirming that the relationship holds across different context (Cook and
Campbell, 1979). Central Java is dominated by food crops – such as rice, wheat, and corn –while
South Sumatra and Papua are dominated by estate crops – such as palm oil and cocoa
(Agriculture Statistics, Ministry of Indonesia, 2016). RPO membership also varies across the
three regions. Central Java has the highest rate of RPO membership among the three at 53%,
followed by South Sumatera at 16%, and Papua at 6% (Graph 4.1).
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Graph 4.1 RPO Membership in Provinces of Indonesia
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Figure 4.3. Map of Selected Provinces

220 farmers from the three districts were then randomly selected and administered a
survey questionnaire (Appendix A). In selecting the respondents and spreading the questionnaire,
I was greatly supported by the Agriculture Extension and Human Resource Development
Agency (AEHRD) in the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia. AEHRD is an agency
under the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia that works closely with farmers on the
ground and conducts agricultural extension programs. This consists of education, information
sharing, trainings, and coordination of government-related regulations and programs. The agency
is regulated under Indonesia’s national Law Number 16 year 2006. Its purpose is to increase the
productivity and livelihoods of Indonesian farmers through a participatory mechanism.
Agricultural extension in Indonesia is conducted through regular and systematic programs where
extension officers regularly visit different farmers within their jurisdiction and follow up on their
progress. Since the agency has representatives in each district across Indonesia, the questionnaire
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was distributed randomly to farmers from different villages within the representative’s
jurisdiction. This technique does not follow the stratified sample technique because an equal
number of villages from each district were not selected. Rather, my technique selected farmers
directly. 34 samples are drawn from 7 villages in Semarang, Central Java; 96 samples are drawn
from 9 villages in Keeron, Papua; and 91 samples are drawn from 14 villages in Muara Banyu
Asin, South Sumatera. To prevent biased answers, the respondents are asked to fill the
questionnaire anonymously.
The survey questionnaire consists of information about the farmers’ membership in
RPOs, agricultural activities, socio-economic characteristics, and forms of political participation.
Because this chapter seeks to understand institutional political participation, my analysis focuses
on voting and participation in policy discussions with the government. Both forms of political
participation are coded dichotomously. If a respondent answered they had participated in the
activity during the past year, the act was coded as “1.” If, on the other hand, they had not taken
part in this act in the past year, the action was scored as “0.” Since Indonesia is a decentralized
country with local elections held independently, the question refers to both national and local
level elections. On RPO membership, the survey asked whether farmers belong to either
agricultural cooperatives or producer associations. RPO membership is also coded
dichotomously. If a farmer is currently a member of an RPO, they are coded as “1.” If they are
not a member of an RPO, they are coded as “0.” An alternative measure is to code the variable
categorically and distinguish between non-member, regular member, and member that holds an
important role in the organization. However, a separate measure on members having a structural
role in the organization is also included. Thus, coding RPO membership categorically is not
necessary. Sample descriptive statistics are provided below.
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Official surveys and reports on farmers within Indonesia exist. However, available data
does not include the questions needed for this study. Most of the surveys gather information on
agricultural production and the socio-economic information of households. Meanwhile,
information regarding organizational membership and political participation is almost nonexistent. The largest national survey on farmers, PATANAS (National Farmers Panel), for
example, provides information on farmer incomes, workforce participation, consumption habits,
poverty indicators, production assets, technology used, and financial access. Additionally,
surveys are done annually with a focus on different commodities each year. For example, the
2011 PATANAS focused on the vegetable subsector, while the 2012 PATANAS focused on
estate crops.

Model Specification
To test whether membership in an RPO increases the likelihood of a farmer participating
politically, I construct the following model and run the estimation by Probit regression model
using the survey data collected.

PEi = βo + β1RPOMEMBERi + β2 POSITIONi + β3 RPOMEMBERxPOSITIONi + β4 Xi + εi … (1)
PPi = βo + β1RPOMEMBERi + β2 POSITIONi + β3 RPOMEMBERxPOSITIONi + β4 Xi + εi … (2)

PEi is participation in an election (voting). PPi is participation in a policy discussion. POSITIONi

are variables influencing a person’s position in the organization. Xi is a set of control variables
that can explain participation in elections and policy discussions.
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As explained above, two forms of political participation – voting and participation in
policy discussions with the government – are the dependent variables. RPO membership is the
primary independent variable. However, other variables can determine individual behavior. To
test whether an individual’s position in the organization constrains the relationship between RPO
membership and member political participation, I include the four variables that influence a
farmer’s position in the organization as the interaction variables in the model. The four main
variables are whether the farmer holds a structural position in the organization, educational level,
land ownership, and age. If farmers hold a structural position in the organization, such as the
head of the organization, treasury, or secretary, they will take the value of “1.” If they do not
hold any structural positions (i.e. regular members), they will take the value of “0.” Educational
level is measured by an ordinal variable that goes from “1” for having no education at all, “2” for
having elementary school education, “3” for having middle school education, “4” for having
high school education, and “5” for having higher education. Land ownership is a binary variable,
where a value of “1” represents those who own their own land or have the authority to cultivate
land, either formal or informally. A value of “0” is given to those who do not own land or have
authority over land. In other words, the “0” value is given to farmers who are solely agricultural
workers. Meanwhile, age is a continuous variable dependent on the respondents’ ages.
Other relevant variables are also introduced to control for alternative explanations for
farmer political participation. One crucial factor that previous theories have suggested is the
context in which the organization is located. In the case of RPOs, this may include the type of
agricultural commodities (staple foods or estate crops) the RPO focuses on, whether the
organization is in a region where agriculture holds a vital role in the economy, and the farmers’
distance to markets. The theories suggest that an organization can increase member political
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participation through enhancing their civic skills. Thus, it is important to look at how different
agricultural subsectors – and their different production and marketing systems – can influence
the development of these civic skills. For example, food staples (i.e. rice) are argued to have a
more complex production process that requires more coordination during the irrigation and
milling processes than estate crops (Talhelm et al., 2014). This creates closer collaboration
between RPO members (Bray, 1986) and provides them with a greater opportunity to develop
civic skills. The location of an organization also influences an organization’s performance and its
ability to provide civic skills to members. If the organization is located far from the market, it is
harder for farmers to coordinate since economic activity becomes too costly. This makes it more
difficult for the farmers to develop their civic skills (Alene et al., 2008). Similarly, if the
organization is located in an agriculture dominant region, then farmers may be able obtain more
substantial support from the government, i.e. infrastructure development, input access, and other
support. This increases the opportunity for farmers to effectively participate in the organization
and develop their civic skills.
Other control variables that I include are those that relate to a person’s affiliation with
external actors. This includes whether RPO members are affiliated with certain political parties;
whether they have connections with other civic organization such as religious, youth, and
women’s organizations, among others; and whether they hold business contracts. This controls
for the intrinsic characteristic of an individual – whether the person has an interest in politics and
social activities in the first place (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999). Summary statistics of all
variables are presented in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of All Variables in the Model
Variables

Obs

Mean

StdDev

Min

Max

220

0.74

0.44

0

1

Participation in Election
(1=participate)

220

0.82

0.38

0

1

RPO Membership
(1=member)

220

0.84

0.37

0

1

220

2.35

1.22

1

5

220

43.4

13.2

19

72

220

0.27

0.44

0

1

220

0.81

0.39

0

1

220

0.89

0.31

0

1

220

0.61

0.51

0

1

220

31.42

88.87

1

500

Member of a political party
(1=member)

220

0.19

0.39

0

1

Member of other civic organization
(1=member)

220

0.44

0.49

0

1

Hold economic contract
(1=hold economic contract)

220

0.26

0.44

0

1

Participation in Policy Discussion
(1=participate)

Education
(1=no education, 2=elementary school,
3=middle school, 4=high school, 5=higher
education)
Age
Structural Position in the Organization
(1=hold structural position in the
organization)
Land Ownership
(1=own land)
Organization located in agriculture
dominant sector
(1=located in agriculture dominant sector
district)
Staple Food as the main agriculture
commodities (1=staple food)
Distance to market (km)
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4.5 Empirical results and analysis
This section reports estimation results for the model presented above in equation 1 and 2.
Two forms of farmer political participation – participation in an election (voting) and
participation in policy discussions with the government – are predicted from membership in
RPOs and a set of control variables that might be associated with political participation. The
summary results of my analysis are reported in Table 4.3 – for participation in elections – and
Table 4.4 – for participation in policy discussions. I estimate the model using different methods
in which model 1 uses the bivariate probit analysis, model 2 uses the multivariate probit analysis,
model 3 uses the multivariate logit analysis, model 4 uses the multivariate probit analysis using
interaction variables, and model 5 uses the multivariate logit analysis using interaction variables.
The results of my analyses demonstrate that being a member of an RPO increases the likelihood
of a farmer participating in both forms of political activities. This supports previous theories that
suggest organizations increase levels of political participation.
The first step of the analysis is to see whether there is an association between RPO
membership and farmer political participation. A descriptive analysis of the data shows that
86.4% of farmers who are members of an RPO participated in an election, and 76% of farmers
who are members of an RPO participated in a policy discussion (Table 4.2). However,
individuals who are not members of RPOs also have a high participation rate in elections and
policymaking. However, they have a lower rate of participation than RPO members do. 61.1% of
non-members participated in an election, while 55.5% of non-members participated in policy
discussions. This shows that RPO members have a higher participation rate in both elections and
policymaking compared to non-members. Additionally, the Pearson Chi2 test for associations
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shows a significant association between RPO membership and participation in an election.
However, this does not hold for participation in policy discussions. A similar test is also
conducted using bivariate probit analysis to see the independent effect of RPO membership on a
person’s participation in both voting and policy discussions. The results, shown in Model 1 of
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, demonstrate a positive correlation. However, they differ in significance.
The results illustrate that there is a significant difference in the rates of participation in elections
between members and non-members of RPOs but not for participation in policy discussions.

Table 4.2 Estimation Results in Explaining Participation in Policy Discussion
Political Participation
Participate in election
Chi2 (1, N=220) = 13.22***

Member
86.4%

Non-member
61.1%

Does not participate in election

13.6%

38.9%

Participate in policy discussion
Chi2 (1, N=220) = 2.338

76%

55.5%

Does not participate in policy
discussion

24%

44.5%

Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Table 4.3 Estimation Results in Explaining Participation in Policy Discussion
Dependent Variable = Participation in Policy Discussion
Independent Variables

1

0.3536

2
Probit
Multivariate
0.498

3
Logit
Multivariate
0.797

4
Probit
Interaction
0.145

5
Logit
Interaction
0.377

(0.236)

(0.275)*

(0.469)*

(1.453)

(2.39)

0.232

0.3876

0.263

0.448

(0.0934)**

(0.1570)**

(0.255)

(0.4282)

0.0003304

-0.0006

0.0055

0.00997

(0.0082)

(0.0138)

(0.025)

(0.0404)

0.166

0.297

-0.0186

-0.0287

(0.255)

(0.428)

(0.613)

(0.995)

0.112

0.261

-1.195

-2.021

(0.236)

(0.413)

(0.706)*

(1.244)

0.5979

1.0202

0.618

1.06315

(0.322)*

(0.525)*

(0.333)*

(0.542)**

-0.002

-0.003

-0.002

-0.00305

(0.001)

(0.002)

(0.001)*

(0.00197)

0.805

1.462

0.867

1.5146

(0.3030)***

(0.563)***

(0.31813)***

(0.576)***

-0.009

0.029

0.048

0.119

(0.207)

(0.354)

(0.211)

(0.362)

-0.182

-0.287

-0.0936

-0.202

(0.233)

(0.405)

(0.2438)

(0.415)

-0.0707

-0.1287

-0.0814

-0.158

(0.202)

(0.7040

(0.207)

(0.35)

0.013

0.0108

(0.273)

(0.457)

Probit Binary
RPO Member
Education
Age
Land Ownership
Hold Structural Position
Organization located in
agriculture dominant
sector
Market Distance
Member of Political Party
Member of Other Civic
Organization
Hold Economic Contract
Staple food as the main
agriculture commodity
RPO*education
RPO*age
RPO*land ownership
RPO*structural position
Constant

-0.0056

-0.0115

(0.02654)

(0.0433)

0.3087

0.5309

(0.67063)

(1.01)

1.551

2.676

(0.7544)**

(1.334)**

0..35549

0.962

-1.624

-0.92

-1.66

(0.21373)***

(0.636)

(1.056)

(1.348)

(2.213)

N=220

N=220

N=220

Number of observation
N=220
N=220
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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Table 4.4 Estimation Results in Explaining Participation in Election
Dependent Variable = Participation in Election
Independent Variables

1

0.8168

2
Probit
Multivariate
0.67

3
Logit
Multivariate
1.185

4
Probit
Interaction
0.51

(0.2415)***

(0.297)**

(0.52)**

(1.623)

(2.8)

0.274

0.5267

0.4544

0.777

(0.108)**

(0.21)**

(0.3021)

(0.514)

0.192

0.03357

-0.0025

-0.007

(0.0102)*

(0.0189)*

(0.028)

(0.048)

-0.484

-0.805

0.045

0.07

(0.342)

(0.615)

(0.688)

(1.178)

-0.1946

-0.3314

-1.0718

-1.5403

(0.274)

(0.52)

(0.7912)

(1.38)

-0.46734

-0.871

-0.324

-0.652

(0.474)

(0.924)

(0.48)

(0.925)

0.00073

0.00115

0.008

0.0013

(0.0017)

(0.00296)

(0.0017)

(0.003)

1.098

1.915

1.09

1.943

(0.262)***

(0.456)***

(0.268)***

(0.467)***

0.224

0.415

0.235

0.429

(0.261)

(0.474)

(0.263)

(0.481)

0.52

0.999

0.553

1.0775

(0.32)

(0.6303)

(0.3293)*

(0.673)

-0.117

-0.244

-0.0876

-0.1811

(0.247)

(0.46)

(0.2528)

(0.4701)

-0.238

-0.371

(0.32626)

(0.568)

Probit Binary
RPO Member
Education
Age
Land Ownership
Hold Structural Position
Organization located in
agriculture dominant
sector
Market Distance
Member of Political Party
Member of Other Civic
Organization
Hold Economic Contract
Staple food as the main
agriculture commodity
RPO*education
RPO*age
RPO*land ownership
RPO*structural position
Constant

5
Logit
Interaction
0.612

0.02617

0.0497

(0.0306)

(0.0525)

-0.6791

-1.135

(0.806)

(1.428)

0.923

1.313

(0.845)

(1.494)

0.282

0.023

-0.041

0.064

0.315

(0.211)

(0.748)

(1.42)

(1.4985)

(2.55)

N=220

N=220

Number of observation
N=220
N=220
N=220
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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To test whether RPO membership contributes to the different levels of political
participation instead of other variables, I conduct a multivariate analysis to estimate the effect of
RPO membership on farmer political participation. Multivariate analysis lets us control for other
potential alternative explanations that can contribute to farmer political participation. Table 4.2
and Table 4.3 report the results. For participation in an election, both probit and logit models
show a positive and statistically significant relationship. This means that members of RPOs are
more likely to participate in an election. This relationship holds even after controlling for other
alternative explanations. The inclusion of contextual variables, such as commodity type and
geographical location, suggest that the relationship is generalizable across contexts.
Similarly, both probit and logit estimation show that after controlling for other alternative
explanations, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between RPO
membership and participation in policy discussions. This result reaffirms many organizational
theories that argue that being a member of an organization will increase the likelihood of a
person participating politically. This result shows that the theories apply to a specific type of
organization, RPOs (agricultural cooperatives and producer associations), in rural agricultural
communities.
To determine the magnitude of the relationship, I calculate the marginal effect of the
estimates. This is reported below in Table 4.5. Based on the results, we can see that farmers who
are members of an RPO are 16.9% more likely to participate in policy discussions than farmers
who are not members of an RPO. Similarly, farmers who are members of an RPO are 17% more
likely to participate in an election than farmers who are not members of an RPO.
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Table 4.5 Marginal Effect on Probabilities of Political Participation

Independent Variables

Marginal Effect on
Participation in Policy
Discussion

RPO Membership

0.169
(0.01)

Education

0.07
(0.03)

Marginal Effect on
Participation
inElection

0.0001
(0.0025)

Age

Land Ownership

0.053
(0.08)

Structural Position in the Organization

0.034
(0.07)

Staple

-0.021
(0.06)

Agriculture Dominance

0.209
(0.123)

Market Distance

-0.0005
(0.0003)
0.2
(0.06)

Political Party Affiliation
Membership in other Civic
Organization

-0.003
(0.06)
-0.057
(0.06)

Hold economic contract

Notes: Results report marginal predicted probabilities with standard errors in parentheses.
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0.17
(0.025)
0.05
(0.021)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.081
(0.046)
-0.04
(0.06)
-0.023
(0.05)
-0.07
(0.06)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.304
(0.089)
0.0446
(0.05)
0.09
(0.047)

Since the position of a member in an organization can yield different levels of political
participation, I also test whether the relationship between RPO membership and a person’s
political behavior is conditional on a person’s position in the organization. Model 4 and 5 in both
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show the results of the estimation. The general finding is that a person’s
position in the organization does not determine his/her political participation. For participation in
elections, participation is not influenced by structural position in the organization, land
ownership, age, or education. For participation in policy discussion, the estimations show that
only holding a structural position in the organization influences the level of member
participation. This is reasonable since most policy discussions with authorities may only involve
representatives of the organizations instead of all members. However, participation in policy
discussions does not differ by age, education, and land ownership.
Other findings also reaffirm several previous studies. First, education increases the
likelihood of a person participating in both elections and policy discussions with the government.
This confirms the education theory of political participation. Second, the significance of several
variables that relate to the contextual factor of the organization is also confirmed. In particular, if
the organization is located in an agriculture dominant sector, farmer participation in policy
discussions increases. This shows that in an agriculture dominant region, governments are more
inclined to support farmers by involving them in policy discussions than farmers who are in
regions where agriculture is less significant to the economy. Third, having an affiliation to a
political party increases the likelihood of a farmer participating in both elections and policy
discussions. This is reasonable since political organizations can mobilize members to participate
in elections and policy discussions more than organizations who do not have political party
affiliations.
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4.6 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to see whether being a member of a Rural Producer
Organization increases the likelihood of farmers participating in two ways – voting in elections
and participating in policy discussions with the government. This, in turn, is to see whether
membership in RPOs represent one component of rural political agency, which is the focus of
this dissertation. The empirical results show that farmers who are members of an RPO are indeed
more likely to participate in both forms of political activities than farmers who are not members
of an RPO. This relationship holds even after controlling for other alternative explanations
gathered from past theories or fieldwork. The relationship in general also holds across all
members of an RPO regardless of the position they hold in the organization, their age, their
education, and their land ownership status. This suggests that RPOs, in general, are relatively
democratic in that every member of the organization has the same opportunity to develop civic
skills, receive information, and build trust with other members. Thus, these members can
develop skills that enhance political participation. Additionally, membership in an RPO makes
farmer political participation more likely than membership in other civic associations, such as
religious, youth, and women’s organizations.
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CHAPTER 5
RURAL AGRICULTURE PARTICIPATION IN GLOBALIZED
MARKET

5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated the importance of RPOs in shaping rural political
agency. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to understand the factors that explain rural RPO
participation in Indonesia. As discussed previously, there is still a limited understanding of the
contextual factors that contribute to the level of rural participation in a region. In the case of
Indonesia, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 show that a change in the political system from an
authoritarian to a democratic regime has shaped how rural communities participate in these
RPOs. However, the variation in rural participation under Indonesia’s decentralized system
indicates that there are other possible contextual explanations outside the political system. Using
mixed-method qualitative and quantitative approaches, this chapter identifies these other
contextual features and tests how they correlate with rural participation in RPOs. Through an
interview I conducted on selected farmers, several contextual factors were identified – (1)
exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of government support programs, and (3) existence
of external supporting actors. Based on these factors, a survey was also conducted to see which
of the variables were most common. A quantitative approach – a fixed-effect panel data
regression on panel data of Indonesian states from 2010 to 2015 – was then used to test the
correlation between these contextual factors and participation in RPOs. The period selection is
based on the years Indonesia has been a decentralized system (after 2009) as well as data
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availability of RPO membership. Data on RPO membership at the local level, both province and
district levels, are only available since 2010 from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Republic of
Indonesia. The empirical results show that regional exposure to international trade is the main
factor that explains variation in rural participation in RPOs.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 discuss the interviews and survey I
conducted, which provide the bases for the variables I test in the quantitative analysis. In this
section, I discuss how the survey and interviews demonstrate that exposure to trade liberalization
is the primary reason small agricultural producers join RPOs. Section 5.3 discusses the analytical
framework and hypotheses connecting trade liberalization to rural participation. Section 5.4
explains the empirical strategies, measurement, and data that are used. Section 5.5 discusses the
empirical findings and analyses. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.

5.2 Qualitative Research: Insights on Contextual Factors Explaining Rural Participation
To understand which contextual factors influence the level of rural participation in RPOs,
I conducted interviews and a survey. Ten members of an RPO, where six hold important
positions in the organization, were interviewed to identify key contextual factors that motivate
farmers to join their organization. A semi-structured interview using a set of questions
(Appendix B) was adopted during my research fieldwork in the summer of 2017. This allowed
participants to provide information that is important to them but not necessarily reflected in the
interview questions. The selected participants were active members of an RPO and represented
each region under study as well as different agricultural products to obtain a diverse set of
answers. The selection was done with the help of the Agriculture Extension and Human
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Resource Development Agency (AEHRD), Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia that
works closely with Indonesian RPOs.
The interview results show that several main conditional factors influence farmers’
participation in RPOs: (1) the exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of government
support programs, and (3) existence of supporting external actors. For the most part, farmers that
were interviewed had a similar initial response when asked what motivated them to join an RPO.
In other words, farmers were motivated to join an RPO to stay competitive in the market, as they
are concerns over the fluctuating prices and the low selling price of agricultural products in
Indonesia due to the effect of global market activities. A sugar farmer, for instance, said that he
and his group were having a hard time selling their sugar products due to the increasing sugar
imports coming into Indonesia. According to him, this has created a fall in sugar prices for local
farmers, as they are not well equipped to compete in the growing market. Furthermore, he
explained that farmers have limited resources, such as capital, inputs, and finances, making many
of them feel excluded from the market. Similarly, a rubber farmer described that due to a more
open market, the government has less control over agricultural prices, making it difficult for
farmers to sell their products at a competitive price. With limited financial options and other
resources, it is more challenging for farmers to keep up with global competition.
When asked whether being in an RPO helped, the rubber farmer responded that while
farmers still struggle with a stiff competitive market, being members of an RPO have helped
them connect to the government and important actors, such as distributors and business partners.
“At least when the government understands that the commodity price is harming us, they will try
to be in touch with rural organizations to make purchasing arrangements,” he further responded.
The sugar farmer also responded that, “one way for us to be able to stay competitive in the
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market is by working together and finding the solution, either through making our productions
more efficient or by raising the problems to relevant authorities.” Palm oil farmers agreed with
these statements and put much emphasis on the role of RPOs in increasing the collective
bargaining position of farmers, mainly with the government and traders.
Exposure to trade has also brought other challenges for farmers, such as having to adhere
to stricter regulations and standards in the global market. The agricultural market has become
more complex due to more extended and sophisticated supply chains. This creates stricter
regulations, higher food safety and quality standards, and changing consumption patterns
(Narayanan and Gulati, 2002). Because farmers have limited access to information in the formal
market as well as limited ways to share information amongst each other, they face high
information asymmetry. Thus, it is difficult for them to meet market requirements (Gulati et al.,
2007). Several participants talked about this problem and explained that on many occasions, their
export sales were rejected because their products were deemed unqualified. Many of the
participants explained that being a member of an RPO has allowed them to overcome these
challenges because they have access to many governmental and non-governmental programs that
help them meet the necessary requirements. This has allowed them to penetrate foreign markets.
A palm oil farmer further emphasized, “[B]eing a member of an RPO is a mechanism for them
[farmers] to connect with the government and related authorities so that concerns over the global
market can be conveyed.”
Indeed, access to governmental programs is also the main reason why farmers join RPOs,
as indicated by my respondents. In Indonesia, most of the government’s agricultural support is
distributed through RPOs, although not necessarily. Farmers can also get support directly from
the government. However, many more farmers benefit from this support when the government
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provides it through RPOs instead of sending it directly to farmers. When asked how often and
through what means – through their RPO or directly – they receive government support, the
answer varied among respondents. A rice farmer answered that she received much government
support, i.e. seeds and equipment, through her organization and never directly from the
government. However, the rubber and palm oil farmer experienced both. The rice farmer stated
that the government tended to provide rice through RPOs because rice cultivation required
farmers to coordinate their irrigation. This was not true for other products, such as palm oil.
Either way, this accessibility to government agricultural support is one of the primary motivation
for farmers to join RPOs.
Respondents also replied that the existence of active external supporting actors, the
agriculture extension officers in particular, was another reason why they joined RPOs. When
such external actors are actively available, farmers can benefit from their guidance and
information, thus increasing their productivity and competitiveness. The rice farmer explained
that many rice farmers in her area were enticed by extension officers to join an RPO because
they offered guidance programs. Extension officers, however, are not the only external actors
that can influence farmers’ decisions to join an RPO. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and business partners looking to cooperate with farmers are also common. Collective action
among farmers through RPOs can make such relations more effective. One farmer said: “...it is
easier for them to work with us as a group rather than individually.” Moreover, he explained that
because they are now linked to global commodity chains and global food supplies, many farmers
are motivated to join RPOs to increase their market access in the global market. Additionally,
business partners commonly look for an established group rather than individual farmers. This is
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because RPOs not only provide a mechanism for collective activities, but they also overcome
fundamental issues, such as economies of scale and access to financial institutions.
A survey was then conducted towards the same group of farmers survey was conducted
in Chapter 4 to see which of the identified factors were predominant. One of the questions asked
on the survey was: “what motivates you to join rural organizations such as agriculture
cooperatives or producers organization?” Results are shown in Graph 5.1. where we see
exposure to trade liberalization as the main motivating factor for farmers to join an RPO,
followed by government support incentives.
Graph 5.1 Survey Result on Farmers’ Motivation to Participate in RPOs
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Since exposure to trade has been identified as the main contextual factor driving farmers
to join an RPO, the next section provides an analytical framework on the relationship between
trade and rural participation.
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5.3 Analytical Framework and Hypothesis
To complement the insights gained from the interviews and survey above, this section
builds an analytical framework on the relationship between trade liberalization and rural civic
participation. The literature indicates that there are three main channels in which trade
liberalization can translate into higher rural civic participation: (1) distributional economic effect,
(2) government accountability, and (3) information effect. The distributional economic effect
relates to how trade distributes benefits differently across different actors, as the StolperSamuelson (SS) theory suggested. The SS theory is based on the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model
which argues that countries will produce goods based on their relative abundant factors or
endowments. Take an example of two countries, where one has a capital-abundant factor and the
other has a labor-abundant factor. The country with a capital-abundant factor will produce
capital-intensive goods, and the country with a labor-abundant factor will produce laborintensive goods. Both countries gain from trading with each other so they can both acquire what
they lack.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is the extension of the H-O model, which states that a
rise in the relative price of a good will lead to a rise in the return on the factor used most
intensively in the production of the good. Conversely, it will lead to a fall in the return on the
factor that is used less in the production. In a two-factor model, such as skilled and unskilled
labor, trade will increase the income of those with abundant factors in the country and reduce the
income of those with scarce factors. Thus, the theory suggests that the income of unskilled labor,
the abundant factor, will increase in comparison to skilled labor in developing countries. The
contrary also holds for skilled labor in developed countries. Based on this distributive effect
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towards society, scholars have argued that trade can shape national coalitions, either based on
class (Rogowski, 1989) or sector / industry (Gourevitch, 1986; Frieden, 1991).
Since the agricultural sector in developing countries is dominated by unskilled labor (i.e.
small farmers) and is land intensive, the SS theory would then predict that trade liberalization
will increase the livelihood of small farmers. When this is the case, the modernization theory of
democracy suggests that this can promote civic activism in rural communities. This is because
farmers gain more access to education and, therefore, become more receptive towards new ideas
(Schumpeter, 1950; Lipset, 1959). The reality, however, shows that trade does not necessarily
benefit farmers economically. Instead, my interviews show that trade poses income risks for
farmers, as they face higher market competition and stricter regulations. Several studies have
suggested that globalization, in general, has resulted in large corporations dominating the global
agri-food system (Jussaume, 1998; Hendrickson and Heffernan, 2002). Many small farms are
being replaced by these large multinational corporations, and the latter have more political
influence to obtain benefits from the government and shape public policy (Roach, 2007).
Likewise, a study by Paul (2013) suggests that current global production is dominated by a
handful of companies that creates an oligopoly in the global agricultural market. For instance,
three of the biggest seed producers dominate 90% of global sugar beets. A similar situation can
be found for 57% of global maize production and 55% of global soya beans production.
However, risks from trade liberalization do not necessarily mean rural deprivation. In
many cases, rural populations have revolted and created movements to fight these challenges.
Moyo and Yeros (2005) review how rural movements arose in three continents – Africa, South
America, and Asia. These popular resistances challenged the neoliberal state and the ways in
which the state undermined rural labor through new land tenure arrangements and the
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commodification of land policies. Van der Ploeg (2009) also reiterates this view. He argues that
when confronted with increasing dependence on global market and depeasantization, rural
populations can form resistances to the capitalist production logic and form counter movements
of repeasantization. Bhavnani and Jha (2013) also test this close relationship between “trade
shocks” and rural movements in India. They find that pro-democracy independence movements
and parties in India are mostly active in regions that have experienced negative trade shocks.
Thus, the first channel that links trade and rural civic participation aligns closely with the
information obtained in the interviews – distributive economic effects of trade liberalization
motivate rural civic activism.
The second channel is government accountability. Trade can improve governance since it
requires institutions that are transparent, less corrupt, and able to provide equal opportunity for
different stakeholders to increase their incomes and conduct efficient resource allocations
(Bonaglia et.al, 2001; Aman, 2001; Chesterman, 2008). Through its potential benefits, trade can
also increase a government’s financial capacity. Governments can receive higher revenues from
taxes, tariffs, and other fees associated with trade activities. To gain these benefits, governments
have incentives to create stable economic and political conditions and enhance their
responsiveness. Thus, trade creates a more accountable government that is more likely to be
responsive to the need of its citizens. This allows RPOs to flourish, as government support is one
important factor that contributes to the success of RPOs .
The last channel is the information effect of international trade. The basic argument is
that trade will lead to higher interactions among small farmers as well as with other actors –such
as traders, local governments, importers, investors, NGOs, and other international organizations.
This will allow small farmers to be exposed to new information, technology, and ideas, including
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democratic practices. Latynskiy (2016) argues that these external actors can help sustain
successful RPOs. Since trade reduces information and traveling costs and intensifies the
interactions among foreign countries and individuals, the transmission of new ideas is more
attainable. This paves the way for more democratic practices to be implemented. Exposure to
trade liberalization will therefore create incentives and awareness among farmers to mobilize and
take part in new participatory acts such as joining rural organizations.
Figure 5.1 shows the summary of the analytical framework described above. Based on
this argument, the following hypothesis is tested:
H1: Increase exposure to trade will increase rural participation in RPOs.

Figure 5.1 Theoretical Framework of Trade and Rural Participation in RPOs

Rural
Participation in
RPOs
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Endowment Factor
The relationship between trade and rural participation in RPOs, however, is conditioned
by agricultural landscape. Different regions vary in commodities and endowments. The literature
on democracy has indicated that factor endowments play an important role in determining
whether trade increases democratic processes. The focus is on the economic conflict between
elites – who are equipped with high capital endowments – and citizens with high labor
endowments (Robinson, 2006). In labor-abundant countries, trade will increase the income of
labor and allow them greater de facto political power, resulting in more democratic practices.
However, the same does not hold for capital-abundant countries, where trade widens income
inequality and provides an avenue for elites to gain more power. This theory is further tested by
Doces and Magee (2015) who argue that a higher level of trade in labor-abundant countries is
associated with an increase in democratic processes. This is not true in capital-abundant
countries.
Although the above theories are used to understand national level democracies, I argue
that they can be applied to local level democratic practices as well. Within the agriculture sector,
endowment factors vary. There are land-abundant regions regions with high land-owning
farmers – that are typically dominated by large agricultural lands. There are also labor-abundant
regions – regions with high landless farmers. Based on the SS theory, trade liberalization will
benefit areas based on their endowments factor. In a labor-abundant agricultural area, trade will
benefit agricultural laborers more than it will benefit those with land-abundant factors. This
increases the possibility of rural participation. In contrast, in a land- and capital-abundant area
(i.e. dominated by large agriculture land ownership), trade will not benefit agricultural laborers
more than capital owners. This results in less robust rural political participation.
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As agricultural regions may vary in this regard, the effect of trade on rural civic
participation can differ. I adopt the factor endowment theories in the trade and democracy
literature and test whether trade increases rural civic participation only in regions that are laborabundant. The following hypothesis is tested:
H2: Trade will increase rural participation in RPOs in areas with labor-abundant agricultural
sectors.

5.4 Empirical Research Design
The Model
To test both hypotheses above, I develop a model that explains the level of rural
participation in RPOs as follows:
RPOit = αo + α1TRADEit + α2ENDWMNTit + α 3Xit + α4 Λ it + εi
RPOit is rural participation in RPOs, TRADEit is the level of trade liberalization or trade
exposure, ENDWMNTit is a variable that captures endowment factor, Xit is a list of control
variables, and Λ is the interaction between trade liberalization and endowment factor. The main
independent variable is trade exposure and its interaction with the endowment factor. The
relevant control variables included are those that have the potential to explain rural participation
in RPOs, such as demographic information, human development, and a state’s economic
characteristics.
I test the model on Indonesian state-level data between the period of 2010-2015. While,
ideally, this theory should be tested across countries, data on rural organization membership at
the national level are very limited. Moreover, such organizations may not be comparable since
different countries might have different forms of organizations with different functions and roles.
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Since the model is tested across Indonesian states, socio-political variations across states is
required. The selection of the time period is therefore based on the period in which Indonesia
has decentralized (2004 onward) as well as the availability of Indonesian RPO membership data
(which starts in 2010). I ran the model by using both fixed effect and random effect regression
for the panel data. This allows me to control for potential unobserved variables and differences
across states and time since it contains information on both intertemporal dynamics and
individual characteristics. The panel data is balanced and includes a total of 186 observations.
The dataset is constructed using several data sources described in the following section.

List of Variables and Measurements
Dependent Variable: Rural Participation in RPOs
The dependent variable in this model is rural participation in RPOs, which measures RPO
membership in a region. It is measured by calculating the total number of agricultural farmers
belonging to RPOs divided by the total agricultural farmers in the state. It includes different
types of RPOs, including agricultural cooperatives and producer associations. This measure,
however, does not capture the magnitude of rural participation because high membership level
does not necessarily mean more activities and high member engagement. For example, an
organization may have a high rate of membership but low contribution from its members.
However, scholars have argued that calculating RPO activities is a difficult task since there are
different forms of RPOs with different activities, goals, and characteristics (Shiferaw et al, 2009;
Fischer and Qaim, 2011; Ragasa and Golan, 2012). When this task is possible, it is typically
done among a certain number of organizations. Thus, finding the aggregate state level of RPO
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activities is almost impossible to do. Membership level is, therefore, a better proxy to determine
the level of rural farmer engagement in an organization.
Moreover, I argue that because RPOs are voluntary organizations, being a member of an
RPO is itself a form of rural farmer participation. Data on the number of farmers joining RPOs
and total agricultural workers are obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Republic of
Indonesia. The data on RPO membership is obtained specifically from the Extension Program
and Human Resource Development Department under the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of
Indonesia (BPPSDMP).

Main Independent Variable: Trade Liberalization
The main independent variable is trade liberalization, which is defined by the level of
market openness in a region. The literature on trade has used different ways to measure trade,
which includes tariff levels and policies, trade volume, deviation measures, and subjective
indexes (Spilimbergo et. al, 1999; Calderón et al, 2005). Scholars have argued that to measure
the level of openness, we need to look at trade policy instead, i.e. tariff and non-tariff barriers.
However, quantifying trade policies, particularly for non-tariff barriers, is difficult. In this study,
trade policies are not relevant to use since I am conducting a within-country analysis. Trade
policies tend to be made at the national level. Trade volume (ratio of export and import to GDP)
is the simplest and most commonly used measure. The measure, however, is problematic because
trade volume does not reflect actual trade policy because it captures the real level of trade
openness. This level can be affected by other things, such as geographical conditions, income,
and size of the economy. The second trade measure that is commonly used is whether the region
is dominated by an import-competing subsector or an export-oriented subsector. In this case,
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trade is measured not only by its density but also by its type. The classification that is commonly
used is whether a region is a net importer or net exporter, and thus trade is measured by the trade
balance. The trade balance is the difference between the value of goods exported and goods
imported for a certain period of time. The code “1” represents net importer – where imports
exceed exports – while “0” represents the opposite, a net exporter.
Since there are debates on how best to measure trade, I use both trade volume and trade
balance to check the robustness of the theories. Moreover, since the interest of this study is rural
agricultural communities, both measures are more relevant to the theory since they focus on the
agricultural sector. Trade volume is measured by the ratio of total agricultural exports and
imports per agriculture GDP of a region. Trade balance is measured by the difference between
agricultural exports and imports. To check whether rural political participation in RPOs can be
influenced by the general trade liberalization of a region, I also conduct an analysis using general
trade volume. In this case, state level data on trade and GDP are used rather than agricultural
sector data. All the dataset used here are obtained from the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics
(BPS).

Control Variable: Endowment Factor
Endowment factor is defined by the production factor endowed in the region. Based on
previous trade theories, endowment factor is divided into those that are endowed with labor and
those that are endowed with capital owners. Within the agricultural sector, the division can be
based upon agricultural landowners and those that are purely agricultural laborers. An ideal way
to measure endowment factor is by looking at how many farmers own land. However, such data
are not available at the aggregate level. Farmer survey data, such as the National Farmer Survey
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Data (PATANAS), have explored the subject but are done at the individual level and typically
concentrate in a specific area at different times. Thus, I cannot find state-level data that is
comparable across cases.
An alternative measure is to look at the type of commodities dominating the region. The
agriculture subsector consists of five main sub-sectors – staple foods, horticulture, livestock,
fisheries, and estate crops. Based on the Indonesian National Farmer Survey Data (PATANAS),
smallholder farmers dominate the staple foods subsector more than private plantations and
national state-owned enterprises. In 2003, the number of smallholder farmers in the staple food
subsector reached 18 million. In 2013, there was a slightly lower number of 17.7 million
smallholder farmers. This represented around 60% of total smallholder farmers in Indonesia
(PATANAS, 2014). Further data on smallholder farmers within the Indonesian agriculture
subsector is shown in Graph 5.2 and Graph 5.3.
Based on this reasoning, I use a proxy for endowment factor by looking at the share of
staple food commodities in the agriculture sector of a region. If a region’s agriculture sector is
dominated by staple foods, I assume that land ownership is low. Therefore, that region can be
considered a labor-abundant region. On the contrary, a region in where non-staple food
commodities dominate indicates high land ownership. Thus, this region can be considered a
land-abundant region. The share of the commodity is calculated by the ratio of the total
production of staple food to the overall agricultural GDP. All relevant data ‒ state level
commodity production and agriculture GDP ‒ is obtained from the State Statistics Annual
Report, which is provided by each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).
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Graph 5.2 Number of Smallholder Households Based on Agriculture Subsector*
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Livestock

Fisheries

Control Variables: Socio-political factors
Other variables are included in the model to control for alternative explanations of rural
participation in RPOs. The variables include socio-economic and political factors as well as the
structure of the agriculture sector in the state. Socio-economic factors measure the
developmental level of the population in the state. This includes poverty level, inequality, share
of rural population, and the human development index. Poverty and inequality are expected to
have a negative correlation with rural participation in RPOs. This is because poorer rural
populations will have less capacity and power to act in a collective manner. Meanwhile the
human development index is expected to have a positive correlation with rural participation in
RPOs. Scholars have long acknowledged the importance of high socio-economic standings for
democratic practices, such as civic participation (Lipset, 1960; Diamond, 1999). Despite doubts
about the ability of these theories to explain the recent wave of democracies, scholars and
practitioners commonly agree that democratic practices will survive better in the presence of
wealth and development. Data on poverty, inequality, and the human development index are
obtained from the State Statistics Annual Report, which is provided by each state’s
representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS). The human development index
data from the BPS consist of three elements: life expectancy, educational level, and income.
Another control variable that is included in the model is the structure of the agriculture
sector in the state. This includes the share of the rural population in the state, agriculture share to
GDP, whether the agriculture sector is the main sector of the state, and farmer access to
agriculture credit. It is expected that a when the agriculture sector plays a large role in the
economy ‒ indicated by the population share, economic share, and its relative position in the
economy ‒ it will increase rural participation in RPOs. This is because collective action among
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farmers will be more accessible. And when the agriculture sector is important in the economy,
the government is also more likely to include rural participation in public affairs as well as
encourage farmers to become members of RPOs. Additionally, access to agriculture credit is
important for encouraging rural participation in RPOs since RPOs are economic-based and,
therefore, require financial institutions. The data is obtained mostly from State Statistics Annual
Report provided by each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS)
as well.
Data on whether agriculture is the main sector is obtained by calculating the share of
agriculture GDP to the overall GDP. I then construct a measure where the agriculture sector in
the region is considered the main sector when the agriculture share is over 50 percent of the
overall GDP. I code the regions using a binary measure – “1” represents agriculture as the main
sector of the region, and “0” stands for the reverse. Meanwhile, agriculture credit is calculated by
the value of total credit given in the agriculture sector per agriculture GDP using the data
obtained by the Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia.
The last control variables are those that are related to political factors. These include the
number of jurisdictions and the election period. The number of jurisdictions is the number of
districts within the state based on the data obtained from the Ministry of National Affairs
Republic of Indonesia. Since rural participation in RPOs often requires collective action and
cooperation between different farmers across districts within a state, more jurisdictions in a state
is expected to reduce rural participation in RPOs. In addition, rural participation in RPOs is
expected to flourish during the election period because farmers in developing countries are a
large share of voters. In Indonesia, farmers are included in the 65% of blue-collar voters, making
them significant voters in regency areas in particular – districts that consist of large rural areas
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(Mujani et. al, 2018). Moreover, agricultural issues are a sensitive election issue in Indonesia and
other developing countries since many developmental problems lie within the agriculture sector.
Thus, many vote-buying activities that deliver agriculture needs, such as fertilizer and loans, are
mostly conducted through an organized body such as an RPO. In Indonesia, for example,
supporting the Indonesian National Farmer Association (HKTI) is common for political
candidates who want to gain support from farmers across the country.
A summary of all the variables, definitions, and measurements is displayed in Table 5.1
below. Descriptive statistics of each of the variables are presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.1 List of Variables
Variable

Definition

Measurement

Data Source

RURAL
PARTICIPATION
IN RPOs

The level of Rural Producer
Organizations
(RPOs)
membership in the state

Percentage of small
agriculture producers
belonging to RPO to total
small agriculture producers in
the state

Extension Program and
Human Resource
Development Department,
Ministry of Agriculture
Republic of Indonesia
(BPPSDMP).

AGRICULTURE
TRADE

Level of agriculture market
openness

Total agriculture export and
import per agriculture GDP

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

GENERAL TRADE

Level of the overall market
openness

Total export and import per
agriculture GDP

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

NET IMPORT

Trade balance shows higher
import value than export

Trade balance is calculated by
total export minus total
import. The data is coded “1”
when the state is net importer
(import exceeds export), and
“0” for net exporter (export
exceeds import)

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

ENDOWMENT

Main endowment factor of
production in the state

Use proxy of staple food share
from
the
state’s
total
agriculture production

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

POVERTY

The share of population
living under the poverty line.
Poverty line is calculated
based on national standard of
living, including both food
and non-food needs.

Percentage of population
living under the poverty line to
total population of the state

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

(Continued)
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Variable

Definition

Measurement

Data Source

INEQUALITY

The unequal income
distribution within the
population.

Calculated using the gini
coefficients.

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
INDEX

Development level of
population in terms of
education, health, and
income.

Calculated by the Indonesian
Center Bureau Statistics (BPS)
using equation that captures
the
three
development
components.

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

RURAL
POPULATION
SHARE

The relative size of rural
population in the region.

The share of rural population
to total population in the state.

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

AGRICULTURE
SHARE

The
relative
size
agriculture sector in
economy.

of
the

The share of agriculture GDP
to total GDP of the state.

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

MAIN SECTOR

Whether agriculture sector is
the main sector in the state.

Binary data, where “1” holds
for the condition where
agriculture is the main sector
in the economy, while “0”
holds for the opposite.
Agriculture is the main sector
in the economy is when
agriculture GDP share holds
more than 50% of the total
GDP.

Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS).

AGRICULTURE
CREDIT

Access to agriculture credit.

Total of agriculture credit
value per agriculture GDP.

Ministry of Agriculture,
Republic of Indonesia

JURISDICTION

Number of districts within
the state.

Number of districts within the
state.

Ministry of National
Affairs, Republic of
Indonesia

ELECTION

Election period, either at
national level or local level.

Binary variable where “1”
holds when there are either
national or local level election
within that year, while “0”
holds for the opposite.

Ministry of National
Affairs, Republic of
Indonesia

0 is for the years under
authoritarian regime (prior
1995)
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of All Variables in the Model
Variables

Obs

Mean

StdDev

Min

Max

186

23.13

14.56

3

65

186

22.69

27.68

14

138

186

22.69

27.68

7

90

186

0.8

0.39

0

1

186

9.8

4.2

2

29

186

12.87

6.8

4.18

36.8

186

0.37

0.037

0.28

0.46

186

59.63

14.9

17

80.7

186

66.45

3.6

54.5

74.17

186

21.5

9.32

3.64

43.57

Agriculture as main sector
(1=agriculture as main sector)

186

0.55

0.5

0

1

Endowment Factor (Share of staple food
production)

186

63.15

29.8

0.814

99.62

186

12.9

7.09

4

29

186

0.17

0.37

0

1

RPO membership
General trade share
Agriculture trade share
Net import
(1=net importer)
Agriculture credit
Poverty
Inequality
Rural Population
Human Development Index
Agriculture share

Number of Jurisdiction
Election period
(1= election held within the year)

5.5 Empirical Results
Seven models are conducted to test the hypotheses above, and the results are shown in
Table 5.3 below. Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between trade liberalization and RPO
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membership. Based on the bivariate model, the empirical results show a positively significant
relationship between the two variables at p<0.05. The following models then test the relationship
using multivariate analysis to see whether rural participation in RPOs can be attributed to trade
liberalization or socio-economic, agricultural, and political factors. Multivariate models allow us
to test the effect of trade liberalization on rural participation in RPOs while simultaneously
testing and controlling for alternative explanations. The estimation results in model 2 show that
even after controlling for alternative factors, trade liberalization still has a positive and
significant effect on rural participation in RPOs (p<0.1).
To test the robustness of the result, I conduct a similar model (model 3) in which I use
overall trade liberalization instead of agriculture trade liberalization. I then test this relationship
again using trade balance as the trade indicator (model 4). I also conduct the same model as
model 2 but use a random effect method rather than a fixed effect method (model 6). The
estimation results in model 3 show that overall trade has no significant effect on rural
participation in RPOs. This indicates that farmers are reacting to the agriculture market only.
This is predictable since the direct impact of trade on farmers comes mostly from the agriculture
sector. The estimation in model 4, however, shows a negatively significant effect between net
importers and rural participation in RPOs (p<0.01). This shows that net-importer regions have a
lower rate of rural participation in RPOs. In other words, rural participation in RPOs is more
likely to occur when the agriculture sector is benefiting from trade rather than in regions facing
market competition from growing imports. The last model for robustness check is shown in
model 6 where I estimate the multivariate relationship between agriculture trade liberalization on
rural participation in RPOs using a random effect method. The estimation result shows a
positively significant relationship between agriculture trade liberalization and rural participation
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in RPOs (p<0.05). Despite showing similar results, the fixed effect method is the most suitable
model for the estimation by using the Hausman Test.
The overall estimation results indicate that regions with higher exposure to trade have a
higher rate of rural participation in RPOs. Specifically, regions that are net-exporters have a
higher rate of rural participation in RPOs. This shows that trade exposure encourages rural
political agency since it motivates farmers to join RPOs. RPOs can not only benefit farmers
economically, but they can also increase farmers’ political roles in the society. This also shows,
as seen in the trade-democracy literature, that trade shocks can support deeper democracy by
leveraging inclusivity of rural population,
To test whether the relationship between trade and rural participation is conditional on
factor endowments, I take the existing model and include an interaction variable of factor
endowment. This is measured by the share of staple food subsector in the agriculture sector,
using both a fixed effect method in model 5 and a random effect method in model 7. I found that
although the endowment factor significantly affects rural participation in RPOs, it does not affect
the relationship between trade liberalization and rural participation in RPOs. The use of staple
food share in the agriculture sector as a proxy indicates that a region with a high rate of landless
farmers ‒ which mostly exist in the staple food subsector ‒ has a higher rate of rural participation
in RPOs. Regions with high land-owner farmers, on the other hand, have a lower rate of rural
participation in RPOs. Regions that are exposed to higher trade liberalization, however, are not
affected by this factor endowment and, in general, show an increasing rate of rural participation
in RPOs
Other interesting findings from the estimation show that different contextual variables are
also important factors increasing rural participation in RPOs. A consistent result is shown for the
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human development index, agriculture share, and rural population share. Human development
index shows the most consistent findings. The results show the human development index
positively and significantly affects the rate of rural participation in RPOs. Since education is a
main element of the human development index, this finding supports the findings of previous
theories that argue education is a predictor of civic participation. This finding shows that the
theories hold even for marginalized populations such as rural agrarian communities. Other
contextual variables that influence the rate of rural participation in RPOs are agriculture share
and rural population. A higher agriculture share means that farmers are important to the
economy. They thus have a higher willingness to act collectively and cooperate more with
government officials. A similar logic applies to findings that show higher rural population results
in an increase in rural participation in RPOs.
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Table 5.3. Estimation Results in Explaining RPO Movement

Dependent Variable = RPO membership
Independent Variables

Agriculture Trade Share

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE

FE

FE

FE

Interaction (FE)

RE

Interaction (RE)

0.0793251

0.0270803

0.0788404

0.0012196

(0.0407962)*

(0.0936831)

(0.03457)**

(0.081)

0.0903534
(0.0401144)*
*

General Trade Share

-0.0425857
(0.0653305)

Net import

-5.215396
(1.893098)***

AgriTrade x Factor Endowment

0.0007253

0.0010827

(0.0011701)

(0.0010245)

Socio agriculture aspect
Poverty

0.07309

-0.0439836

0.1669389

0.0367698

-0.2685036

-0.2798519

(0.433899)

(0.4381765)

(0.4311668)

(0.4387598)

(0.29604)

( 0.2983)

Inequality

25.43636

29.56412

24.791

25.28238

28.34176

27.92303

(24.1233)

(24.87765)

(23.82045)

(24.17632)

(22.3155)

(22.29971)

Rural Population

0.7188563

0.8389254

1.028249

0.6713029

0.0510631

0.0532612

(0.4720877)

(0.4731021)*

(0.4664633)**

(0.4792811)

(0.2045006)

(0.20664)

2.28509

2.005856

2.52798

2.171397

1.54639

1.502262

(0.7830398)***

(0.8731592)**

(0.7796417)***

(0.8058734)***

( 0.53536)***

(0.53826)**

1.50425

0.9908195

1.224821

1.468488

0.4094787

0.4525949

(0.729896)**

(0.7945264)

(0.7047196)*

(0.7337339)**

(0.3309286)

Human Development Index

Agriculture Share

(0.33637)

(Continnued)
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Dependent Variable = RPO membership
Independent Variables

1
FE

Agriculture as Main Sector

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE

FE

FE

Interaction (FE)

RE

Interaction (RE)

-6.506785

-5.764886

-7.186175

-6.481648

-3.867988

-4.16922

(4.058758)

(4.125666)

(4.021772)*

(4.067667)

(3.342126)

(3.36171)

0.07188563

0.0872497

0.0772495

0.0488408

0.1029508

0.0641581

(0.0441371)

(0.0447891)*

(0.0432688)*

(0.0577756)

(0.03901)***

(0.0531264)

0.04587

0.0678657

0.0501851

0.0610394

0.1912915

0.2071027

(0.1886335)

(0.1934371)

(0.1862507)

(0.190614)

(0.1769812)

(0.1777417)

0.17083

.1253076

.1688971

0.0835103

0.2256993

0.0625116

(1.254422)

(1.269127)

(1.238259)

(1.264983)

(1.212173)

(1.220104)

0.9806289

0.7200955

0.9898309

0.9826986

0.3768642

0.3882331

(0.7896433)

(0.7916544)

(0.7758424)

(0.7913443)

(0.2899869)

(0.2943002)

-231.4707

-203.2286

-253.8555

-218.4083

-112.7465

-108.0984

(81.63) ***

(88.47249)**

(81.23295)**

(84.47653)**

(43.306)***

(43.686)**

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

0.86

0.88

0.87

0.88

0.88

0.87

0.88

Factor Endowment

Agriculture Credit

Political Variables
Election Period

Number of Jurisdiction

Constant

Observations
R- squared

*Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%
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Next, I address concerns regarding endogeneity, as the relationship between trade and
rural participation may run in the reverse direction. Since this theory is heavily drawn from the
trade and democracy literature, scholars in this literature have repeatedly raised the concern of
reverse causality where democracies influence the level of trade openness (Eichengreen and
Leblang, 2006; Grofman and Gray, 2000; Yu, 2007). Democracies are more conducive for open
trade activities in contrast to authoritative regimes (Mansfield et al, 2000) because they have
better rule of law (Barro, 1999), better enforcement of intellectual property rights, and better
product safety standards (Rodrik, 1997). Democracies are also thought to produce more free
trade policies since interest groups have more opportunities to shape trade policies and gain trade
protections when needed (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Rotemberg, 2003). In particular, labor
groups in democracies can gain power that could further push for more democracy (O'Rourke
and Taylor, 2006). Although no studies have been done to test whether civic participation, in
general, can influence the level of trade openness, the possible relationship between democracy
and trade could similarly apply to civic participation. As the democracy and trade literature
suggest, the participation of labor groups can result in different trade policies. Active civic
participation can also mean that citizens are more concerned with trade policies and thus obtain
more information regarding the issues. Therefore, they participate more in trade activities which
can lead to more trade policies.
Several strategies have been introduced to solve this endogeneity problem. A highly
suggested solution is using an instrumental variable, which is a variable that measures trade but
is not correlated with other variables that can influence democracy. Instrumental variables that
are commonly used for trade include the following geographical and demographic variables: the
distance from other nations, land area, population, and waterway access (Frankel and Romer,
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1999; Wei, 2001; Cordova and Meissner, 2008). These instrumental variables, however, cannot
be applied to rural participation because they can directly influence the interaction between
citizens and, therefore, influence civic participation. Moreover, since I use a subnational level
unit of analysis, some variables (i.e. distance to other nations) cannot be applied to predict the
subnational level of trade openness. Meanwhile, the use of distance to other regions within the
country does not link to the level of trade openness either. Finding a suitable instrumental
variable is not an easy task. There is risk of generating weak findings when weak instrumental
variables are used (Yogo, 2004).
Another plausible way to avoid the endogeneity problem is to use the lag identification or
the use of one period lagged explanatory variables (Bellemare et al, 2017). This strategy is
common across the social sciences. The idea is that the suspected independent variables occur in
advance of the dependent variable (Antonakis et.al., 2014). In other words, the lagged value of
the interest explanatory variable is unlikely to be endogenous to the dependent variable. The
findings from the lagged independent variable estimation are reported in Table 5.4 below. The
estimation results show a consistent outcome – that the relationship between trade exposure in
the agriculture sector and RPO membership is positive and statistically significant.
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Table 5.4. Estimation Results in Explaining RPO Movement Using Lagged Independent Variables

Dependent Variable = RPO membership
Independent Variables (lagged 1
year period)

Agriculture Trade Share

1

2

3

4

5

FE

FE

FE

FE

0.0364

0.1154

(0.0216)*

(0.037)***

General Trade Share

6

7

Interaction (FE)

RE

Interaction (RE)

0.028

0.0925

-0.0092

(0.083)

(0.0313)**

(0.066)

0.000626
(0.063)

Net import

-2.23
(1.283)*

AgriTrade x Factor Endowment

0.0015
0.0012

(0.0008)

(0.001029)
Socio agriculture aspect
Poverty

Inequality

Rural Population

Human Development Index

Agriculture Share

-0.318

-0.343

(0.0446)

(0.48)

0.562

-0.367

-0.24

-0.284

(0.275)**

(0.45)

(0.3123)

(0.3133)

0.9325

-0.553

12.822

0.367

1.0137

0.1823

(1.45)

(1.5919)

(15.82)

(1.524)

(1.324)

(1.394)

-4.853

-1.04

-0.67

-3.045

-0.157

-0.152

(4.0225)

(4.56)

(3.45)

(4.303)

(0.217)

(0.218)

1.564

1.467

2.067

1.296

1.327

1.118

(0.7034)**

(0.822)*

(0.53)***

(0.74)*

(0.544)**

(0.554)**

1.567

0.973

0.49

1.4345

0.506

0.497

(0.729)**

(0.809)

(0.51)

(0.7365)**

(0.319)

(0.321)

(Continued)
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Dependent Variable = RPO membership
Independent Variables

1
FE

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE

FE

FE

Interaction (FE)

RE

Interaction (RE)

-2.516

-0.276

-1.814

-1.467

-1.582

-0.688

(1.368)*

(1.724)

(2.971)

(1.634)

(1.17)

(1.265)

0.0121

0.049

0.063

-0.02

0.05

0.001

(0.045)

(0.045)

(0.029)**

(0.05)

(0.039)

(0.05)

0.086

0.054

-0.15

0.093

0.1917

0.1908

(0.1717)

(0.183)

(0.115)

(0.171)

(0.165)

(0.163)

1.828

1.659

0.258

1.6325

1.477

1.297

(1.0609)*

(1.106)

0.73

(1.072)

(1.05)

(1.043)

0.74165

0.3763

0.355

0.7105

0.535

0.514

(0.7408)

(0.768)

(0.498)

(0.74)

(0.305)*

(0.308)*

167.134

-35.671

-140

81.76

-77.87

-60.56

(244.61)

(264)

(44.75)

(254.9)

(41.95)*

(42.9)

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

0.88

0.89

0.89

0.95

0.89

0.85

0.86

Agriculture as Main Sector

Factor Endowment

Agriculture Credit

Political Variables
Election Period

Number of Jurisdiction

Constant

21.96
(1.035)***

Observations
R- squared

* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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5.6 Conclusion
The main goal of this chapter was to understand the contextual factors that explain rural
civic participation in RPOs. Through interviews and a survey I conducted on selected farmers,
three contextual factors were identified: (1) exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of
government support programs, and (3) existence of external supporting actors, with exposure to
trade liberalization being the most common factor. The quantitative analysis confirmed the
correlation between exposure to trade and rural participation in RPOs even after controlling for
other relevant factors, including the existence of incentives such as government support
programs. As the insights from the interview and the theory have suggested, exposure to trade
poses several challenges for farmers, mainly through its distributive economic effect. This thus
makes collective action through RPOs more likely. Collective action through RPOs not only
helps farmers stay competitive on the market, but also allows them to relay their concerns to
relevant authorities.
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY EFFECT OF RURAL PARTICIPATION

6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I showed that rural civic participation in RPOs builds rural
political agency. RPO membership increases farmer participation in other civic activities,
including participation in policy-making discussions. Indeed, the concept of rural political
agency consists not only of the ability of rural communities to act collectively but also to have
access to political decision-making processes and obtain favorable policies. The main objective
of this chapter is to see how rural participation in RPOs influence the level of governmental
support programs, measured by the level of spending. This chapter focuses on government
productivity programs that specifically target agricultural development as well as general social
welfare programs. The agricultural productivity programs include an array of government
support such as agriculture infrastructure, irrigation systems, extension programs, and production
inputs.
I argue that RPOs, due to the nature of their activities, will be more effective in
influencing agricultural productivity programs than general welfare programs. Furthermore,
because local governments have control over many productivity policies, this chapter argues that
the effectiveness of rural participation is mostly at the local level compared to the central level.
Thus, this chapter will mainly look at agricultural productivity programs that local governments
provide.
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By using quantitative analysis on subnational data of Indonesia from 2010 to 2015, I
found that rural participation in RPOs is associated with a higher level of local agricultural
support. However, this does not hold true for agricultural support provided by the central
government as well as general welfare spending. This finding demonstrates that rural
participation is most effective at the local level rather than at the national level.
In this chapter, I further argue that the effectiveness of rural participation in obtaining
local agricultural supports is not inevitable. Instead, it depends on the local political environment
which shapes the behaviors of local governments. Because local incumbents are also political
actors interested in re-election, targeted spending such as agricultural support provides them an
opportunity to engage in vote-buying with rural agrarian communities. This motive, in turn,
provides a mechanism to solve free-riding problems inherent to RPOs.
Such vote-buying practices, I argue, are conditioned by three political contexts, namely
(1) the level of political competition, (2) the level of state independence, and (3) the level of
central-local political cohesion. The level of political competition represents the political value
of farmers to politicians. Vote-buying practices are likely to occur when political competition is
high, meaning the political value of farmers is high. The level of central-local political cohesion
looks at the environment that enables local incumbents to engage in vote-buying without being
constrained by their counterparts in the central government. Lastly, the level of state
independence represents the capacity of local governments to generate revenue to finance votebuying practices. The empirical findings generally support these claims, suggesting that further
development of rural political agency depends on the political incentives of local governments.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 provides background information
on spending in decentralized Indonesia that are relevant to farmers. Section 6.3 discusses the
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analytical framework that demonstrates the relationship between rural participation in RPOs and
the level of agricultural productivity programs. By drawing from previous electoral literature,
section 6.4 then discusses how local governments’ electoral incentives promote vote-buying
behavior, which further shapes the provision of agricultural productivity policies. I will then
discuss the empirical methods and analysis in sections 6.5 and 6.6, along with insights from
fieldwork. Section 6.7 concludes the chapter.

6.2 Related Government Support Programs under Decentralized System
Agriculture and Rural Development Support
Since decentralization, agriculture affairs in Indonesia have mostly been handled by local
authorities to reach more effective and efficient agricultural development outcomes. As
explained previously, the decentralization law established two kinds of local responsibilities for
different sectors. First, local governments have obligatory responsibilities that include state
development, public facilities maintenance, health, education, government administration, the
environment, census taking, local safety, and law enforcement. Second, local governments can
take on optional tasks. These include agriculture, forestry, mineral resources, tourism, fisheries,
trade, and industrial affairs. Since these sectors depend a lot on local environments, they prove
difficult for the central government to legislate alone. Typically, local governments manage these
optional tasks together with the central government. Therefore, agricultural spending in
Indonesia comprises of both local and central government resources. Good coordination between
central and local governments is therefore required to achieve better agricultural development.
While the central government focuses on agricultural policymaking, including legislating
subsidies and agricultural trade policies, the implementation of these policies is facilitated by
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local authorities. At the same time, local governments are also responsible for developing their
own agricultural programs that are a better fit for regional needs. Two main sources of local
agricultural development budgets are (1) the deconcentration and co-administration fund from
the central authority’s national budget (APBN) and (2) the regional subnational budget (APBD).
The regional budget (APBD) consists of three components: (1) the region’s own revenue, (2)
general allocation fund from the central government (DAU), and (3) special allocation fund from
the central government (DAK).6 Since local government funding in the agricultural sector and in
general are still limited, funding from the central government is an important source of funding
for local agricultural development. The structure of local and central funding for the agricultural
sector can be seen in Figure 6.1 below.

6

Law Number 33 Year 2004 requires the central government to provide funding transfers to subnational
governments based on the national income. Since decentralization has transferred a wide range of governmental
tasks to subnational governments, the central government gives general allocation fund (DAU) to subnational
governments – both at the province and district level – to support local governments in governing their jurisdictions.
The DAU is provided in the form of a “block” grant in which there are no specific programs that are targeted. The
calculations are based on the characteristics and needs of the subnational unit, with the population, GPD per capita,
land area, construction price index, and fiscal capability taken into consideration. Meanwhile, special allocation fund
(DAK) is provided from the central government to fund special tasks or programs, mainly infrastructure. Some
examples of this are school infrastructure and road infrastructure. These programs are usually targeted towards
underdeveloped and disaster-prone areas. Another criteria is whether the region has a sector important to the
national economy such as tourism or food security.
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Figure 6.1 Indonesia’s Agricultural Spending Scheme
Regional Budget Revenue (APBD)

Subnational Spending

Regional
Revenue

Other Spending

General Allocation
Fund from Central
(DU)

Subnational
Agriculture
Development
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and Coadministrative
Spending

National Budget Revenue (APBN)
National
Revenue

Other Spending

National Spending

According to Sumedi et al. (2013), local agricultural spending at the subnational level is
limited because half of the budget is used solely for administrative activities. The other half –
development programs – includes spending for the general agricultural sector, food security, and
rural development. Because local authorities having the authority to allocate local agricultural
spending, there is a considerable amount of variation in agricultural expenditures across
provinces in Indonesia, as shown in Graph 6.1 below.
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Graph 6.1 Agriculture Development Spending in Provinces of Indonesia*)
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Source: Ministry of Finance Republic of Indonesia.
*) Agriculture Development Spending includes spending that is provided for agriculture sector, food security, and
rural development

To supplement these agricultural programs, the central government has provided
additional funding to local governments through their deconcentration and co-administration
programs. This has also increased rapidly over the years (Graph 6.2). The source of this revenue
is from the national budget for the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia and, therefore,
separate from the regional subnational budget (APBD). From 2005 to 2010, central agricultural
spending grew 220 percent from about USD 130 million in 2000 to USD 250 million in 2006
and USD 495 million in 2010 (Sumedi et al., 2013). More than half of the spending is given to
support local agricultural programs and activities through deconcentration spending. This
includes, among others, research and development, quarantine programs, financial credits,
extension and human development programs, agriculture infrastructure, agriculture tools and
machines, and food security institutions (Graph 6.3)
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Graph 6.2 Central Agriculture Spending through Deconcentration and
Co-administration Spending
1000
900
800

Million US$

700
600
500
400

300
200
100
0
2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Source: Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia.

Graph 6.3 Deconcentration and Co-administration Spending in Compare to Central
Agriculture Spending

300

Million US$

250
200
150
100
50
0

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Year
Delegation Spending

Central Agriculture Spending

Source: Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia, taken from Sumedi et al (2013).
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Welfare Spending
Social welfare assistance programs in Indonesia include a wide array of social spending
in areas such as education, health, industry, and disaster relief (World Bank, 2015). Several
popular programs that support the poor are cash transfer programs, scholarships, and subsidized
rice. The two main sectors of social welfare programs, however, remain education and health.
They are included in national development priorities (World Bank, 2015). Both social welfare
programs are under the responsibility of local governments. This means that local governments
are required to provide such welfare programs. Based on Indonesia’s education Law number 20
Year 2003, local governments are required to provide at least 20 percent of its regional budget
(APBD) towards education spending. The same requirement also applies to the central
government, as 20 percent of the national budget (APBN) must be allocated towards education
spending. Despite these requirements, the implementation of education spending resembles those
in the agricultural sector. Local governments account for most of the overall education spending
(Graph 6.4). How much of this education spending is distributed at the local level also varies
across provinces in Indonesia (Graph 6.5). The 20 percent requirement has not been met in all
regions.
Graph 6.4 Structure of Indonesia’s Education Spending
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Source: Ministry of Education and Culture Republic of Indonesia, 2016.
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Graph 6.5 Education Spending in Provinces of Indonesia (%)
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Similar to education, health spending is one of the required sectors that local
governments must provide. Based on Indonesian Health Law Number 36 Year 2009, local
governments must allocate at least 10 percent of their subnational budget (APBD) towards the
health sector. Local governments are required to provide different health needs, including access
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to health care, health facilities, and insurance. They also need to ensure the identification of
health beneficiaries. However, like the agricultural and education sectors, health spending across
subnational Indonesia also varies, with the majority of provinces still not achieving the 10
percent requirement (Graph 6.6). This figure is slightly more positive when compared to
education spending figures.

Graph 6.6 Health Spending in Provinces of Indonesia (%)
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Although local authorities are responsible for the health sector in their jurisdictions, the
central government also plays a vital role in local health programs. While local governments
provide basic health care and set fees for public health services, the central government is
responsible for national health programs, including health insurance (Kruse et al., 2009). The
structure of the overall health spending in Indonesia, therefore, comprises of central and local
government spending. However, the central government holds a higher share of overall health
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spending. In 2015, the total local government spending accounted for 24.2 Trillion Rupiahs,
while the central government accounted for 62.4 Trillion Rupiahs (Ministry of Finance Republic
of Indonesia, 2016). This figure shows that the central government accounts for around 70
percent of the total national health spending, a different picture compared to the agricultural and
education sectors. The central government also provides health deconcentration spending to local
governments, but that only accounts for a small percentage of the overall health spending (Graph
6.7).
Graph 6.7 Structure of Indonesia’s Health Spending
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The discussion above shows that the role of local governments in providing support for
rural development, either in the form of agricultural productivity programs or general welfare
programs, became more significant in Indonesia as it decentralized. The significant role of local
governments and the different forms of government support programs should therefore be
considered in understanding rural political agency.
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6.3 Rural Participation and Agricultural Productivity Program
Collective action studies have suggested groups that are better organized and able to
solve collective action problems have a higher chance of demanding and obtaining their desired
policy (Olson, 1965; Keefer, 2011). Groups that can manage their common interests through
cooperation and coordination will have more bargaining power to influence a policy outcome.
This condition explains why narrow special interests dominate public policy, as they have a
greater ability to solve collective action problems compared to the general public (Olson, 1965).
Similarly, Bates (1983) argues that the ability of large agricultural and industrial interest groups
to organize themselves disadvantages small farmers. Small farmers are often large in number and
scattered in different geographical locations. It is therefore difficult for them to overcome
collective action problems such as free-riding, information asymmetry, and high transaction
costs. As a result, one of the main problems developing countries face is that agricultural support
is often given to large private firms at the expense of small farmers (Bates, 1983). These large
firms and politicians, therefore, maintain a cozy relationship where they get continued access to
agricultural support, while the politicians get political support.
To overcome collective action problems among larger groups of citizens, organizations –
from political parties to civil society groups – are important (Keefer, 2011). Organizations can
overcome “free rider” problems by forming smaller groups which lower the cost of participation
and increase the benefits for potential participants (Lichbach, 1994). Policymakers and
development practitioners have followed the same line by promoting collective action among
farmers through RPOs. These RPOs not only overcome market access problems, but they also
represent farmers in policymaking (Hellin et al., 2008). As shown in Chapter 5, farmers who are
members of an RPO are more likely to participate in policy discussions. Therefore, when an
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RPO collective action is successful, it can perform a similar function to small interest groups. In
both cases, they allow members to coordinate and advocate for their common interests to the
government.
The ability of RPOs to shape agricultural productivity support is shown in many cases in
Indonesia. A study by Regaty (2017), for example, shows how “Tani Sekar Mulyo,” a farmer
organization based in Batu city, East Java, has successfully advocated for higher agricultural
infrastructure during the years 2009-2016. The study indicates that coordination and cooperation
among members of the organization are the main forces driving the successful lobbying of the
local government. Another success case is “Kelompok Tani Maju 1.” It is a farmer organization
based in East Lampung which acquired support from the local government to expand its
production fields and received other production support such as seeds and fertilizer.
Similar insights were also gained from my fieldwork in Indonesia. Based on the survey I
conducted, 76% of farmers who are members of an RPO have participated in policy discussions
with the local government. Their participation occurred in different forums, but it was through
three main venues. First, farmers participate in Participatory Development Planning, known as
“Musrembang.” These are public forums held by local officials in different government levels,
including village, county, city, and district. They are based on a principle of bottom-up planning
in which different societal groups can participate. The results of these forums are then given to
provincial governments to input into their development and budget planning. Discussions with
respondents during fieldwork indicate that musrembang is one of the main venues for farmers to
communicate with the government. A farmer I interviewed mentioned that, in many cases,
agricultural support given by the government is based on their discussion
in musrembang (Interviewed on September 20th, 2016).
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The second venue farmers use to participate is through policy discussions with
agriculture extension offices. These offices are spread across different regions and hold regular
consultations with farmers. This program is held in coordination with the Regional Agriculture
Office and the central government. The main objective of the program is to provide education
and information related to different government programs and ensure that government national
planning objectives are met. As they are typically close to farmers, extension offices are more
accessible to farmers. Policy discussions through extension offices are more common than other
venues. The office maintains registration information of farmers who participate in their
programs to keep track of their development, and they also work closely with RPOs within their
jurisdictions. This provides farmers with the opportunity to deliver their concerns and provide
feedback for the government in a structured and consistent way. Although extension officers
have limited authority in the policy decision-making process, many farmers I interviewed
emphasized the important role these officers play in advocating for their needs.
The last venue farmers use to participate is through personal connections with local
officials and local legislators who hold office. Regaty (2017) argues that the success case of the
“Tani Sekar Mulyo” farmer group can be attributed to its connection with certain legislators.
Specifically, the study revealed how the provision of agricultural support is based on a votebuying relationship, where support is given in exchange for votes. Nevertheless, a common
practice among local officials and legislators is to hold direct meetings with farmers and discuss
relevant policy issues. Since the provision of agricultural support is typically given to certain
groups and not individuals, direct public discussion is mainly held in coordination with RPOs.
The discussion above shows that participation in RPOs is an important way for farmers to
deliver their concerns and gain agricultural support from the government. Because RPOs are
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voluntary, we can assume that the rate of membership represents successful collective action.
Therefore, we can expect that higher rural participation in RPOs is associated with higher
agricultural compensation support. This points out to the first testable hypothesis of this chapter,
which is:
H1: Higher rural participation increases local agricultural support.
Moreover, I argue that certain actors can have greater influence in obtaining productivity
policies at the local level instead of the central or national level. By bringing political and
administrative control to local governments, these governments not only have more authority
over some policies but are more accessible to their citizens compared to the central government.
Although the central government also has an important role in providing productivity programs,
the role of local government is more significant. Productivity programs demanded by the citizens
and provided by the government are not the same as general welfare programs. I argue that
RPOs, due to the nature of their activities, will be more effective in delivering agricultural
productivity programs than general welfare programs. Therefore, we would expect that rural
participation in RPOs is not associated with general welfare programs. On the contrary,
participation in labor institutions better guarantees general welfare policies, as suggested by
previous studies.
To emphasize the two claims raised above, I test the following hypotheses:
H2: Rural Participation is not associated with central agricultural support
H3a: Rural Participation is not associated with general welfare policies
H3b: General welfare policies is associated with labor institutions
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6.4 Vote-buying Practices in the Provision of Agricultural Productivity Programs
The effectiveness of rural civic participation in delivering agricultural productivity
programs, however, is not a foregone conclusion. Rather it depends on local politicians’ votemaximizing behavior. The pluralist view of policy-making has suggested that successful
collective action, even those that are formed by narrow and wealthy special interests, do not
guarantee successful policy outcomes (Dahl, 1958). While the power structure of the society may
provide some level of influence, the final policy outcome will largely depend on the strategic
behavior and interests of policymakers, including their electoral strategy for re-election. With
elections and policy decision-making processes devolving to the local level for many
democracies, the electoral strategy of local incumbents has, therefore, become an important
aspect in understanding agricultural productivity policies. The political relationship at the local
level that was once between local and central politicians has shifted to local politicians and their
local constituents.
I argue that local incumbents will only provide agricultural productivity programs when it
provides them with a higher chance of winning elections. Through particularistic benefits such as
agricultural support, such voting exchange is easier to control. This vote-buying practice, in
which rents are provided in exchange for votes, has indeed been ubiquitous in developing
countries (Schaeffer and Schedler, 2007; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Larreguy et al., 2016).
Through political decentralization, local political actors are now prone to vote-buying practices,
as many rent opportunities have shifted from the national to the local level (Schaeffer and
Schedler, 2007). Indonesia experienced a similar situation, as elections at different government
tiers are highly marked by vote-buying practices (Aspinall et.al, 2017; Kurniawan et. al., 2017).
Agricultural support such as tractors, seeds, fertilizers, and finances are common practices for
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patronage. They, therefore, have been argued to be highly susceptible to vote-buying in
developing countries.
Why do politicians pursue vote-buying practices? One explanation that incentivizes such
practice in developing countries is the weak mobility of political parties (Berenschot, 2018).
Most political parties in developing countries are less stable and legitimized, causing political
actors to build their connections with their constituents or local elites to develop their supporters.
When politicians look for personal votes instead of party votes, particularistic benefits, such as
agriculture support, are commonly given to secure votes. Non-excludable goods, on the other
hand, are prone to free-rider problems.
In Indonesia, and several other developing countries, such an incentive is also shaped by
the legislative electoral system. Indonesia has an open list Proportional Representation (PR)
system in electing both national and regional parliaments. Under such a system, voters can vote
either for individual candidates or a party. The number of seats that each party has is
proportional to the combined votes for the party and the candidates. The candidate with the
highest votes will obtain their party seat. Although voters can vote either for an individual or a
party, this system promotes individualized electoral campaigns because individual votes is more
effective than party votes. In many instances, candidates coming from the same party compete
with one another. This has increased the motives for politicians to provide transactional goods,
making voters seek benefits for themselves or their group and be less interested in party
programs or national issues (Aspinall et.al., 2017). Considering that the electoral system is
implemented in both national and local level elections, such conditions spur vote-buying
practices across Indonesia at both tiers.
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Providing agricultural productivity programs in developing countries is particularly
beneficial for incumbents. Rural agrarian voters represent a large share of votes in developing
countries (Varshney, 2000; Bates and Block, 2013). In many cases, they represent the median
voters in the electorate. Based on the median voter model, politicians should, therefore, promote
policies that are beneficial for rural agrarian communities as part of their effort to gain electoral
votes. Due to their low turnout, farmers are targeted for vote-buying practices, which provide an
even greater benefit for politicians (Gersbach, 2008). While changing voters’ preferences has
become the core discussion in the vote-buying literature, mobilizing voters by offering rents has
become an important strategy for politicians .
Poor voters are also more risk-averse and, therefore, more receptive towards vote-buying
rents (Kitschelt, 2000; Brusco et al., 2004). They tend to have low reservation prices and highly
elastic voting behavior in which votes are relatively easier to buy in exchange for rents. Like
other poor populations, farmers would prefer to receive short-term benefits from engaging in
vote-buying practices because the marginal return is greater than future public goods. Moreover,
their dependence on the government ensures their support since rents can be withdrawn when
they do not comply (Varshney, 2000).
Vote exchange, however, is too expensive to provide when targeting large groups such as
farmers individually. RPOs, in turn, can play an important role in obtaining larger agricultural
support, as they can overcome free-rider problems by monitoring voter compliance (Bernard and
Spielman, 2009). In this case, politicians focus on building networks with the head of the
organization. The head distributes the benefits and influences the voting behavior of members.
Through these “mediators,” politicians can lower the monitoring cost and better control voter
behavior. Consequently, the high rate of rural participation in RPOs can motivate local
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incumbents to provide broader agricultural support since the incumbents have more control over
voters. Agricultural productivity policies are therefore provided when rural participation is likely
and politicians have motives to engage in vote-buying.

Local Political Contexts for Vote-Buying Practice
As explained above, political contexts, such as the electoral system and party
mobilization, can shape the incentives of politicians in Indonesia to provide vote-buying rents.
The national political context, however, does not explain the subnational variation of agriculture
spending within Indonesia. I further argue that three local political variables condition votebuying practice at the local level. They are: (1) the level of political competition; (2) the level of
decentralization or state independence; and (3) central-local political cohesion.
Due to the lack of transparency in vote-buying, there is a lack of direct observation of the
practice7 (Antwi and Adams, 2003; Aidt and Jensen, 2017). One way to overcome this hurdle is
to observe the political environment that facilitates such behavior.8 Thus, looking at the political
context of vote-buying practices can help us understand the underlying factors that explain
agricultural productivity policies at the local level. I elaborate on each of the relevant political
factors as follows:

7 One strategy that could be used to observe vote-buying is to calculate the share of individual votes compared to
the overall party votes. Allen (2014), for example, uses such a strategy to observe personal votes in Indonesian
national elections. However, as the author mentioned, such data is not available at the local level.
8 Beck et al. (2001), for example, uses the Database of Political Institutions to measure the checks and balances of
elections, which includes the number of parties and whether the president’s party has a majority in the legislature.
Knack and Keefer (1995, 2006) use the International County Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset to build an index of
bureaucratic quality.
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1. The level of Political Competition
Political competition, which is measured by the number of effective parties,9 is widely
discussed in the political science literature. Higher political competition is argued to provide
political challenges for incumbent parties, as that can promote political accountability, discipline
clientelism, and lessen corruption in the government (Medina and Stokes, 2002; Piattoni, 2001;
Hale, 2007). When a small number of political parties control the local government budget, that
lowers political competition. These parties will have more discretion to use the budget to their
benefit which is conducive for vote-buying behaviors. In cases where extreme parties dominate
moderate parties, vote-buying practices become more common, as the former can pursue their
desired policy to a greater extent (Brusco, 2004). Because the decision to provide rents is based
on whether incumbent politicians exploit their power, providing limits to this power through
higher political competition will limit vote-buying practices. The increased competition will also
lead citizens to compare across parties, which increases government accountability. As
challengers exist and make promises, constituents will have the ability to punish corrupt
incumbents by switching to other parties (Medina and Stokes, 2002).
The concept of vote-buying requires some level of competition, however. Indeed, recent
studies have found many instances in which higher political competition is associated with votebuying. When one party dominates, hence, low political competition, there is no incentive for
politicians to provide rents to gain more votes. In other words, the political value of particular
constituents like farmers is low when political competition is low. Under this condition,
politicians are more likely to provide universal and non-excludable goods instead of
particularistic benefits commonly associated with vote-buying. On the contrary, it is when

9 Since political parties aggregate their preferences of different issues in the society, political parties, therefore,
reflect the different interests of politically relevant groups.
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political competition is high do votes become valuable for politicians to buy (Keefer, 2002;
Krishna, 2008).
As explained above, vote-buying practices that distribute agricultural productivity
programs are dependent on the level of rural participation. Thus, expanding on Hypothesis 4, I
test the following hypothesis:
H4: Rural participation will increase local agricultural support in areas with high political
competition.

2. Central-Local Political Cohesion
The second relevant political context is central-local political cohesion, which shows
party harmonization between the central and local governments. This variable shows the
enabling environment for local incumbents to build vote-buying networks. The logic is that when
the central and local government winning party is the same, vote-buying practices at the local
level will be constrained. This happens either because there is more monitoring and disciplining
from the central government or more electoral coordination from the central counterparts
(Filippov et al., 2004; Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2006). Indeed, intergovernmental conflicts
between central and local governments have been one of the most discussed problems under the
decentralization system. Local governments become empowered to achieve their interests while
the central government has less control over government policies. This conflicting interest is
particularly common in resource allocation (Besley and Coate, 2003). Thus, without discipline
from the central government, vote-buying and corruption become prevalent in subnational
governments (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). On the contrary, when party harmonization exists
between central-local governments, intergovernmental conflicts and vote-buying are less likely
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(Filippov et al., 2004; Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2006). Based on this argument, I test the
following hypothesis:
H5: Higher rural participation will increase local agricultural support in areas with low
central-local political cohesion.

3. Level of Decentralization or State Independence
The last political context relates to local governments’ capacity to finance vote-buying
practices, which is the level of decentralization or state independence. It is measured by the
percentage of states’ own revenue from its total revenue.10 Highly decentralized states mainly
generate their own revenue by imposing taxes, which leads to a high-cost economy. More control
over taxes, in turn, give states more authority over resources. This makes them more inclined to
use such resources for vote-buying practices. Although it is expected that local governments’
responsiveness is high in areas where tax is high, large local governments tend to be more
exposed to vote-buying and corruption risks (Stokes et.al, 2013). Based on this argument, I test
the following hypothesis:
H6: Higher rural participation will increase local agricultural support in areas with high
independence (more decentralized).

Figure 6.2 below summarizes the arguments described in this chapter.

10

Total revenue consists of both state revenue and central government transfers.
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Figure 6.2 Theoretical Framework on Local Vote-buying Practice

Vote-buying
Practice

6.5 Empirical Method
Model Specification
The first part of the analysis is to see whether rural participation in RPOs influences the
level of local agricultural public spending as well as the central government’s agricultural
spending and local welfare spending. Political variables that might affect local government and
central government's spending are also included in the model. The model is stated as follows:
LOC_AGRISPENDit = αo + α1 RPOit + α2POLCOHit + α3POLCOMPit +
α4INDPit + α5ELECit + α6Xit + εit…………………....(1)
LOC_WELFSPENDit = αo + α1 RPOit + α2POLCOHit + α3POLCOMPit +
α4INDPit + α5ELECit + α6Xit + α7PLP it + εit…….....(2)
CENT_AGRISPENDit = αo + α1 RPOit + α2POLCOHit + α3POLCOMPit +
α4INDPit + α5ELECit + α6Xit + εit ………..………....(3)
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where LOC_AGRISPENDit is the level of local agriculture spending; LOC_WELFSPENDit is the
level of local welfare spending; CENTGOVSUPit is central agricultural support that is given from
the national to the subnational government; RPOit is rural participation in RPOs; POLCOHit is
central-local political cohesion; POLCOMPit is political competition; INDPit is the level of state
independence; ELECit is the pre-election period; Xit is the list of control variables; and PLP it is
the labor institutions suggested by Rudra (2005). The PLP variable is included in the model of
welfare spending based on Rudra’s findings that government welfare programs depend on the
strength of the general labor institutions.
Similar to the previous model on rural participation in RPOs, relevant control variables
are also included in this model to account for alternative explanations for government spending
on rural communities. The control variables used here are development indicators, which include
poverty, inequality, and the human development index. It also includes the relative importance of
rural agricultural communities in the population, such as the share of the rural population, the
share of the agricultural sector in the economy, whether agriculture is the main sector in the
economy, and the share of staple foods in the agriculture sector. These socio-economic
conditions are included to show that the comparative disadvantage of the agriculture sector in the
economy is the basis for government support.
As explained above, rural participation in RPOs does not automatically translate to higher
agricultural support and depends on the electoral incentives of local incumbents. As agricultural
support is targeted towards a specific group, such spending can provide a source of rents for
vote-buying. To see how rural participation and vote-buying practices interact, I test whether the
overall effect of rural participation in RPOs on local agriculture public spending is influenced by
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the political context that supports vote-buying practices – i.e. political competition, central-local
political cohesion, and state independence. This test is depicted in equation (4), where β3
indicates the extent to which the political context modifies the relationship between rural
participation in RPOs and different government spending. The marginal effect of rural
participation in RPOs is therefore presented in equation (5), which indicates that the effect of
rural participation in RPOs on government spending is only partial.
Government Spending = β0 + β1 RPO Participation + β2 Political Context +
β3 RPO Participation × Political Context + εi
............(4)
∂ Government Spending / ∂ RPO Participation = β1 + β3 Political Context..…(5)

I test the model on the same dataset used in Chapter 4, which is the Indonesian statelevel data between the period of 2010-2015. The panel data is balanced and includes a total of
186 observations. The dataset is constructed using several data sources described in the
following section.

List of Variables and Measurements
Dependent Variable: Government Spending
1. Local Agricultural Spending
The variable of LOC_AGRISPEND shows the level of subnational government spending on
agriculture-related sectors. This includes agricultural spending, food security spending, and rural
development spending, which is sourced from the regional subnational budget (APBD). It is
calculated by the share of this local agriculture-related spending to local development GDP.
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Local development GDP is the total GDP excluding administrative spending, which includes
mostly local administrative salaries and operational costs. It includes the overall agricultural
spending in all tiers of government, including the province and district levels. According to the
Ministry of Finance of Republic of Indonesia, this agricultural spending includes spending on
different agricultural activities such as irrigation, agriculture infrastructure support, inputs
facilities, agriculture tools, extension programs, financial access, and research and development.
Data for local spending is obtained from the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia, data on
agricultural spending is obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia, while
data on GDP is obtained from the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics.

2. Central Agriculture Deconcentration and Co-administration Spending
The variable of CENT_AGRISPEND shows the level of agricultural support given by the
central government to each subnational province. It includes both deconcentration and coadministration spending, which is provided by the central government through the Ministry of
Agriculture Republic of Indonesia. Explanations of this spending is provided in Chapter 3. It is
calculated as the share of total deconcentration and co-administration spending given to the
relevant province to overall deconcentration and co-administration spending. All data is obtained
from the Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia.

3. Local Welfare Spending
LOC_WELFSPEND consists of both local education and health spending. Education and
health spending are both calculated as the share of each local spending to local development
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GDP. Data for local spending is obtained from the Ministry of Finance, Republic of Indonesia,
while local development GDP is obtained from the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics.

Main Independent Variables:
1. Rural Participation in RPOs
Rural participation in RPOs in this model will use the same measurement as in Chapter 4.
Rural participation is defined as membership in an RPO and is calculated as the percentage of
small producers belonging to RPOs divided by the total agricultural farmers in the state. Data on
the number of farmers in RPOs and total agricultural workers are obtained from the Ministry of
Agriculture, Republic of Indonesia. The data on RPO membership is specifically obtained from
the Extension Program and Human Resource Development Department under the Ministry of
Agriculture Republic of Indonesia (BPPSDMP).

2. Interaction Variables Between Rural Participation in RPOs and Different Political
Contexts
Since there are three political contexts tested in this chapter, there are three interaction
variables used. They are Rural Participation x Political Competition; Rural Participation x
Central Local Political Cohesion; and Rural Participation x State Independence.
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Political Context Variables:
1.

Political Cohesion
Variable POLCOH measures the central-local political cohesion of the political parties. This

is a binary variable where the value of “1” represents when the winning coalition of the local
legislative is the same as the national legislative winning coalition. Otherwise, it is coded as “0.”
Data for party structures both in national and local legislatives is obtained from the Ministry of
National Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.

2.

Political Competition
The variable POLCOMP shows the level of political competition in the region which is

measured by the number of effective parties in the legislative. It shows the relative proportion of
political parties by taking into account the vote share (Laakso and Taagerpera, 1979). It is
calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera (LT) Index with the following formula:

∑(

where

)

is the proportion of votes of the i-th party. Data for party structure and electoral votes

is obtained from the Ministry of National Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.

3. State Independence
The variable INDP shows the level of state independence from the central government. It is
measured by the percentage of a state’s own local revenue to the overall local revenue. As
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mentioned above, a local government’s revenue is sourced not only from its own revenue but
also from the central government’s. In Indonesia’s case, local governments receive revenue from
the central government from the general allocation fund (DAU) and the special allocation fund
(DAK). All local related revenue information is obtained from the Ministry of Finance, Republic
of Indonesia.

Control Variables
1. Pre-election Period
During the pre-election period, incumbent politicians are under scrutiny by their citizens
regarding social and trade liberalization issues. With fiscal policies having immediate and
noticeable effects on voter welfare, incumbents have the incentive to adopt socially beneficial
policies that can maintain their legitimacy. Moreover, considering their immobility and large
number, small agriculture producers are important in local Indonesian elections. Therefore,
during the pre-election period, politicians try to gain their votes through targeted spending
focused on the agricultural sector.
Pre-election period in this case means one year period before the election year. For local
spending, I look at one period before the local election is held. For central spending, I look one
period before the national election. Both central and local elections in Indonesia are held every 5
years. However, they are conducted during different times. Schedules of Indonesian elections are
obtained from the Ministry of National Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.
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2. Socio-economic Conditions
Since government support is likely to depend on the socio-economic conditions of the
population, I included poverty level, inequality, share of rural population, and the human
development index in my analysis. Since the government is likely to provide support and social
assistance when development conditions are low, poverty, inequality, and the share of rural
population is expected to have a positive correlation with all three forms of government support.
Meanwhile the human development index is expected to have a negative correlation with all
three forms of government support. Data on poverty, inequality, share of rural participation, and
the human development index is obtained from the State Statistics Annual Report provided by
each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS). The human
development index data from the BPS consist of three elements, life expectancy, educational
level, and income.

3. GDP per Capita
Another control variable involves the local government’s capacity to provide such spending
to each province. The log of local GDP per capita and the number of jurisdictions within the
province will therefore be included. Data on GDP and population are obtained from the State
Statistics Annual Report provided by each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau
Statistics (BPS), while data on the number of jurisdictions is obtained from the Ministry of
National Affairs Republic of Indonesia.
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4. Structure of Agriculture Sector
Similar to the model in Chapter 4, the structure of the agricultural sector in the state will also
be included in the model. This is because the government’s decision to provide support to a
sector will depend on its position relative to the other sectors in the economy. Local governments
also face similar choices as the central government in choosing which sector to support. Since
political context is included to capture the political reasons for government support, economic
reasons should also be included. Like Chapter 4, this analysis included agricultural share of GDP
and whether the agricultural sector is the main sector of the state. It is expected that a larger
agriculture sector ‒ indicated by the sector’s economic share and its relative position in the
economy ‒ will increase government support, particularly agricultural support.

5. Labor Institution
The last control variable is the Potential Labor Power (PLP) suggested by Rudra (2002)
which measures labor power as a predictor of social welfare programs. Because labor plays an
important part in explaining the welfare state, Rudra attempts to calculate the strength of labor
instead of the union density which has been used in previous literature. The PLP index captures
two measures of labor strength, the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor11 and the surplus labor
– measured by the working age population minus the economically active population. 12 The
formula of PLP is therefore as follows:

x

11

Rudra argues that the political power of labor increases when skilled labor dominates the labor structure in the
economy as they are more able to act collectively.
12
Rudra also argues that strength of skilled labor will increase when surplus labor decreases.
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Data on subnational labor structure in Indonesia is obtained from the State Statistics Annual
Report provided by each state’s representative of the Indonesian Center Bureau Statistics (BPS).
Summary of all the variables used in this analysis and its descriptive statistics are given
in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 below:
Table 6.1 List of Variables
Variable

Definition

Measurement

Data Source

LOCAL
AGRICULTURAL
SPENDING

The level of subnational
government spending on
agriculture related sector. This
includes agriculture public
spending, food security
spending, and rural development
spending, which is sourced from
the regional subnational budget
(APBD).

The share of local
agriculture related
spending to local
development GDP. Local
development GDP is the
total GDP excluding
administrative spending.

Ministry of Agriculture
Republic of Indonesia;
Ministry of Finance
Republic of Indonesia

CENTRAL
AGRICULTURAL
SPENDING

Level of central government
support in agriculture sector for
each subnational province.
Includes both deconcentration
and co-administration spending.

It is calculated as the
share of total
deconcentration and coadministration spending
given to the province to
the overall
deconcentration and coadministration spending.

Ministry of Agriculture
Republic of Indonesia.

LOCAL
EDUCATION
SPENDING

The level of education spending
provided at the subnational
level.

The share of local
education spending to
local development GDP.

Ministry of Finance,
Republic of Indonesia;
Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics.

LOCAL HEALTH
SPENDING

The level of health spending
provided at the subnational
level.

The share of local health
spending to local
development GDP.

Ministry of Finance,
Republic of Indonesia;
Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics.

RURAL
PARTICIPATION
IN RPOs

The level of Rural Producer
Organizations
(RPOs)
membership in the state

Percentage of small
agricultural producers
belonging to RPOs of the
total small agricultural
producers in the state

Extension Program and
Human Resource
Development
Department, Ministry of
Agriculture Republic of
Indonesia (BPPSDMP).

PRE-ELECTION
PERIOD

One year before election period.

Binary variable where “1”
holds when there is
election in the following
year, while “0” holds for
the opposite.

Ministry of National
Affairs, Republic of
Indonesia
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Variable

Definition

Measurement

Data Source

POLITICAL
COMPETITION

The level of political
competition in the region.

The number of effective
parties in the legislative.
Calculated using the LaaksoTaagepera (LT) Index.

Ministry of National
Affairs, Republic of
Indonesia.

CENTRALLOCAL
POLITICAL
COHESION

Central-local political
cohesion of the political
parties.

This is a binary variable,
where “1” represents when
the winning coalition of the
local legislative is the same
with the national legislative’s
winning coalition and “0”
means otherwise.

Ministry of National
Affairs, Republic of
Indonesia.

STATE
INDEPENDENCE

The
level
of
state
independence from the central
government.

The percentage of the local
government’s own revenue to
the overall local revenue.

Ministry of Finance,
Republic of Indonesia

POVERTY

The share of population living
under the poverty line. Poverty
line is calculated based on the
national standard of living,
which includes both food and
non-food needs.

Percentage of population
living under the poverty line
to total population of the state

Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics
(BPS).

INEQUALITY

The unequal income
distribution within the
population.

Calculated using the gini
coefficients.

Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics
(BPS).

HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT
INDEX

Development level of
population in terms of
education, health, and income.

Calculated by the Indonesian
Center Bureau Statistics
(BPS) using an equation that
captures
the
three
development components.

Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics
(BPS).

RURAL
POPULATION
SHARE

The relative size of rural
population in the region.

The share of rural population
to total population in the
state.

Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics
(BPS).

AGRICULTURE
SHARE

The relative size of
agricultural sector in the
economy.

The share of agricultural
GDP to total GDP of the
state.

Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics
(BPS).

MAIN SECTOR

Whether agricultural sector is
the main sector in the state.

Binary data, where “1”
means agriculture is the main
sector in the economy, while
“0” holds for the opposite.
Agriculture is the main sector
in the economy when
agriculture GDP is more
than 50% of the total GDP.

Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics
(BPS).

PLP

Potential Labor Power (PLP)
which explains the labor
power.

Rudra (2002) PLP index.

Indonesian Center
Bureau Statistics
(BPS).
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Table 6.2 Summary Statistics of All Variables in the Model
Variables

Obs

Mean

StdDev

Min

Max

186

23.13

14.56

3

65

186

22.69

27.68

14

138

186

22.69

27.68

7

90

186

0.8

0.39

0

1

186

9.8

4.2

2

29

186

12.87

6.8

4.18

36.8

186

0.37

0.037

0.28

0.46

186

59.63

14.9

17

80.7

186

66.45

3.6

54.5

74.17

186

21.5

9.32

3.64

43.57

Agriculture as main sector
(1=agriculture as main sector)

186

0.55

0.5

0

1

Endowment Factor (Share of staple food
production)

186

63.15

29.8

0.814

99.62

186

12.9

7.09

4

29

186

0.17

0.37

0

1

RPO membership
General trade share
Agriculture trade share
Net import
(1=net importer)
Agriculture credit
Poverty
Inequality
Rural Population
Human Development Index
Agriculture share

Number of Jurisdiction
Election period
(1= election held within the year)

6.6 Empirical Analysis
To test the abovementioned hypotheses, I conduct several quantitative analyses using a
fixed-effect method for cross-case data. Table 6.4 reports the estimation results for equation (1),
which explains the provision of local agricultural spending using subnational level data of
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Indonesian provinces. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 report the estimation results for equation (2), which
explains the provision of local social welfare spending. I test two main social welfare programs,
education and health, which are reported in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, respectively. Finally, Table
6.7 reports the estimation results for equation (3), which explains the provision of the central
government’s support for the agricultural sector. In each of the estimations, different models are
conducted to test the validity of the results and test the hypotheses on the local political
variables.
In testing the relationship between rural participation and local agricultural spending,
seven models are used. Model 1 tests the bivariate relationship between the two variables. Model
2 tests the relationship between the two variables in a multivariate setting in which all relevant
control variables are included. Model 3 tests the relationship between the two variables while
including the interaction variable between rural participation and pre-election period. This is to
see whether agricultural spending is associated with clientelism. Model 4 tests the relationship
between the two variables while including the interaction variable between rural participation
and state independence. Model 5 tests the relationship between the two variables while including
the interaction variable between rural participation and central-local political cohesion. Model 6
test the relationship between the two variables while including the interaction variable between
rural participation and local political competition. Model 7 tests the relationship between the two
variables using a random effect method.
Based on the bivariate model, the estimation results show an insignificant relationship
between rural participation and local agricultural spending. However, the relationship is the
opposite under the multivariate models, as rural participation has a positive and statistically
significant relationship with local agricultural spending (p<0.1). This result holds true in almost
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all the models conducted, indicating that the role of rural participation in shaping local
agricultural spending does not stand alone. Rather it holds true when other conditions are in
place.13 Based on the multivariate estimation in Model 2, these conditions are low human
development index (p<0.05), high agriculture share in the economy (p<0.05), under pre-election
period (p<0.01), high state independence (p<0.05), and low political competition (p<0.1). Two
of the three expected political variables are significantly correlated with local agricultural
spending – political competition and state independence. While state independence has the
expected sign, political competition does not. The results indicate that agricultural support is
given under low political competition, which supports the government control hypothesis. That
is, when political competition is low, there is less government control since the opposition is
weak. Therefore targeted spending, such as agricultural support, is higher.
The interaction variable between rural participation and local political contexts,
however, is the focus of this chapter. Based on the estimation results, the interaction between
rural participation and local political competition is the only interaction variable that is
statistically significant with a positive sign. This means that these two variables, when taken
together, reinforce the level of local agricultural spending (shown in Model 6). In other words,
the role of rural participation in obtaining agricultural support increases when local political
competition is high. While high rural participation indicates the ability of rural communities to
demand their desired policy, the interaction between rural participation and political competition
confirms that the provision of agricultural compensation programs is attached to vote-buying
practices. Agricultural productivity programs will be given when local political competition is
13

This is known as a suppressive variable. The variable will only be significant when other conditions hold,
shown by its increasing significance and the overall variance explained in the model by increasing the adjusted R
squared.
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high, which increases the political value of farmers for politicians. Meanwhile, high rural
participation provides a mechanism to control voting behavior.
In contrast to local agricultural spending, rural civic participation, in general, does not
yield a significant relationship for local education spending, local health spending, and the
central government’s agricultural support. These findings indicate that rural participation is most
effective at the local level, as farmers are closer to local authorities instead of central authorities.
Meanwhile, the estimation results for both education and health spending indicate a more
significant effect of labor power, as suggested by previous welfare state theories using the PLP
measured suggested by Rudra (2002).
The role of labor power (PLP) in the bivariate model with education shows a positive and
significant correlation (p<0.01) but an insignificant correlation with health spending. This
relationship, however, changes when the interaction variable with local political variables are
also in place. In both education and health spending, the interaction between labor power with
state independence and pre-election period yields a significant effect but in different directions.
For education spending, the role of labor power is increased under the pre-election period but
decreased as the state becomes more independent. These findings reaffirm the vote-buying claim
that the more independent a state is, the more it is prone to vote-buying practices that target
agricultural support rather than general welfare support. However, during the pre-election period,
both education and agricultural spending increases, indicating that broad policies such as
education may not always be a substitute for more targeted spending. During this period,
incumbents may increase their chances of winning by providing both types of policies.
A different result is shown for local health spending, where both the pre-election period
and state independence yield a positive and significant effect in enhancing the role of labor
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power. State independence shows a consistently positive and significant result across different
models for local health spending. This weakens the argument for local government vote-buying
practices. However, there are several possible explanations for why state independence has a
positive effect on health spending but not education spending. First, the role of the central
government in providing health services in Indonesia is dominant regardless of a state being
more independent in terms of revenue. This indicates that the central government has more
control than local authorities over the health sector. A more independent state brings scrutiny and
may therefore be more obligated to provide such support and less likely to be influenced by its
political incentives. Second, local governments are more committed to spending on health rather
than education, as health was 20 percent of the subnational budget while education was 10
percent of the subnational budget. Despite these mixed findings in local social welfare programs,
the provision of local agricultural spending is dependent on political variables that are conducive
for vote-buying.
One interesting finding is how central-local political cohesion is not a significant factor in
the provision of agricultural support from the local government or the central government. The
estimation results show that despite other political variables having an influence on a local
government’s decision to provide agricultural support, the local government’s decision is not
influenced by its political relationship with the central government. Similarly, the central
government’s decision to provide agricultural support, such as deconcentration programs, is not
influenced by either the political context at the local level or the level of central-local political
cohesion. Instead, the central government’s decision is mostly based on the socio-economic
contexts of subnational units.
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Table 6.3. Estimation Results in Explaining Local Agriculture Spending
Dependent Variable = Local Agriculture Spending
Independent Variables

Rural participation

GDP per capita (log)

1
FE
(Bivariate)

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE (Multivariate)

FE (Interaction1)

FE (Interaction2)

FE (Interaction3)

FE (Interaction4)

RE

0.02

0.025

0.03

0.0404

0.0483

0.1185

0.03969

(0.014)

(0.014)*

(0.015)**

(0.0303)

(0.0264)*

(0.031341)

(0.014754)**

0.1358

0.124

0.1144

0.11365

0.1222

0.0012

(0.1635)

(0.16)

(0.15884)

(0.15894)

(0.15721)

(0.1317)

- 0.0825

-0.087

-0.11406

-0.1161516

-0.106378

-0.012501

Socio-economic aspect:
Poverty

(0.074)

(0.0749)

(0.0763)

(0.0761)

(0.0754)

( 0.04087)

Inequality

-3.82

-3.941

-3.617

-3.462189

-4.14299

-2.23505

(4.22)

(4.228)

(4.207)

(4.30775)

(4.1743)

(3.53286)

Rural Population

-0.074

-0.07317

-0.03529

-0.0257

-0.06673

-0.0312839

(0.08)

(0.0827)

(0.0869)

(0.08304)

(0.085203)

(0.0797)

-0.33

-0.3392

-0.3577

-0.3585

-0.3813257

-0.169275

(0.16)**

(0.16127)**

(0.162524)**

(0.1635)**

( 0.16139)**

(0.09276)*

0.294

0.2858

0.27833

0.2745

0.259763

0.22815

(0.12)***

(0.1235)**

(0.1237)**

(0.1254)**

(0.12285)**

(0.043)***

-0.71

-0.6909

-0.79097

-0.8069

-0.61252

-0.41202

(0.75)

(0.717)

(0.71499)

(0.71618)

(0.713716)

(0.4865)

Human Development Index

Agriculture Relative Position:
Agriculture Share

Agriculture as Main Sector

Political Variables:
Election Period

0.62

0.819

0.5975

0.59147

0.61052

0.539345

(0.23)***

(0.3698)**

(0.2143)***

(0.2138)***

(0.21181)***

(0.2031)***

(Continued)
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Dependent Variable = Local Agriculture Spending
Independent Variables

1
FE

Subnational independence

Political Cohesion

Political Competition

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE

FE

FE

Interaction (FE)

RE

Interaction (RE)

0.043

0.04138

0.0405

0.04398

0.04359

0.01019

(0.02)**

(0.0214)*

(0.0228)*

(0.02142)**

(0.021126)**

(0.013434)

-0.008

-0.0031

-0.0904

-0.05781

-0.0277914

-0.0347086

(0.23)

(0.2342)

(0.24716)

(0.432)

(0.24416)

(0.21092)

-0.16

-0.1602

-0.16483

-0.1673

-0.278701

-0.139142

(0.0957)*

(0.098)

(0.0978)*

(0.0988)*

(0.11601)**

(0.080925)*

Interaction Variables:
RPO x Election Period

-0.0082
(0.0125)

RPO x Independence

0.002
(0.0037)

RPO x Political Cohesion

-0.00217
(0.0149)

RPO x Political Competition

0.00403
(0.0023)*

Constant

Observations
R- squared

5.16

24.75

25.2148

24.262

23.633

29.003

14.9

(0.33)***

(15.4)

(15.45)

(15.379)

(15.2927)

(15.415)*

(7.02)**

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

0.77

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.77

*Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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Table 6.4. Estimation Results in Explaining Local Education Spending
Dependent Variable = Local Education Spending
Independent Variables

Rural participation

1
FE
(Bivariate)

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE (Bivariate)

FE (Multivariate)

FE (Interaction1)

FE (Interaction2)

FE (Interaction3)

FE (Interaction4)

-0.00877

0.03739

0.03739

0.039878

0.0344

0.03749

(0.030807)

(0.028989)

(0.02934)

(0.028223)

(0.02934)

(0.029139)

23.29

6.0241

6.02437

30.723

-4.21396

-4.7189

(5.727)***

(6.38951)

(6.8524)

(13.8365)**

(6.89412)

(22.208)

-0.3944

-0..39447

-0.515489

-0.383927

-0.39535

(0.33475)

(0.33668)

(0.32829)

(0.33568)

(0.33625)

Labor Institution:
PLP

GDP per capita (log)

Socio-economic aspect
Poverty

Inequality

Rural Population

Human Development Index

0.03249

0.03249

0.1887971

0.05364

0.03407

(0.15385)

(0.15448)

(0.15868)

(0.157)

(0.1565)

-9.0785

-9.078513

-8.84584

-8.79206

-9.12885

(8,83263)

(8.89839)

(8.595655)

(8.857739)

(8.90197)

0.0099

0.0099

-0.017721

0.002714

0.010312

(0.170488)

(0.17111)

(0.166167)

(0.171096)

(0.17123)

-0.6048989

-0.60489

-0.35568

-0.59236

-0.60115

(0.332397)*

(0.333876)*

(0.33415)

( 0.33568)*

( 0.339103)*

Agriculture Relative Position
Agriculture Share

Agriculture as Main Sector

0.02652

0.02652

0.05589

0.0181387

0.02857

(0.254529)

(0.2554566)

(0.247886)

(0.25526)

(0.25762)

-0.246744

-0.246744

-0.42717

-0.21591

-0.25774

(1.473098)

(1.478402)

(1.434799)

(1.47638)

(1.48918)

(Continued)
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Dependent Variable = Local Education Spending
Independent Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE

FE

FE

FE

Interaction (FE)

RE

Interaction (RE)

-0.09191

-0.09198

-0.26306

-0.106461

-0.09454

Political Variables:
Election Period

(0.44628)

(0.83004)

(0.43905)

(0.448557)

(0.45091)

Subnational independence

0.050146

0.050146

0.11945

0.051976

0.0498441

(0.04487)

(0.04503)

(0.049499)

(0.045027)

(0.0453024)

Political Cohesion

-0.040412

-0.404086

0.1051449

0.43954

-0.04405

(0.4812215)

(0.485079)

(0.47084)

(0.832671)

(0.486569)

-0.08928

-0.08928

-0.115006

-0.0930612

-0.073492

(0.2016881)

(0.20242)

(0.196459)

(0.2021199)

(0.32738)

Political Competition

Interaction Variables:
PLP x Election Period

0.00052
(5.61446)*

PLP x Independence

-0.8684208
(0.2921089)***

PLP x Political Cohesion

-3.85659
(5.4559)

PLP x Political Competition

-0.17697
(2.88291)

Constant

Observations
R- squared

5.5596

7.9812

50.27

50.27

32.035

49.35232

49.827

(0.7321)***

(0.6649) ***

(31.768)

(31.896)**

(31.5171)

(31.8516)

(32.6873)

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

0.51

0.51

0.63

0.63

0.65

0.63

0.63

* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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Table 6.5. Estimation Results in Explaining Local Health Spending
Dependent Variable = Local Health Spending
Independent Variables

Rural participation

1
FE
(Bivariate)

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE (Bivariate)

FE (Multivariate)

FE (Interaction1)

FE (Interaction2)

FE (Interaction3)

FE (Interaction4)

-0.0111

0.0193145

0.0140411

0.0179399

0.016773

0.0205

(0.022872)

(0.0231172)

(0.023157)

(0.0228744)

(0.0233977)

(0.0237)

6.04277

10.58881

7.296296

-9.73156

12.1262

25.9505

(4.4532)

(5.095212)**

(5.406646)

(11.21432)

(5.496282)**

(17.65734)

-0.251719

-0.2216154

-0.1858039

-0.2427566

-0.262045

(0.266944)

(0.265645)

(0.26607)

(0.2676224)

(0.26735)

Labor Institution:
PLP

GDP per capita (log)

Socio-economic aspect
Poverty

Inequality

Rural Population

Human Development Index

0.0177623

0.0111299

-0.68667

0.03572

0.036327

(0.122687)

(0.1218876)

(0.128609)

(0.1251696)

(0.124452)

2.37415

3.433961

2.245455

2.617499

1.78254

(7.04344)

(7.0209)

(6.966678)

(7.061754)

(7.07784)

-0.058388

-0.0549144

-0.0431124

-0.0644936

-0.053486

(0.135951)

(0.135015)

(0.1346765)

(0.136404)

(0.136145)

-0.3709717

-0.3521775

-0.50877

-0.360326

-0.326958

(0.265064)

(0.2634315)

(0.270825)*

( 0.265852)

( 0.26962)

Agriculture Relative Position
Agriculture Share

Agriculture as Main Sector

-0.57564

-0.5720441

-0.59189

-0.582767

-0.551435

(0.20297)***

(0.2015579)***

(0.2009)***

(0.203504)***

(0.20484)***

1.514212

1.523019

1.613983

1.5404

1.38476

(1.17468)

(1.166474)

(1.162888)

(1.177032)

(1.18403)

(Continued)
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Dependent Variable = Local Health Spending
Independent Variables

1
FE
(Bivariate)

2

3

4

5

6

7

FE (Bivariate)

FE (Multivariate)

FE (Interaction1)

FE (Interaction2)

FE (Interaction3)

FE (Interaction4)

Political Variables
Election Period

Subnational independence

Political Cohesion

Political Competition

-0.298752

-1.250297

-0.2041122

-0.3111

-0.32967

(0.356679)

(0.6549105)*

(0.3558495)

(0.3576)

(0.35852)

0.1070626

0.1063993

0.068739

0.10862

0.103499

(0.035783)***

(0.0355342)***

(0.040119)*

(0.03589)***

(0.03602)***

-0.6277173

-0.5658301

-0.7082065

-0.2201

-0.67056

(0.3837422)

(0.382732)

(0.381612)*

(0.663839)

(0.386865)

0.1408471

0.1433106

0.15506

0.137644

0.326753

(0.1608329)

(0.1597118)

(0.1592278)

(0.161138)

(0.260296)

Interaction Variables:
PLP x Election Period

7.651841
(4.429868)*

PLP x Independence

0.480211
(0.2367509)**

PLP x Political Cohesion

-3.27572
(4.34967)

PLP x Political Competition

-2.08287
(2.29216)

Constant

Observations
R- squared

8.47706

7.539291

44.4458

43.14824

54.5289

43.6668

39.2357

(0.543913)***

(0.6649) ***

(25.33308)*

(25.16671)*

(25.54431)

(25.39344)

(25.98921)

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

0.74

0.74

0.77

0.78

0.78

0.78

0.78

* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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Table 6.6. Estimation Results in Explaining Central Deconcentration Spending
Dependent Variable = Central Deconcentration Spending
Independent Variables

Rural participation

GDP per capita (log)

1

2

3

4

5

6

FE (Bivariate)

FE (Multivariate)

FE (Interaction1)

FE (Interaction2)

FE (Interaction3)

FE (Interaction4)

0.0409831

0.0443421

0.04956

-0.00462

0.0583445

0.152393

(0.1235001)

(0.11249)

(0.11785)

(0.2604)

(0.124356)

(0.363805)

-0.606583

-0.610523

-0.61198

-0.589479

-0.601191

(1.270175)

(1.274851)

(0.005534)

(1.275971)

(1.274376)

0.6123405

0.617298

0.602938

0.634558

0.6443

(0.598218)

(0.60116)

(0.60194)

(0.60588)

(0.608798)

7.52629

7.29372

8.17369

9.358277

7.670055

(33.76577)

(33.9168)

(34.0226)

(34.5594)

(33.87746)

-3.01017

-3.0093

-3.009217

-3.02806

-3.02698

(0.6616858)***

(0.66401)***

(0.663957)***

(0.66721)***

(0.6659908)***

2.749646

2.745115

2.7536

2.715721

2.801734

(1.28861)**

(1.2934)

(1.293139)

(1.299042)

(1.303455)

0.7224616

0.705765

0.7305

0.6859004

0.785046

(0.981246)

(0.990603)

(0.985346)

(0.993888)

(1.00458)

-5.341416

-5.3063

-5.361321

-5.11227

-5.556635

(5.726802)

(5.75124)

(5.747117)

(5.808937)

(5.78637)

-2.411664

-2.038223

-2.395984

-2.396916

-2.40801

(1.70563)

(2.966613)

(1.71309)

(1.712156)

(1.71116)

Socio-economic aspect
Poverty

Inequality

Rural Population

Human Development Index

Agriculture Relative Position
Agriculture Share

Agriculture as Main Sector

Political Variables
Election Period

(Continued)
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Dependent Variable = Central Deconcentration Spending
Independent Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

FE (Bivariate)

FE (Multivariate)

FE (Interaction1)

FE (Interaction2)

FE (Interaction3)

FE (Interaction4)

Subnational independence

Political Cohesion

Political Competition

-0.09883

-0.101195

-0.12345

-0.095713

-0.098646

(0.170676)

(0.17195)

(0.20807)

(0.1726346)

(0.171156)

-2.686857

-2.676967

-2.635207

-1.862007

-2.753301

(1.87083)

(1.87844)

(1.893462)

(3.603476)

(1.88861)

-1.01409

-1.00738

-1.0002

-1.042889

-0.635702

(0.78321)

(0.787112)

(0.788677)

(0.793145)

(1.4435)

Interaction Variables:
RPO x Election Period

-0.01544
(0.10023)

RPO x Independence

0.0011547
(0.0055344)

RPO x Political Cohesion

-0.03263
(0.1216967)

RPO x Political Competition

-0.141956
(0.045439)

Constant

Observations
R- squared

3.4687

-15.34399

-14.4685

-15.055

-12.456

-22.51524

(2.934974)

(123.35)

(123.91)

(123.778)

(124.226)

(125.8582)

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

N=186

0.22

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.49

* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
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6.7 Conclusion
This chapter shows how rural participation influences the level of government
productivity programs. Since the main livelihood of rural communities is in the agricultural
sector, the analyses focus on government support programs that specifically target agricultural
development in general, which include agriculture infrastructure development, irrigation
systems, extension programs, access to production inputs, financial access, and research and
development.
Based on the estimation results, the role of rural participation alone on local agriculture
support is not statistically significant. However, the relationship becomes significant when other
conditions are also in place. Based on the different models in this chapter, rural participation
consistently shows a significant and positive effect on local agriculture spending when other
relevant variables are added. Thus, I find that the effectiveness of rural participation in gaining
local agricultural support is not inevitable. It depends on other variables. Because many
compensation policies lie in the hands of local governments who are also political actors, the
effectiveness of rural participation in obtaining local agricultural support depends on the
electoral interests of local governments. Because local incumbents are interested in re-election,
the provision of targeted and particularistic spending such as agricultural support is prone to
vote-buying. Agricultural support provides an opportunity for local incumbents to gain higher
political support from rural agrarian communities.
I further found that vote-buying at the local level is conditioned by certain political
contexts. The strongest finding is that it is likely to occur when political competition is high, thus
the political value of farmers is high. This suggests that although international trade empowers
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rural participation, further development of rural political agency depends on the political
incentives of local governments.
Another political factor that determines agricultural support at the local level is the level
of state dependence. The estimation results in this chapter indicate that higher agricultural
support is given to states where they are more financially dependent. In other words, the more
decentralized a state is, the more they have control over their financial resources. This can
provide the financial capacity and power to use state resources as rents to gain more electoral
votes.
Meanwhile, the estimation results show an insignificant association between the level of
central-local political cohesion and agricultural support. This has important implications for our
overall understanding of trade and productivity policies in decentralized democracies. As
productivity trade policy function as a way for governments to continue national liberalization
policies, the lack of the central government’s control over the policies weakens its ability to
synchronize national trade policies with related policies. This finding suggests that further
studies on productivity trade policies need to consider central-local coordination and its
implication for the development of national trade policies.
The analyses also found that rural participation is only effective in local agricultural
support but not in the central government’s agricultural support or local welfare programs. This
indeed indicates that rural participation is most effective at the local level since rural
communities are closer to local authorities than central authorities.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary of the Dissertation
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate civic activism among rural communities in
Indonesia and how this activism shapes their political agency. It is defined here as the rural
communities’ capacity to participate in matters that concern their well-being and ability to access
decision-making processes. A key feature of rural political agency is, therefore, rural
participation, however, one that can translate into their policy of interest. Understanding civic
participation in rural agrarian communities should be an integral part of understanding
democracy in developing countries such as Indonesia, as nearly three-quarters of its population
lives in rural areas and engaging in agricultural activities.
Since the dissertation focuses on Indonesia, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide a historical
background of rural participation in Indonesia during two different political systems, which are
the “New Order” authoritarian regime (Chapter 2) and democratic regime (Chapter 3). The
discussions highlighted that under the “New Order” regime, the government implemented many
agricultural and developmental programs, including supporting rural civic participation, that was
good on the surface. In practice, however, they were constrained by clientelist and predatory
practices that made rural farmers passive and not mobilized. Farmers’ organizations were more
of an instrument of control and rent-seeking than a means for rural representation. Under the
democratic regime, the discussions highlighted how the reformation provides a segway for rural
communities to participate in political activities. However, there are challenges to the progress of
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RPOs that comes from within the organization and the external context. They include collective
action problems, unconsolidated democracy, and the weak decentralized system. Thus,
democratization and decentralization can be considered as a perquisite in the development of
rural civic participation in Indonesia, although not sufficient.
The next three chapters provide empirical findings to answer the research questions. It
starts by looking at the role of RPO membership on individual political participation in Chapter 4
by using quantitative analysis based on an original survey of 220 farmers drawn from 30 villages
across three districts of Indonesia – Keeron, Papua; Muara Banyu Asin, South Sumatera; and
Semarang, Central Java. The empirical results suggest that farmers who are members of an RPO
are more likely to participate in two political forms - voting in elections and participating in
policy discussions with the government- compared to farmers who are not members of an RPO.
The relationship, in general, also holds true across all members of an RPO regardless of the
position they hold in the organization, age, education, and land ownership. In addition, the
empirical results also show that membership in RPO is most significant for farmer’s political
participation in compare to other forms of civic associations such as religious, youth, and women
organizations. Understanding rural agricultural producers participation in RPOs therefore can
provide us an understanding of the overall rural civic participation.
Chapter 5 discusses the contextual factors explaining rural participation in RPOs across
subnational Indonesia. Through the interviews, there were three main external factors identified,
namely (1) exposure to trade liberalization, (2) existence of government support programs, and
(3) the existence of external supporting actors. Further, through the survey, it is identified that
exposure to trade liberalization is the most common reason why farmers join an RPO. Several
farmers indicated in the interview that they join RPOs to stay competitive in the current
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globalized market, as they have concerns over the fluctuating prices and the low selling price of
agricultural products in Indonesia due to the market openness. A quantitative approach – a fixedeffect panel data regression on panel data of Indonesian states from 2010 to 2015 – was then
used to test the correlation between these contextual factors and participation in RPOs. The
empirical results indicate that regions with higher exposure to trade indeed have a higher rate of
rural participation in RPOs, even after controlling for other relevant factors, such as the
availability of government support programs. This finding shows that trade exposure encourages
rural political agency since it motivates rural farmers to join RPOs.
Chapter 6 links back to the notion of rural political agency where the chapter discusses
how rural participation results in rural farmers obtaining their desired policy outcomes. This
chapter looks at how rural participation in RPOs correlates with government agricultural
productivity programs, as well as general social welfare programs. The agricultural productivity
programs include an array of government supports such as agriculture infrastructure
development, irrigation systems, extension programs, and access to production inputs. By using
quantitative analysis on subnational data of Indonesia from 2010 to 2015, the empirical results
indicated that rural participation in RPOs is associated with a higher level of local agricultural
support. However, this does not hold true for agricultural supports that are provided by the
central government, as well as general welfare spending. This finding demonstrates that the
development of rural political agency through their civic participation is most effective at the
local level rather than at the national level.
In this chapter, I further argue that the effectiveness of rural participation in obtaining
local agriculture supports is not automatic. Instead, it is constrained by the local political
environment that shapes local governments’ behavior. Because local incumbents are now
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political actors who have their electoral interest for re-election, targeted spending such as
agriculture support provides an opportunity for vote-buying practices from rural agrarian
communities. Such vote-buying practice, I argue, is conditioned by three political contexts,
namely (1) the level of political competition, (2) the level of state independence, and (3) the level
of central-local political cohesion. The empirical findings show that rural civic participation
translates into government support when political competition is high, as the value of rural
communities’ votes becomes high.

7.2 Main Conclusions
The findings in this dissertation show that contrary to the common view of rural communities
being weak and unable to organize, there are growing rural civic participation in a society-based
organization such as RPOs. This dissertation found that exposure to trade openness provides the
primary motivation for rural farmers to join an RPO, as they desire to stay competitive in the
market. The need to include contextual features of a region is promoted in this dissertation as
data shows the variation of rural civic participation exists across places.
This dissertation further shows that high civic participation in RPOs promotes rural
political agency, as it correlates with higher government support. This is because RPOs, on top
of their economic function, also enhance the political participation of its members, mainly by
participating in policymaking discussions. The findings further shows that government supports
are mainly provided in the form of agricultural productivity programs given by the local
government. Meanwhile, civic participation in RPOs does not correlate with government support
provided by the central government and in the form of general welfare programs. This indicates
that rural civic participation is most effective at the local level as they are closer to local
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authorities rather than central authorities. Such correlation, however, holds true under certain
political conditions as it is influenced by local incumbent’s vote maximizing behavior. This
suggests that further development of rural political agency will still depends on the political
incentive of local government.

7.3 Future Research
This study talks to different fields of research and suggests that there are ample of
opportunities for future research. In response to the literature on RPOs, I pointed out the possible
ways in which RPOs can function in the political realm. Past studies on the role of RPOs have
mostly focused on how RPOs increase economic production and sales, but less have been made
on their participation in political activities. I propose that more studies need to be made using
broader cases to obtain the transferability of the theory. Further research questions related to this
can also be explored, such as Why do certain RPOs are more involved in politics?; What are the
characteristics of RPOs that participate in political activities?; and In what forms do they
participate?
Moreover, this dissertation finds that political context at the local level matters for the
progression of rural political agency, as it links to the vote-maximizing motives of local
incumbents. Part of the explanation for Indonesian is its electoral system. Because the electoral
system is an open-list PR system that promotes a personal vote, we can expect that the provision
of a particularistic benefit such as agriculture support is common. Further research questions to
explore may include: Do agricultural productivity support always attached to vote-buying
practices such as in the case of Indonesia?; If not, how would the argument be different?; Does
local political context still matter then?.
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On democracy in general, further studies can also be done in looking at how RPOs
support the progression towards a consolidated democracy. How do RPOs interact with other
Civil Society Organizations? How does modernization affect RPOs development? Does further
exposure to trade mean a better quality of democracy?

7.4 Policy Implication
This dissertation pointed out the important role of local government in progressing rural
political agency as many supporting policies related to agricultural and rural development are
under the local government’s authority. Considering that the provision of such spending is
attached to the political motives of local incumbents, rural farmers have less control over their
political agency. As the findings suggested, it is when such spending provides electoral benefit to
incumbents do agricultural support is given. Such practice is not necessarily bad for rural
producers because they gain agriculture support under such conditions. However, they do have
less control over it. When such policies are constrained, it is difficult for them to exercise their
political rights and well-being. Thus, decentralization poses another challenge for rural
development and requires strengthening central-local coordination as well as local citizens-local
government cooperation.
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Appendix A. Survey Questions

QUESTIONNAIRE

Prepared by Ranitya Kusumadewi, PhD candidate at Political Science Department, Maxwell
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, United
States.
Contact:
+628121105293 (Indonesia),
+13154209454
(United
States),
rkusumad@syr.edu (email).

CONFIDENTIAL
LOCATION
1.

Province

2.

Regency/City

3.

District

4.

Village

BACKGROUND
5.

Education

6.

Age

7.

Main Occupation

8.

Family Members

9.

Marital Status

1. Does not attend
School
2. Primary School
3. Middle School
4. High School
5. Higher Education

Additional Information:

1. Agriculture
2. Non-agriculture

Additional Information:

1. Married
2. Not Married
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10.

Position in the household

1. Head of household
2. Member of household

FARMING ACTIVITIES
11.

Type of commodities

(List of commodities)

12.

Land Ownership

1. Land Owner
2. Farm labor

Additional Information:

13.

Currently or have been involved
in agriculture training

1. Yes
2. No

Additional Information:

14.

Do you have other occupation?

1. Yes
2. No

Additional Information:

15.

Receive government support

1. Yes
2. No

Additional Information (please list
the type of government support
received):

16.

Access to the nearest market

………..Km

17.

Access to the nearest city

…….…. Km

18.

Access to financial institution

a. Accessible
b. Difficult
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Additional Information (please
explain):

19.

Business contracts

a. Contract with domestic
companies or
organization
b. Contract with foreign
companies or
organization
c. Does not have any
business contract

Additional Information (please
explain):

PARTICIPATION
20.

Membership of Rural Producers
Organization (RPO)

a. Yes
b. No

Additional Information (if yes,
please list the name of the
organization):

21.

Reason to join an RPO

a. Challenges from

Additional Information:

exposure to trade
liberalization,
b. Obtain government
support programs,
c. Support from external
actors
d. Others
22.

Position in the RPO

1. Head
2. Held structural Position
3. Member

Additional Information:

23.

Role of RPO

1. Cooperation in
production activities.
2. Cooperation in sales
3. Representative for
negotiation with buyers
4. Representative with
government
5. Others
(May choose more than
one)

Additional Information:

24.

Involve in policy discussion with
the government?

a. Yes
b. No

Additional Information (please list
the type of policy discussion
involved):
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25.

Affiliated to political parties

a. Yes
b. No

26.

Participate in election

a. Yes
b. No

27.

Member of other civic
organization (e,g religious
organization, youth organization,
etc.)

a. Yes
b. No

Additional Information (please list
the type of organization):

a. Yes
b. No

Additional Information (please
elaborate):

INTERNATIONAL TRADE
28.

Do you feel challenged by
international trade?

29.

Challenges in production

Please explain the challenges in production activities (if any):

30.

Challenges in Marketing

Please explain the challenges in marketing activities (if any):

31.

Are you satisfied with the
government's role in facing the
challenges of international trade?

32.

If not satisfied with the role of
government above, please
explain your expectation.

a. Yes
b. No

Please explain.

*END*
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Appendix B. Open Ended Interview Questions
General
-

Are they expose to risk of trade?
If yes, in what way? If no, what other challenges they are facing, or if they benefit, how?
What policy do they hope for?
How do they voice their demand?
How has business or occupational organization helped small scale producers?
Do they involve in different types of organizations as well? If yes, is professional
organizations more effective as a venue to demand their interest?

Activities
-

-

How often are their meetings in a month;
How much range of activities does the organization cover (this might include accessing and
managing the products; providing inputs like seeds and equipment; enabling access to
markets; improving information and communication; identify risk and opportunities and to
make improvements; provide access to credits; disaster relief);
How much they trust the leader of the organization and each other.
What explains a working organization?
How do external organizations such as local and international NGOs help their organization?

Inclusiveness
-

How much percentage is the small producers represented in the organization;
How often they are involved in meetings;
How often they are asked for feedback.

Policy-making
-

How does the small producer involve in dialogue with the government and ability to express
their concerns and preferences?
How do they negotiate with the government?
What explains successful outcomes?

*END*
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